From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 10:54:45 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202004221052.489CCFEBC@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200421021453.198187-2-samitolvanen@google.com>
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 07:14:42PM -0700, Sami Tolvanen wrote:
> This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack,
> which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being
> overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here:
>
> https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
>
> Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the
> ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses
> of shadow stacks used by other tasks and interrupt handlers in
> memory, which means an attacker capable reading and writing
> arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack control
> flow by modifying shadow stacks that are not currently in use.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
> ---
> Makefile | 6 +++
> arch/Kconfig | 25 +++++++++
> include/linux/compiler-clang.h | 6 +++
> include/linux/compiler_types.h | 4 ++
> include/linux/scs.h | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> init/init_task.c | 8 +++
> kernel/Makefile | 1 +
> kernel/fork.c | 9 ++++
> kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +
> kernel/scs.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 10 files changed, 220 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 include/linux/scs.h
> create mode 100644 kernel/scs.c
>
> diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
> index 49b2709ff44e..6094db2c7252 100644
> --- a/Makefile
> +++ b/Makefile
> @@ -866,6 +866,12 @@ ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH
> KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -flive-patching=inline-clone)
> endif
>
> +ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> +CC_FLAGS_SCS := -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack
> +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CC_FLAGS_SCS)
> +export CC_FLAGS_SCS
> +endif
> +
> # arch Makefile may override CC so keep this after arch Makefile is included
> NOSTDINC_FLAGS += -nostdinc -isystem $(shell $(CC) -print-file-name=include)
>
> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> index 786a85d4ad40..8450d56e6af6 100644
> --- a/arch/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> @@ -533,6 +533,31 @@ config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
> about 20% of all kernel functions, which increases the kernel code
> size by about 2%.
>
> +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> + bool
> + help
> + An architecture should select this if it supports Clang's Shadow
> + Call Stack, has asm/scs.h, and implements runtime support for shadow
> + stack switching.
> +
> +config SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> + bool "Clang Shadow Call Stack"
> + depends on CC_IS_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> + help
> + This option enables Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a
> + shadow stack to protect function return addresses from being
> + overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found in
> + Clang's documentation:
> +
> + https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
> +
> + Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones
> + documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of shadow
> + stacks used by other tasks and interrupt handlers in memory, which
> + means an attacker capable of reading and writing arbitrary memory
> + may be able to locate them and hijack control flow by modifying
> + shadow stacks that are not currently in use.
> +
> config HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
> bool
> help
> diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
> index 333a6695a918..18fc4d29ef27 100644
> --- a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
> +++ b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
> @@ -42,3 +42,9 @@
> * compilers, like ICC.
> */
> #define barrier() __asm__ __volatile__("" : : : "memory")
> +
> +#if __has_feature(shadow_call_stack)
> +# define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack")))
> +#else
> +# define __noscs
> +#endif
> diff --git a/include/linux/compiler_types.h b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> index e970f97a7fcb..97b62f47a80d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> +++ b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> @@ -193,6 +193,10 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {
> # define randomized_struct_fields_end
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef __noscs
> +# define __noscs
> +#endif
> +
> #ifndef asm_volatile_goto
> #define asm_volatile_goto(x...) asm goto(x)
> #endif
> diff --git a/include/linux/scs.h b/include/linux/scs.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..051d27ad3da4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/scs.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/*
> + * Shadow Call Stack support.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 Google LLC
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _LINUX_SCS_H
> +#define _LINUX_SCS_H
> +
> +#include <linux/gfp.h>
> +#include <linux/poison.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <asm/page.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> +
> +/*
> + * In testing, 1 KiB shadow stack size (i.e. 128 stack frames on a 64-bit
> + * architecture) provided ~40% safety margin on stack usage while keeping
> + * memory allocation overhead reasonable.
> + */
> +#define SCS_SIZE 1024UL
> +#define GFP_SCS (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO)
> +
> +/* An illegal pointer value to mark the end of the shadow stack. */
> +#define SCS_END_MAGIC (0x5f6UL + POISON_POINTER_DELTA)
> +
> +#define task_scs(tsk) (task_thread_info(tsk)->shadow_call_stack)
> +
> +static inline void task_set_scs(struct task_struct *tsk, void *s)
> +{
> + task_scs(tsk) = s;
> +}
> +
> +extern void scs_init(void);
> +
> +static inline void *__scs_base(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + /*
> + * To minimize the risk of exposure, architectures may clear a
> + * task's thread_info::shadow_call_stack while that task is
> + * running, and only save/restore the active shadow call stack
> + * pointer when the usual register may be clobbered (e.g. across
> + * context switches).
> + *
> + * The shadow call stack is aligned to SCS_SIZE, and grows
> + * upwards, so we can mask out the low bits to extract the base
> + * when the task is not running.
> + */
> + return (void *)((unsigned long)task_scs(tsk) & ~(SCS_SIZE - 1));
> +}
> +
> +static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Reset the shadow stack to the base address in case the task
> + * is reused.
> + */
> + task_set_scs(tsk, __scs_base(tsk));
> +}
> +
> +extern int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node);
> +
> +static inline unsigned long *__scs_magic(void *s)
> +{
> + return (unsigned long *)(s + SCS_SIZE) - 1;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + unsigned long *magic = __scs_magic(__scs_base(tsk));
> +
> + return READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*magic) != SCS_END_MAGIC;
> +}
> +
> +extern void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk);
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
> +
> +#define task_scs(tsk) NULL
> +
> +static inline void task_set_scs(struct task_struct *tsk, void *s) {}
> +static inline void scs_init(void) {}
> +static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
> +static inline int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) { return 0; }
> +static inline bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
> +static inline void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
> +
> +#endif /* _LINUX_SCS_H */
> diff --git a/init/init_task.c b/init/init_task.c
> index bd403ed3e418..aaa71366d162 100644
> --- a/init/init_task.c
> +++ b/init/init_task.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/audit.h>
> #include <linux/numa.h>
> +#include <linux/scs.h>
>
> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> @@ -185,6 +186,13 @@ struct task_struct init_task
> };
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_task);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> +unsigned long init_shadow_call_stack[SCS_SIZE / sizeof(long)] __init_task_data
> + __aligned(SCS_SIZE) = {
> + [(SCS_SIZE / sizeof(long)) - 1] = SCS_END_MAGIC
> +};
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Initial thread structure. Alignment of this is handled by a special
> * linker map entry.
> diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
> index 4cb4130ced32..c332eb9d4841 100644
> --- a/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS) += trace/
> obj-$(CONFIG_IRQ_WORK) += irq_work.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_PM) += cpu_pm.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_BPF) += bpf/
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK) += scs.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += events/
>
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 8c700f881d92..f6339f9d232d 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
> #include <linux/thread_info.h>
> #include <linux/stackleak.h>
> #include <linux/kasan.h>
> +#include <linux/scs.h>
>
> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
> @@ -456,6 +457,8 @@ void put_task_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
>
> void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
> {
> + scs_release(tsk);
> +
> #ifndef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
> /*
> * The task is finally done with both the stack and thread_info,
> @@ -840,6 +843,8 @@ void __init fork_init(void)
> NULL, free_vm_stack_cache);
> #endif
>
> + scs_init();
> +
> lockdep_init_task(&init_task);
> uprobes_init();
> }
> @@ -899,6 +904,10 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
> if (err)
> goto free_stack;
>
> + err = scs_prepare(tsk, node);
> + if (err)
> + goto free_stack;
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
> /*
> * We must handle setting up seccomp filters once we're under
> diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
> index 3a61a3b8eaa9..c99620c1ec20 100644
> --- a/kernel/sched/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> #include <linux/nospec.h>
>
> #include <linux/kcov.h>
> +#include <linux/scs.h>
>
> #include <asm/switch_to.h>
> #include <asm/tlb.h>
> @@ -6045,6 +6046,7 @@ void init_idle(struct task_struct *idle, int cpu)
> idle->se.exec_start = sched_clock();
> idle->flags |= PF_IDLE;
>
> + scs_task_reset(idle);
> kasan_unpoison_task_stack(idle);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
> diff --git a/kernel/scs.c b/kernel/scs.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..e1a8fc453b86
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/kernel/scs.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Shadow Call Stack support.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 Google LLC
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
> +#include <linux/scs.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <asm/scs.h>
> +
> +static struct kmem_cache *scs_cache;
> +
> +static void *scs_alloc(int node)
> +{
> + void *s;
> +
> + s = kmem_cache_alloc_node(scs_cache, GFP_SCS, node);
> + if (s) {
> + *__scs_magic(s) = SCS_END_MAGIC;
> + /*
> + * Poison the allocation to catch unintentional accesses to
> + * the shadow stack when KASAN is enabled.
> + */
> + kasan_poison_object_data(scs_cache, s);
> + }
> +
> + return s;
> +}
> +
> +static void scs_free(void *s)
> +{
> + kasan_unpoison_object_data(scs_cache, s);
> + kmem_cache_free(scs_cache, s);
> +}
> +
> +void __init scs_init(void)
> +{
> + scs_cache = kmem_cache_create("scs_cache", SCS_SIZE, SCS_SIZE,
> + 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
> +{
> + void *s;
> +
> + s = scs_alloc(node);
> + if (!s)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + task_set_scs(tsk, s);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + void *s;
> +
> + s = __scs_base(tsk);
> + if (!s)
> + return;
> +
> + WARN_ON(scs_corrupted(tsk));
> +
I'd like to have task_set_scs(tsk, NULL) retained here, to avoid need to
depend on the released task memory getting scrubbed at a later time.
Exposures of this pointer would expose the region of other SCSs.
-Kees
> + scs_free(s);
> +}
> --
> 2.26.1.301.g55bc3eb7cb9-goog
>
--
Kees Cook
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-22 17:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 430+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-18 16:10 [PATCH 00/18] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 01/18] arm64: mm: don't use x18 in idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:43 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 02/18] arm64/lib: copy_page: avoid x18 register in assembler code Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 03/18] arm64: kvm: stop treating register x18 as caller save Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-21 6:19 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-22 17:22 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-10-22 21:45 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 04/18] arm64: kernel: avoid x18 as an arbitrary temp register Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 05/18] arm64: kbuild: reserve reg x18 from general allocation by the compiler Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 17:32 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-10-18 19:00 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-21 6:12 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-21 20:43 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 06/18] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:58 ` Joe Perches
2019-10-18 17:08 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-10-18 17:11 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 18:32 ` Miguel Ojeda
2019-10-18 20:33 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-10-19 0:21 ` Miguel Ojeda
2019-10-18 17:42 ` Jann Horn
2019-10-18 17:56 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-22 16:28 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-22 16:30 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-22 16:49 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-22 19:26 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-24 13:28 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-24 14:38 ` Masahiro Yamada
2019-10-23 16:59 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-24 1:47 ` Masahiro Yamada
2019-10-24 12:04 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-10-24 22:17 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 07/18] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 08/18] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 09/18] trace: disable function graph tracing with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 17:01 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-10-18 17:08 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-21 6:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 10/18] kprobes: fix compilation without CONFIG_KRETPROBES Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 17:02 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-10-21 9:13 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 11/18] kprobes: disable kretprobes with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 17:04 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-10-21 9:15 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 12/18] arm64: reserve x18 only with Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 21:23 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-10-22 16:00 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-22 16:27 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 13/18] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:49 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-10-18 17:05 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-21 16:56 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-21 22:43 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-22 15:47 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 14/18] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-21 6:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-21 22:39 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-22 5:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 15/18] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 16/18] arm64: kprobes: fix kprobes without CONFIG_KRETPROBES Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-21 6:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-21 16:06 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 17/18] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 16:10 ` [PATCH 18/18] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 17:12 ` Jann Horn
2019-10-18 17:18 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-18 17:23 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-18 17:35 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-21 16:49 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-21 9:28 ` [PATCH 00/18] add support for Clang's " Masami Hiramatsu
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 00/17] " samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 01/17] arm64: mm: don't use x18 in idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings samitolvanen
2019-10-25 9:24 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 02/17] arm64/lib: copy_page: avoid x18 register in assembler code samitolvanen
2019-10-25 9:41 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-25 21:40 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 03/17] arm64: kvm: stop treating register x18 as caller save samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 04/17] arm64: kernel: avoid x18 as an arbitrary temp register samitolvanen
2019-10-25 10:02 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 05/17] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) samitolvanen
2019-10-25 10:56 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-25 20:49 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-28 16:35 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-28 19:57 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-29 18:06 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-25 16:22 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-10-25 20:51 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-26 15:57 ` Joe Perches
2019-10-28 15:19 ` Sami Tolvanen
[not found] ` <CANiq72n4o16TB53s6nLLrLCw6v0Brn8GAhKvdzzN7v1tNontCQ@mail.gmail.com>
2019-10-28 16:15 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 06/17] scs: add accounting samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 07/17] scs: add support for stack usage debugging samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 08/17] kprobes: fix compilation without CONFIG_KRETPROBES samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 09/17] arm64: disable function graph tracing with SCS samitolvanen
2019-10-25 11:03 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-29 17:45 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-29 20:35 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 10/17] arm64: disable kretprobes " samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 11/17] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation " samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 12/17] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 13/17] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 14/17] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 15/17] arm64: kprobes: fix kprobes without CONFIG_KRETPROBES samitolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 16/17] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code samitolvanen
2019-10-25 1:20 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-10-25 1:29 ` Masahiro Yamada
2019-10-25 1:42 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-10-25 19:24 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-24 22:51 ` [PATCH v2 17/17] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack samitolvanen
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 00/17] add support for Clang's " samitolvanen
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 01/17] arm64: mm: avoid x18 in idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings samitolvanen
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 02/17] arm64/lib: copy_page: avoid x18 register in assembler code samitolvanen
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 03/17] arm64: kvm: stop treating register x18 as caller save samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:48 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 04/17] arm64: kernel: avoid x18 __cpu_soft_restart samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:47 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 05/17] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-01 16:28 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 06/17] scs: add accounting samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 07/17] scs: add support for stack usage debugging samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-01 16:32 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 08/17] kprobes: fix compilation without CONFIG_KRETPROBES samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:55 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 09/17] arm64: kprobes: fix kprobes " samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:56 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 10/17] arm64: disable kretprobes with SCS samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:56 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 11/17] arm64: disable function graph tracing " samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:58 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-01 20:32 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 12/17] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation " samitolvanen
2019-10-31 17:11 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-11-01 3:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 13/17] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended samitolvanen
2019-10-31 17:18 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-10-31 17:27 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-10-31 17:34 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-10-31 17:42 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 3:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 14/17] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted samitolvanen
2019-11-01 4:00 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 15/17] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack samitolvanen
2019-10-31 17:28 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-11-01 4:01 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 16/17] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:46 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-01 4:02 ` Kees Cook
2019-10-31 16:46 ` [PATCH v3 17/17] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack samitolvanen
2019-11-01 3:45 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-01 15:44 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 00/17] add support for Clang's " Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 01/17] arm64: mm: avoid x18 in idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 02/17] arm64/lib: copy_page: avoid x18 register in assembler code Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 03/17] arm64: kvm: stop treating register x18 as caller save Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-04 11:04 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-11-04 13:30 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-11-04 11:51 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-04 21:44 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 04/17] arm64: kernel: avoid x18 __cpu_soft_restart Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-04 11:39 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-04 16:44 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 05/17] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:36 ` Miguel Ojeda
2019-11-04 12:31 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-04 18:25 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 06/17] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-04 13:13 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-11-04 16:42 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-04 16:59 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 07/17] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-02 17:31 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-04 12:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-04 21:35 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 9:17 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 08/17] kprobes: fix compilation without CONFIG_KRETPROBES Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-13 20:27 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 09/17] arm64: kprobes: fix kprobes " Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 10/17] arm64: disable kretprobes with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-04 17:04 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-04 23:42 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 9:04 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 11/17] arm64: disable function graph tracing " Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-04 17:11 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-04 23:44 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 9:15 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-05 20:00 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-11-05 22:05 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 12/17] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation " Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 13/17] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-04 13:20 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-11-04 21:38 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-04 21:59 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-11-05 0:02 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 14:55 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 14/17] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 15/17] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 16/17] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v4 17/17] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:55 ` [PATCH v5 00/14] add support for Clang's " Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:55 ` [PATCH v5 01/14] arm64: mm: avoid x18 in idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:55 ` [PATCH v5 02/14] arm64/lib: copy_page: avoid x18 register in assembler code Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:55 ` [PATCH v5 03/14] arm64: kvm: stop treating register x18 as caller save Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:55 ` [PATCH v5 04/14] arm64: kernel: avoid x18 in __cpu_soft_restart Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:55 ` [PATCH v5 05/14] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-15 15:37 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-15 18:34 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 06/14] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 07/14] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 08/14] arm64: disable function graph tracing with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-15 14:18 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-05 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 09/14] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation " Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 10/14] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-06 20:39 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-11-15 14:27 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-05 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 11/14] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-06 4:45 ` Miguel Ojeda
2019-11-07 10:51 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-11-07 16:26 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-05 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 12/14] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-15 14:43 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-05 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 13/14] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-15 14:46 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-05 23:56 ` [PATCH v5 14/14] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-15 15:20 ` Mark Rutland
2019-11-15 20:19 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-18 23:13 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-11-12 23:44 ` [PATCH v5 00/14] add support for Clang's " Kees Cook
2019-11-13 12:03 ` Will Deacon
2019-11-13 18:33 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-15 14:16 ` Mark Rutland
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 00/15] " Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 01/15] arm64: mm: avoid x18 in idmap_kpti_install_ng_mappings Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 02/15] arm64/lib: copy_page: avoid x18 register in assembler code Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 03/15] arm64: kvm: stop treating register x18 as caller save Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 04/15] arm64: kernel: avoid x18 in __cpu_soft_restart Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 05/15] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 06/15] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 07/15] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 08/15] arm64: disable function graph tracing with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-16 17:39 ` Will Deacon
2020-01-16 21:45 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 09/15] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation " Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-16 17:37 ` Will Deacon
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 10/15] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-16 17:42 ` Will Deacon
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 11/15] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-16 17:44 ` Will Deacon
2020-01-16 20:36 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 12/15] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-16 17:46 ` Will Deacon
2020-01-16 18:14 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-16 18:18 ` Will Deacon
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 13/15] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-16 17:47 ` Will Deacon
2020-01-16 20:16 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 14/15] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-16 18:24 ` Will Deacon
2020-01-16 21:57 ` Sami Tolvanen
2019-12-06 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 15/15] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-16 17:48 ` Will Deacon
2020-01-16 18:24 ` [PATCH v6 00/15] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack Will Deacon
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 00/11] " Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 01/11] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 02/11] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 03/11] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 04/11] scs: disable when function graph tracing is enabled Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-28 22:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 05/11] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 06/11] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 07/11] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-10 16:41 ` Will Deacon
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 08/11] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 09/11] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-10 16:44 ` Will Deacon
2020-02-10 17:18 ` James Morse
2020-02-10 17:52 ` Will Deacon
2020-02-10 18:03 ` Mark Rutland
2020-02-10 18:07 ` Will Deacon
2020-02-10 18:24 ` Mark Rutland
2020-02-11 9:54 ` Will Deacon
2020-02-12 17:30 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-11 9:14 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-02-11 9:55 ` Will Deacon
2020-02-11 10:00 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 10/11] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-01-28 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 11/11] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-11 13:57 ` James Morse
2020-02-12 20:59 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-14 18:13 ` James Morse
2020-02-11 13:57 ` [PATCH v7 00/11] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack James Morse
2020-02-12 17:36 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] " Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 4:19 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-19 17:25 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 02/12] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 03/12] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 04/12] scs: disable when function graph tracing is enabled Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 11:33 ` Mark Rutland
2020-02-19 18:01 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 05/12] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 06/12] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 08/12] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 09/12] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:58 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-19 7:50 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 11/12] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:08 ` [PATCH v8 12/12] efi/libstub: disable SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 0:58 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-19 7:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-02-19 18:27 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-19 18:38 ` [PATCH v8 00/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack James Morse
2020-02-19 18:53 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-02-20 9:55 ` Marc Zyngier
2020-02-19 20:12 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 " Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 02/12] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 03/12] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 04/12] scs: disable when function graph tracing is enabled Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 05/12] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 06/12] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 08/12] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 09/12] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-28 16:31 ` James Morse
2020-02-28 20:51 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 11/12] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI Sami Tolvanen
2020-02-25 17:39 ` [PATCH v9 12/12] efi/libstub: disable SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 00/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 02/12] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 03/12] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 04/12] scs: disable when function graph tracing is enabled Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 05/12] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 06/12] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 08/12] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 09/12] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 18:23 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 11/12] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 16:41 ` [PATCH v10 12/12] efi/libstub: disable SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-06 18:25 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-07 12:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 00/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-20 17:17 ` Will Deacon
2020-04-20 21:18 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-22 17:39 ` Will Deacon
2020-04-22 17:51 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-22 18:01 ` Will Deacon
2020-04-22 23:51 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-23 18:28 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-24 11:21 ` Will Deacon
2020-04-27 20:45 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-05-04 16:52 ` Will Deacon
2020-05-04 17:33 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-05-04 18:03 ` Jann Horn
2020-05-04 18:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-21 1:12 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 02/12] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-20 17:17 ` Will Deacon
2020-04-20 21:21 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 03/12] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-20 17:17 ` Will Deacon
2020-04-20 22:24 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 04/12] scs: disable when function graph tracing is enabled Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-17 10:00 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-17 14:46 ` Mark Rutland
2020-04-17 15:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-17 15:46 ` Mark Rutland
2020-04-17 23:19 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-20 19:23 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 05/12] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 06/12] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 08/12] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 09/12] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 11/12] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-16 16:12 ` [PATCH v11 12/12] efi/libstub: disable SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 00/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-22 17:54 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-04-22 18:00 ` Will Deacon
2020-04-23 18:09 ` Kees Cook
2020-04-24 10:12 ` Will Deacon
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 02/12] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-22 17:43 ` Will Deacon
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 03/12] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-22 17:46 ` Will Deacon
2020-04-22 23:53 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 04/12] scs: disable when function graph tracing is enabled Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 05/12] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 06/12] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 08/12] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 09/12] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 11/12] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-21 2:14 ` [PATCH v12 12/12] efi/libstub: disable SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 00/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:48 ` Miguel Ojeda
2020-04-27 17:01 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 02/12] scs: add accounting Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 03/12] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 04/12] scs: disable when function graph tracing is enabled Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 05/12] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation with SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 06/12] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 08/12] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 09/12] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 11/12] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 16:00 ` [PATCH v13 12/12] efi/libstub: disable SCS Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-27 17:39 ` [PATCH v13 00/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack Ard Biesheuvel
2020-04-27 20:50 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-04-27 22:09 ` Sami Tolvanen
2020-04-29 8:39 ` David Laight
2020-05-15 17:23 ` Will Deacon
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