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From: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
To: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: wsd_upstream <wsd_upstream@mediatek.com>,
	linux-mediatek@lists.infradead.org,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kasan: fix the missing underflow in memmove and memcpy with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 20:32:55 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1570451575.4686.83.camel@mtksdccf07> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACT4Y+b4VX5cW3WhP6o3zyKxHjNZRo1Lokxr0+MwDcB5hV5K+A@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, 2019-10-07 at 14:19 +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 2:03 PM Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 10:18 AM Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > The patchsets help to produce KASAN report when size is negative numbers
> > > > > > > > > > > in memory operation function. It is helpful for programmer to solve the
> > > > > > > > > > > undefined behavior issue. Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and
> > > > > > > > > > > suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
> > > > > > > > > > > [2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Walter Wu (2):
> > > > > > > > > > > kasan: detect invalid size in memory operation function
> > > > > > > > > > > kasan: add test for invalid size in memmove
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >  lib/test_kasan.c          | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> > > > > > > > > > >  mm/kasan/common.c         | 13 ++++++++-----
> > > > > > > > > > >  mm/kasan/generic.c        |  5 +++++
> > > > > > > > > > >  mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> > > > > > > > > > >  mm/kasan/tags.c           |  5 +++++
> > > > > > > > > > >  mm/kasan/tags_report.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
> > > > > > > > > > >  6 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > commit 5b3b68660b3d420fd2bd792f2d9fd3ccb8877ef7
> > > > > > > > > > > Author: Walter-zh Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
> > > > > > > > > > > Date:   Fri Oct 4 18:38:31 2019 +0800
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >     kasan: detect invalid size in memory operation function
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >     It is an undefined behavior to pass a negative numbers to
> > > > > > > > > > > memset()/memcpy()/memmove()
> > > > > > > > > > >     , so need to be detected by KASAN.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >     If size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons to be defined
> > > > > > > > > > > as out-of-bounds bug type.
> > > > > > > > > > >     1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as a
> > > > > > > > > > > large
> > > > > > > > > > >     size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, so that this
> > > > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > > >     qualify as out-of-bounds.
> > > > > > > > > > >     2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate reports
> > > > > > > > > > > by
> > > > > > > > > > >     some systems, e.g. syzbot.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >     KASAN report:
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >      BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
> > > > > > > > > > >      Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task
> > > > > > > > > > > cat/72
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >      CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted
> > > > > > > > > > > 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1
> > > > > > > > > > >      Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
> > > > > > > > > > >      Call trace:
> > > > > > > > > > >       dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288
> > > > > > > > > > >       show_stack+0x14/0x20
> > > > > > > > > > >       dump_stack+0x10c/0x164
> > > > > > > > > > >       print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378
> > > > > > > > > > >       __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0
> > > > > > > > > > >       kasan_report+0xc/0x18
> > > > > > > > > > >       check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0
> > > > > > > > > > >       memmove+0x34/0x88
> > > > > > > > > > >       kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >     [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >     Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
> > > > > > > > > > >     Reported -by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> > > > > > > > > > >     Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > > > > > > > > > > index 6814d6d6a023..6ef0abd27f06 100644
> > > > > > > > > > > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> > > > > > > > > > > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > > > > > > > > > > @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write);
> > > > > > > > > > >  #undef memset
> > > > > > > > > > >  void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
> > > > > > > > > > >  {
> > > > > > > > > > > -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> > > > > > > > > > > +       if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_))
> > > > > > > > > > > +               return NULL;
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >         return __memset(addr, c, len);
> > > > > > > > > > >  }
> > > > > > > > > > > @@ -110,8 +111,9 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
> > > > > > > > > > >  #undef memmove
> > > > > > > > > > >  void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
> > > > > > > > > > >  {
> > > > > > > > > > > -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
> > > > > > > > > > > -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> > > > > > > > > > > +       if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
> > > > > > > > > > > +       !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_))
> > > > > > > > > > > +               return NULL;
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >         return __memmove(dest, src, len);
> > > > > > > > > > >  }
> > > > > > > > > > > @@ -119,8 +121,9 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t
> > > > > > > > > > > len)
> > > > > > > > > > >  #undef memcpy
> > > > > > > > > > >  void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
> > > > > > > > > > >  {
> > > > > > > > > > > -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
> > > > > > > > > > > -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> > > > > > > > > > > +       if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
> > > > > > > > > > > +       !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_))
> > > > > > > > > > > +               return NULL;
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >         return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
> > > > > > > > > > >  }
> > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> > > > > > > > > > > index 616f9dd82d12..02148a317d27 100644
> > > > > > > > > > > --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
> > > > > > > > > > > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> > > > > > > > > > > @@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ static __always_inline bool
> > > > > > > > > > > check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr,
> > > > > > > > > > >         if (unlikely(size == 0))
> > > > > > > > > > >                 return true;
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > +       if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) {
> > > > > > > > > > > +               kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> > > > > > > > > > > +               return false;
> > > > > > > > > > > +       }
> > > > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > > >         if (unlikely((void *)addr <
> > > > > > > > > > >                 kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) {
> > > > > > > > > > >                 kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> > > > > > > > > > > index 36c645939bc9..ed0eb94cb811 100644
> > > > > > > > > > > --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> > > > > > > > > > > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> > > > > > > > > > > @@ -107,6 +107,18 @@ static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct
> > > > > > > > > > > kasan_access_info *info)
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >  const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> > > > > > > > > > >  {
> > > > > > > > > > > +       /*
> > > > > > > > > > > +        * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons
> > > > > > > > > > > +        * to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
> > > > > > > > > > > +        * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
> > > > > > > > > > > +        * a 'large' size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
> > > > > > > > > > > +        * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
> > > > > > > > > > > +        * 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate
> > > > > > > > > > > reports
> > > > > > > > > > > +        * by some systems, e.g. syzbot.
> > > > > > > > > > > +        */
> > > > > > > > > > > +       if ((long)info->access_size < 0)
> > > > > > > > > > > +               return "out-of-bounds";
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > "out-of-bounds" is the _least_ frequent KASAN bug type. It won't
> > > > > > > > > > prevent duplicates. "heap-out-of-bounds" is the frequent one.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >     /*
> > > > > > > > >      * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons
> > > > > > > > >      * to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
> > > > > > > > >      * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
> > > > > > > > >      * a  "large" size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
> > > > > > > > >      *    so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
> > > > > > > > >      * 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate
> > > > > > > > > reports
> > > > > > > > >      *    by some systems, e.g. syzbot. "out-of-bounds" is the _least_
> > > > > > > > > frequent KASAN bug type.
> > > > > > > > >      *    It won't prevent duplicates. "heap-out-of-bounds" is the
> > > > > > > > > frequent one.
> > > > > > > > >      */
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > We directly add it into the comment.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > OK, let's start from the beginning: why do you return "out-of-bounds" here?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Uh, comment 1 and 2 should explain it. :)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The comment says it will cause duplicate reports. It does not explain
> > > > > > why you want syzbot to produce duplicate reports and spam kernel
> > > > > > developers... So why do you want that?
> > > > > >
> > > > > We don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate by some
> > > > > systems, e.g. syzbot. Is it right? If yes, then it should not have
> > > > > duplicate report.
> > > > >
> > > > Sorry, because we don't generate new bug type. it should be duplicate
> > > > report(only one report which may be oob or size invlid),
> > > > the duplicate report goal is that invalid size is oob issue, too.
> > > >
> > > > I would not introduce a new bug type.
> > > > These are parsed and used by some systems, e.g. syzbot. If size is
> > > > user-controllable, then a new bug type for this will mean 2 bug
> > > > reports.
> > >
> > > To prevent duplicates, the new crash title must not just match _any_
> > > crash title that kernel can potentially produce. It must match exactly
> > > the crash that kernel produces for this bug on other input data.
> > >
> > > Consider, userspace passes size=123, KASAN produces "heap-out-of-bounds in foo".
> > > Now userspace passes size=-1 and KASAN produces "invalid-size in foo".
> > > This will be a duplicate bug report.
> > > Now if KASAN will produce "out-of-bounds in foo", it will also lead to
> > > a duplicate report.
> > > Only iff KASAN will produce "heap-out-of-bounds in foo" for size=-1,
> > > it will not lead to a duplicate report.
> >
> > I think it is not easy to avoid the duplicate report(mentioned above).
> > As far as my knowledge is concerned, KASAN is memory corruption detector
> > in kernel space, it should only detect memory corruption and don't
> > distinguish whether it is passed by userspace. if we want to do, then we
> > may need to parse backtrace to check if it has copy_form_user() or other
> > function?
> 
> My idea was just to always print "heap-out-of-bounds" and don't
> differentiate if the size come from userspace or not.

Got it.
Would you have any other concern about this patch?



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  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-07 12:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-27  3:43 Walter Wu
2019-09-27 13:07 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-09-27 14:22   ` Walter Wu
2019-09-27 19:41     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-09-30  4:36       ` Walter Wu
2019-09-30  8:57         ` Marc Gonzalez
2019-10-01  2:36           ` Walter Wu
2019-10-01  3:01             ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-01  3:18               ` Walter Wu
2019-10-02 12:15         ` Walter Wu
2019-10-02 13:57           ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-03  2:17             ` Walter Wu
2019-10-03  6:26               ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-03  9:38                 ` Walter Wu
2019-10-03 13:51                   ` Walter Wu
2019-10-03 14:53                     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-04  4:42                       ` Walter Wu
2019-10-04  8:02                         ` Walter Wu
2019-10-04  9:18                           ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-04  9:44                             ` Walter Wu
2019-10-04  9:54                               ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-04 12:05                                 ` Walter Wu
2019-10-04 13:52                                   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-07  3:22                                     ` Walter Wu
2019-10-07  7:29                                       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-07  8:18                                         ` Walter Wu
2019-10-07  8:24                                           ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-07  8:51                                             ` Walter Wu
2019-10-07  8:54                                               ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-07  9:03                                                 ` Walter Wu
2019-10-07  9:10                                                   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-07  9:28                                                     ` Walter Wu
2019-10-07  9:50                                                       ` Walter Wu
2019-10-07 10:51                                                         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-07 12:03                                                           ` Walter Wu
2019-10-07 12:19                                                             ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-07 12:32                                                               ` Walter Wu [this message]
2019-10-07 13:33                                                                 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-08  6:15                                                                   ` Walter Wu
2019-10-08  9:47                                                                     ` Qian Cai
2019-10-08 11:02                                                                       ` Walter Wu
2019-10-08 11:42                                                                         ` Qian Cai
2019-10-08 12:07                                                                           ` Walter Wu
2019-10-08 12:11                                                                           ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-14  2:19                                                                             ` Walter Wu

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