From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 102/114] arm64: ssbs: Dont treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 10:36:49 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191010083613.611304454@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191010083544.711104709@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
[ Upstream commit eb337cdfcd5dd3b10522c2f34140a73a4c285c30 ]
SSBS provides a relatively cheap mitigation for SSB, but it is still a
mitigation and its presence does not indicate that the CPU is unaffected
by the vulnerability.
Tweak the mitigation logic so that we report the correct string in sysfs.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -341,15 +341,17 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const st
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
+ /* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */
+ if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
+ this_cpu_safe = true;
+
if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
+ if (!this_cpu_safe)
+ __ssb_safe = false;
required = false;
goto out_printmsg;
}
- /* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */
- if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
- this_cpu_safe = true;
-
if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
if (!this_cpu_safe)
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-10 8:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20191010083544.711104709@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 089/114] arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 090/114] KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 091/114] arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 092/114] arm64: fix SSBS sanitization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 093/114] arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 094/114] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 095/114] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 096/114] arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 097/114] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 098/114] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 099/114] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 100/114] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 101/114] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-10 8:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2019-10-10 8:36 ` [PATCH 4.19 103/114] arm64: Force SSBS on context switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20191010083613.611304454@linuxfoundation.org \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).