From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH v12 09/12] namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like path resolution
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 06:19:30 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190904201933.10736-10-cyphar@cyphar.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190904201933.10736-1-cyphar@cyphar.com>
The primary motivation for the need for this flag is container runtimes
which have to interact with malicious root filesystems in the host
namespaces. One of the first requirements for a container runtime to be
secure against a malicious rootfs is that they correctly scope symlinks
(that is, they should be scoped as though they are chroot(2)ed into the
container's rootfs) and ".."-style paths[*]. The already-existing
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV and LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS help defend against other
potential attacks in a malicious rootfs scenario.
Currently most container runtimes try to do this resolution in
userspace[1], causing many potential race conditions. In addition, the
"obvious" alternative (actually performing a {ch,pivot_}root(2))
requires a fork+exec (for some runtimes) which is *very* costly if
necessary for every filesystem operation involving a container.
[*] At the moment, ".." and magic-link jumping are disallowed for the
same reason it is disabled for LOOKUP_BENEATH -- currently it is not
safe to allow it. Future patches may enable it unconditionally once
we have resolved the possible races (for "..") and semantics (for
magic-link jumping).
The most significant *at(2) semantic change with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is that
absolute pathnames no longer cause the dirfd to be ignored completely.
The rationale is that LOOKUP_IN_ROOT must necessarily chroot-scope
symlinks with absolute paths to dirfd, and so doing it for the base path
seems to be the most consistent behaviour (and also avoids foot-gunning
users who want to scope paths that are absolute).
[1]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
include/linux/namei.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 2e18ce5a313e..0352d275bd13 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ static int unlazy_walk(struct nameidata *nd)
goto out1;
if (!nd->root.mnt) {
/* Restart from path_init() if nd->root was cleared. */
- if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH)
+ if (nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_IN_ROOT))
goto out;
} else if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT)) {
if (unlikely(!legitimize_path(nd, &nd->root, nd->root_seq)))
@@ -809,10 +809,18 @@ static int complete_walk(struct nameidata *nd)
return status;
}
-static void set_root(struct nameidata *nd)
+static int set_root(struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
+ /*
+ * Jumping to the real root as part of LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is a BUG in namei,
+ * but we still have to ensure it doesn't happen because it will cause a
+ * breakout from the dirfd.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IN_ROOT))
+ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
+
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
unsigned seq;
@@ -824,6 +832,7 @@ static void set_root(struct nameidata *nd)
} else {
get_fs_root(fs, &nd->root);
}
+ return 0;
}
static void path_put_conditional(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
@@ -854,6 +863,11 @@ static int nd_jump_root(struct nameidata *nd)
if (nd->path.mnt != NULL && nd->path.mnt != nd->root.mnt)
return -EXDEV;
}
+ if (!nd->root.mnt) {
+ int error = set_root(nd);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ }
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
struct dentry *d;
nd->path = nd->root;
@@ -1100,15 +1114,13 @@ const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd)
if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS))
return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
/* Not currently safe. */
- if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)))
return ERR_PTR(-EXDEV);
}
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(res))
return res;
}
if (*res == '/') {
- if (!nd->root.mnt)
- set_root(nd);
error = nd_jump_root(nd);
if (unlikely(error))
return ERR_PTR(error);
@@ -1744,15 +1756,20 @@ static inline int may_lookup(struct nameidata *nd)
static inline int handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
{
if (type == LAST_DOTDOT) {
+ int error = 0;
+
/*
* LOOKUP_BENEATH resolving ".." is not currently safe -- races
* can cause our parent to have moved outside of the root and
* us to skip over it.
*/
- if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)))
return -EXDEV;
- if (!nd->root.mnt)
- set_root(nd);
+ if (!nd->root.mnt) {
+ error = set_root(nd);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ }
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
return follow_dotdot_rcu(nd);
} else
@@ -2251,9 +2268,13 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
+ /* LOOKUP_IN_ROOT treats absolute paths as being relative-to-dirfd. */
+ if (flags & LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)
+ while (*s == '/')
+ s++;
+
/* Figure out the starting path and root (if needed). */
if (*s == '/') {
- set_root(nd);
error = nd_jump_root(nd);
if (unlikely(error))
return ERR_PTR(error);
@@ -2298,7 +2319,7 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
fdput(f);
}
/* For scoped-lookups we need to set the root to the dirfd as well. */
- if (flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH) {
+ if (flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)) {
nd->root = nd->path;
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
nd->root_seq = nd->seq;
diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h
index be407415c28a..ec2c6c588ea7 100644
--- a/include/linux/namei.h
+++ b/include/linux/namei.h
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
#define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS 0x080000 /* No /proc/$pid/fd/ "symlink" crossing. */
#define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS 0x100000 /* No symlink crossing *at all*.
Implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS. */
+#define LOOKUP_IN_ROOT 0x200000 /* Treat dirfd as %current->fs->root. */
extern int path_pts(struct path *path);
--
2.23.0
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-04 20:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-04 20:19 [PATCH v12 00/12] namei: openat2(2) path resolution restrictions Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 01/12] lib: introduce copy_struct_{to,from}_user helpers Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 20:48 ` [PATCH v12 01/12] lib: introduce copy_struct_{to, from}_user helpers Linus Torvalds
2019-09-04 21:00 ` [PATCH v12 01/12] lib: introduce copy_struct_{to,from}_user helpers Randy Dunlap
2019-09-05 7:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-09-05 9:26 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-05 9:43 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-09-05 10:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-09-11 10:37 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-05 13:35 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-05 17:01 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-05 8:43 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2019-09-05 9:50 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-05 10:45 ` Christian Brauner
2019-09-05 9:09 ` [PATCH v12 01/12] lib: introduce copy_struct_{to, from}_user helpers Andreas Schwab
2019-09-05 10:13 ` Gabriel Paubert
2019-09-05 11:05 ` [PATCH v12 01/12] lib: introduce copy_struct_{to,from}_user helpers Christian Brauner
2019-09-05 11:17 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2019-09-05 11:29 ` Christian Brauner
2019-09-05 13:40 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-05 11:09 ` Christian Brauner
2019-09-05 11:27 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-05 11:40 ` Christian Brauner
2019-09-05 18:07 ` Al Viro
2019-09-05 18:23 ` Christian Brauner
2019-09-05 18:28 ` Al Viro
2019-09-05 18:35 ` Christian Brauner
2019-09-05 19:56 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-05 22:31 ` Al Viro
2019-09-06 7:00 ` Christian Brauner
2019-09-05 23:00 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-05 23:49 ` Al Viro
2019-09-06 0:09 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-06 0:14 ` Al Viro
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 02/12] clone3: switch to copy_struct_from_user() Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 03/12] sched_setattr: switch to copy_struct_{to, from}_user() Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 04/12] perf_event_open: switch to copy_struct_from_user() Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 05/12] namei: obey trailing magic-link DAC permissions Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-17 21:30 ` Jann Horn
2019-09-18 13:51 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-18 15:46 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 06/12] procfs: switch magic-link modes to be more sane Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 07/12] open: O_EMPTYPATH: procfs-less file descriptor re-opening Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 08/12] namei: O_BENEATH-style path resolution flags Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 20:19 ` Aleksa Sarai [this message]
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 10/12] namei: aggressively check for nd->root escape on ".." resolution Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 21:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-04 21:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-04 21:36 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-04 21:48 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 22:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-04 22:31 ` David Howells
2019-09-04 22:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-04 23:29 ` Al Viro
2019-09-04 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 11/12] open: openat2(2) syscall Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 21:00 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-09-07 12:40 ` Jeff Layton
2019-09-07 16:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-07 17:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-07 17:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-07 18:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-10 6:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-09-08 16:24 ` Aleksa Sarai
2019-09-04 20:19 ` [PATCH v12 12/12] selftests: add openat2(2) selftests Aleksa Sarai
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