[PATCH v4 0/7] running kernel mode SIMD with softirqs disabled

[PATCH v4 0/7] running kernel mode SIMD with softirqs disabled

[Ard Biesheuvel]

This is a follow-up to [0], but given that the arm64 architectural
pieces have been merged for arm64, the only remaining changes are crypto
specific. Therefore, the audience has been reduced to those people who
are likely to care about these specifics.

Patch #1 addresses an issue in the skcipher walker which doesn't handle
zero sized AEAD inputs entirely consistently, which is uncovered by the
change in patch #7.

Patches #2 and #3 add some sanity checks to the public AEAD and skcipher
APIs to limit their availibility to either task or softirq context
(which is the only way in which they are currently being used). Adding
this restriction permits the arm64 crypto code to get rid of all scalar
fallbacks, given that on this architecture, softirqs are no longer
served while the SIMD unit is being used in kernel mode, which means
that the scalar fallbacks are never needed. These are removed in the
remaining 4 patches.

Changes since v3:
- clarify the nature of the issue addressed by patch #1, and apply the
  same fix to the skcipher walker
- update patches #2 and #3 so that the failures can be observed by the
  crypto stats code

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20210302090118.30666-1-ardb@kernel.org/

Ard Biesheuvel (7):
  crypto: skcipher - handle zero sized inputs correctly
  crypto: aead - disallow en/decrypt for non-task or non-softirq context
  crypto: skcipher - disallow en/decrypt for non-task or non-softirq
    context
  crypto: arm64/gcm-aes-ce - remove non-SIMD fallback path
  crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - stop using SIMD helper for skciphers
  crypto: arm64/aes-ce - stop using SIMD helper for skciphers
  crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - remove non-SIMD fallback path

 arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig           |   6 -
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S |   1 +
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c | 183 +++++------------
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c        | 102 ++--------
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 122 +-----------
 arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c   | 209 +++++---------------
 crypto/aead.c                       |  12 +-
 crypto/skcipher.c                   |  16 +-
 8 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 501 deletions(-)

-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v4 1/7] crypto: skcipher - handle zero sized inputs correctly

[Ard Biesheuvel]

There are corner cases where skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt() may be
invoked with a zero sized input, which is not rejected by the walker
code, but results in the skcipher_walk structure to not be fully
initialized. This will leave stale values in its page and buffer
members, which will be subsequently passed to kfree() or free_page() by
skcipher_walk_done(), resulting in a crash if those routines fail to
identify them as in valid inputs.

Fix this by setting page and buffer to NULL even if the size of the
input is zero. Note that for AEAD encryption in particular, a zero sized
input could be a valid and meaningful use of the API, given the support
for associated authenticated data (AAD), which gets reflected in the
authentication tag as well.

For symmetry, apply the same fix to the plain skcipher walker code, even
though in that case, no meaningful usage scenarios are known for zero
sized inputs.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 crypto/skcipher.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/skcipher.c b/crypto/skcipher.c
index a15376245416..ed2deb031742 100644
--- a/crypto/skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/skcipher.c
@@ -455,6 +455,8 @@ static int skcipher_walk_skcipher(struct skcipher_walk *walk,
 	walk->nbytes = 0;
 	walk->iv = req->iv;
 	walk->oiv = req->iv;
+	walk->buffer = NULL;
+	walk->page = NULL;
 
 	if (unlikely(!walk->total))
 		return 0;
@@ -511,6 +513,8 @@ static int skcipher_walk_aead_common(struct skcipher_walk *walk,
 	walk->nbytes = 0;
 	walk->iv = req->iv;
 	walk->oiv = req->iv;
+	walk->buffer = NULL;
+	walk->page = NULL;
 
 	if (unlikely(!walk->total))
 		return 0;
-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v4 2/7] crypto: aead - disallow en/decrypt for non-task or non-softirq context

[Ard Biesheuvel]

In order to ensure that kernel mode SIMD routines will not need a scalar
fallback if they run with softirqs disabled, disallow any use of the
AEAD encrypt and decrypt routines from outside of task or softirq context.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 crypto/aead.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/aead.c b/crypto/aead.c
index 16991095270d..141c9369b02a 100644
--- a/crypto/aead.c
+++ b/crypto/aead.c
@@ -88,7 +88,11 @@ int crypto_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
 	int ret;
 
 	crypto_stats_get(alg);
-	if (crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
+	if (!(alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) &&
+	    WARN_ONCE(!in_task() && !in_serving_softirq(),
+		      "synchronous call from invalid context\n"))
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+	else if (crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
 		ret = -ENOKEY;
 	else
 		ret = crypto_aead_alg(aead)->encrypt(req);
@@ -105,7 +109,11 @@ int crypto_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
 	int ret;
 
 	crypto_stats_get(alg);
-	if (crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
+	if (!(alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) &&
+	    WARN_ONCE(!in_task() && !in_serving_softirq(),
+		      "synchronous call from invalid context\n"))
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+	else if (crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
 		ret = -ENOKEY;
 	else if (req->cryptlen < crypto_aead_authsize(aead))
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v4 3/7] crypto: skcipher - disallow en/decrypt for non-task or non-softirq context

[Ard Biesheuvel]

In order to ensure that kernel mode SIMD routines will not need a scalar
fallback if they run with softirqs disabled, disallow any use of the
skcipher encrypt and decrypt routines from outside of task or softirq
context.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 crypto/skcipher.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/skcipher.c b/crypto/skcipher.c
index ed2deb031742..f69492aab75d 100644
--- a/crypto/skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/skcipher.c
@@ -628,7 +628,11 @@ int crypto_skcipher_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	int ret;
 
 	crypto_stats_get(alg);
-	if (crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
+	if (!(alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) &&
+	    WARN_ONCE(!in_task() && !in_serving_softirq(),
+		      "synchronous call from invalid context\n"))
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+	else if (crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
 		ret = -ENOKEY;
 	else
 		ret = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->encrypt(req);
@@ -645,7 +649,11 @@ int crypto_skcipher_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	int ret;
 
 	crypto_stats_get(alg);
-	if (crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
+	if (!(alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) &&
+	    WARN_ONCE(!in_task() && !in_serving_softirq(),
+		      "synchronous call from invalid context\n"))
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+	else if (crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
 		ret = -ENOKEY;
 	else
 		ret = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->decrypt(req);
-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v4 4/7] crypto: arm64/gcm-aes-ce - remove non-SIMD fallback path

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Now that kernel mode SIMD is guaranteed to be available when executing
in task or softirq context, we no longer need scalar fallbacks to use
when the NEON is unavailable. So get rid of them.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c | 209 +++++---------------
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c
index 720cd3a58da3..15794fe21a0b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c
@@ -362,84 +362,36 @@ static int gcm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, false);
 
-	if (likely(crypto_simd_usable())) {
-		do {
-			const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr;
-			u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
-			int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
-
-			tag = (u8 *)&lengths;
-
-			if (unlikely(nbytes > 0 && nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
-				src = dst = memcpy(buf + sizeof(buf) - nbytes,
-						   src, nbytes);
-			} else if (nbytes < walk.total) {
-				nbytes &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
-				tag = NULL;
-			}
-
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			pmull_gcm_encrypt(nbytes, dst, src, ctx->ghash_key.h,
-					  dg, iv, ctx->aes_key.key_enc, nrounds,
-					  tag);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-
-			if (unlikely(!nbytes))
-				break;
-
-			if (unlikely(nbytes > 0 && nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
-				memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr,
-				       buf + sizeof(buf) - nbytes, nbytes);
-
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
-		} while (walk.nbytes);
-	} else {
-		while (walk.nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-			int blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-			const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr;
-			u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
-			int remaining = blocks;
-
-			do {
-				aes_encrypt(&ctx->aes_key, buf, iv);
-				crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-				crypto_inc(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
-				dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-				src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-			} while (--remaining > 0);
-
-			ghash_do_update(blocks, dg, walk.dst.virt.addr,
-					&ctx->ghash_key, NULL);
-
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
-
-		/* handle the tail */
-		if (walk.nbytes) {
-			aes_encrypt(&ctx->aes_key, buf, iv);
+	do {
+		const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr;
+		u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
+		int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
 
-			crypto_xor_cpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				       buf, walk.nbytes);
+		tag = (u8 *)&lengths;
 
-			memcpy(buf, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.nbytes);
-			memset(buf + walk.nbytes, 0, sizeof(buf) - walk.nbytes);
+		if (unlikely(nbytes > 0 && nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
+			src = dst = memcpy(buf + sizeof(buf) - nbytes,
+					   src, nbytes);
+		} else if (nbytes < walk.total) {
+			nbytes &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+			tag = NULL;
 		}
 
-		tag = (u8 *)&lengths;
-		ghash_do_update(1, dg, tag, &ctx->ghash_key,
-				walk.nbytes ? buf : NULL);
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		pmull_gcm_encrypt(nbytes, dst, src, ctx->ghash_key.h,
+				  dg, iv, ctx->aes_key.key_enc, nrounds,
+				  tag);
+		kernel_neon_end();
 
-		if (walk.nbytes)
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
+		if (unlikely(!nbytes))
+			break;
 
-		put_unaligned_be64(dg[1], tag);
-		put_unaligned_be64(dg[0], tag + 8);
-		put_unaligned_be32(1, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE);
-		aes_encrypt(&ctx->aes_key, iv, iv);
-		crypto_xor(tag, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	}
+		if (unlikely(nbytes > 0 && nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+			memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr,
+			       buf + sizeof(buf) - nbytes, nbytes);
+
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
+	} while (walk.nbytes);
 
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -464,6 +416,7 @@ static int gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
 	u64 dg[2] = {};
 	be128 lengths;
 	u8 *tag;
+	int ret;
 	int err;
 
 	lengths.a = cpu_to_be64(req->assoclen * 8);
@@ -481,101 +434,41 @@ static int gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, false);
 
-	if (likely(crypto_simd_usable())) {
-		int ret;
-
-		do {
-			const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr;
-			u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
-			int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
-
-			tag = (u8 *)&lengths;
-
-			if (unlikely(nbytes > 0 && nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
-				src = dst = memcpy(buf + sizeof(buf) - nbytes,
-						   src, nbytes);
-			} else if (nbytes < walk.total) {
-				nbytes &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
-				tag = NULL;
-			}
-
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			ret = pmull_gcm_decrypt(nbytes, dst, src,
-						ctx->ghash_key.h,
-						dg, iv, ctx->aes_key.key_enc,
-						nrounds, tag, otag, authsize);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-
-			if (unlikely(!nbytes))
-				break;
-
-			if (unlikely(nbytes > 0 && nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
-				memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr,
-				       buf + sizeof(buf) - nbytes, nbytes);
-
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
-		} while (walk.nbytes);
-
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-		if (ret)
-			return -EBADMSG;
-	} else {
-		while (walk.nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-			int blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-			const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr;
-			u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
-
-			ghash_do_update(blocks, dg, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					&ctx->ghash_key, NULL);
-
-			do {
-				aes_encrypt(&ctx->aes_key, buf, iv);
-				crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-				crypto_inc(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
-				dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-				src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-			} while (--blocks > 0);
+	do {
+		const u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr;
+		u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
+		int nbytes = walk.nbytes;
 
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		tag = (u8 *)&lengths;
 
-		/* handle the tail */
-		if (walk.nbytes) {
-			memcpy(buf, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.nbytes);
-			memset(buf + walk.nbytes, 0, sizeof(buf) - walk.nbytes);
+		if (unlikely(nbytes > 0 && nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
+			src = dst = memcpy(buf + sizeof(buf) - nbytes,
+					   src, nbytes);
+		} else if (nbytes < walk.total) {
+			nbytes &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+			tag = NULL;
 		}
 
-		tag = (u8 *)&lengths;
-		ghash_do_update(1, dg, tag, &ctx->ghash_key,
-				walk.nbytes ? buf : NULL);
-
-		if (walk.nbytes) {
-			aes_encrypt(&ctx->aes_key, buf, iv);
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		ret = pmull_gcm_decrypt(nbytes, dst, src, ctx->ghash_key.h,
+					dg, iv, ctx->aes_key.key_enc,
+					nrounds, tag, otag, authsize);
+		kernel_neon_end();
 
-			crypto_xor_cpy(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				       buf, walk.nbytes);
+		if (unlikely(!nbytes))
+			break;
 
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
-		}
+		if (unlikely(nbytes > 0 && nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+			memcpy(walk.dst.virt.addr,
+			       buf + sizeof(buf) - nbytes, nbytes);
 
-		if (err)
-			return err;
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
+	} while (walk.nbytes);
 
-		put_unaligned_be64(dg[1], tag);
-		put_unaligned_be64(dg[0], tag + 8);
-		put_unaligned_be32(1, iv + GCM_IV_SIZE);
-		aes_encrypt(&ctx->aes_key, iv, iv);
-		crypto_xor(tag, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
-		if (crypto_memneq(tag, otag, authsize)) {
-			memzero_explicit(tag, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-			return -EBADMSG;
-		}
-	}
-	return 0;
+	return ret ? -EBADMSG : 0;
 }
 
 static struct aead_alg gcm_aes_alg = {
-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v4 5/7] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - stop using SIMD helper for skciphers

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Calls into the skcipher API can only occur from contexts where the SIMD
unit is available, so there is no need for the SIMD helper.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig           |   2 -
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 122 ++------------------
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig
index b8eb0453123d..ed1e8cadeb3a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -122,8 +122,6 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_ARM64_BS
 	depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
 	select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
 	select CRYPTO_AES_ARM64_NEON_BLK
-	select CRYPTO_AES_ARM64
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
-	select CRYPTO_SIMD
 
 endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
index fb507d569922..8df6ad8cb09d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
@@ -63,11 +63,6 @@ struct aesbs_cbc_ctx {
 	u32			enc[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32];
 };
 
-struct aesbs_ctr_ctx {
-	struct aesbs_ctx	key;		/* must be first member */
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx	fallback;
-};
-
 struct aesbs_xts_ctx {
 	struct aesbs_ctx	key;
 	u32			twkey[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32];
@@ -207,25 +202,6 @@ static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int aesbs_ctr_setkey_sync(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
-				 unsigned int key_len)
-{
-	struct aesbs_ctr_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err;
-
-	err = aes_expandkey(&ctx->fallback, in_key, key_len);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	ctx->key.rounds = 6 + key_len / 4;
-
-	kernel_neon_begin();
-	aesbs_convert_key(ctx->key.rk, ctx->fallback.key_enc, ctx->key.rounds);
-	kernel_neon_end();
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -292,29 +268,6 @@ static int aesbs_xts_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 	return aesbs_setkey(tfm, in_key, key_len);
 }
 
-static void ctr_encrypt_one(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *src, u8 *dst)
-{
-	struct aesbs_ctr_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	/*
-	 * Temporarily disable interrupts to avoid races where
-	 * cachelines are evicted when the CPU is interrupted
-	 * to do something else.
-	 */
-	local_irq_save(flags);
-	aes_encrypt(&ctx->fallback, dst, src);
-	local_irq_restore(flags);
-}
-
-static int ctr_encrypt_sync(struct skcipher_request *req)
-{
-	if (!crypto_simd_usable())
-		return crypto_ctr_encrypt_walk(req, ctr_encrypt_one);
-
-	return ctr_encrypt(req);
-}
-
 static int __xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool encrypt,
 		       void (*fn)(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[],
 				  int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[]))
@@ -431,13 +384,12 @@ static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 }
 
 static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
-	.base.cra_name		= "__ecb(aes)",
-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "__ecb-aes-neonbs",
+	.base.cra_name		= "ecb(aes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	= "ecb-aes-neonbs",
 	.base.cra_priority	= 250,
 	.base.cra_blocksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct aesbs_ctx),
 	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
 
 	.min_keysize		= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
 	.max_keysize		= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
@@ -446,13 +398,12 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.encrypt		= ecb_encrypt,
 	.decrypt		= ecb_decrypt,
 }, {
-	.base.cra_name		= "__cbc(aes)",
-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "__cbc-aes-neonbs",
+	.base.cra_name		= "cbc(aes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	= "cbc-aes-neonbs",
 	.base.cra_priority	= 250,
 	.base.cra_blocksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct aesbs_cbc_ctx),
 	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
 
 	.min_keysize		= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
 	.max_keysize		= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
@@ -462,13 +413,12 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.encrypt		= cbc_encrypt,
 	.decrypt		= cbc_decrypt,
 }, {
-	.base.cra_name		= "__ctr(aes)",
-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "__ctr-aes-neonbs",
+	.base.cra_name		= "ctr(aes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	= "ctr-aes-neonbs",
 	.base.cra_priority	= 250,
 	.base.cra_blocksize	= 1,
 	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct aesbs_ctx),
 	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
 
 	.min_keysize		= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
 	.max_keysize		= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
@@ -479,29 +429,12 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.encrypt		= ctr_encrypt,
 	.decrypt		= ctr_encrypt,
 }, {
-	.base.cra_name		= "ctr(aes)",
-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "ctr-aes-neonbs",
-	.base.cra_priority	= 250 - 1,
-	.base.cra_blocksize	= 1,
-	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct aesbs_ctr_ctx),
-	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
-
-	.min_keysize		= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
-	.max_keysize		= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
-	.chunksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	.walksize		= 8 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	.ivsize			= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	.setkey			= aesbs_ctr_setkey_sync,
-	.encrypt		= ctr_encrypt_sync,
-	.decrypt		= ctr_encrypt_sync,
-}, {
-	.base.cra_name		= "__xts(aes)",
-	.base.cra_driver_name	= "__xts-aes-neonbs",
+	.base.cra_name		= "xts(aes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	= "xts-aes-neonbs",
 	.base.cra_priority	= 250,
 	.base.cra_blocksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct aesbs_xts_ctx),
 	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
-	.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
 
 	.min_keysize		= 2 * AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
 	.max_keysize		= 2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
@@ -512,54 +445,17 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.decrypt		= xts_decrypt,
 } };
 
-static struct simd_skcipher_alg *aes_simd_algs[ARRAY_SIZE(aes_algs)];
-
 static void aes_exit(void)
 {
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(aes_simd_algs); i++)
-		if (aes_simd_algs[i])
-			simd_skcipher_free(aes_simd_algs[i]);
-
 	crypto_unregister_skciphers(aes_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(aes_algs));
 }
 
 static int __init aes_init(void)
 {
-	struct simd_skcipher_alg *simd;
-	const char *basename;
-	const char *algname;
-	const char *drvname;
-	int err;
-	int i;
-
 	if (!cpu_have_named_feature(ASIMD))
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	err = crypto_register_skciphers(aes_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(aes_algs));
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(aes_algs); i++) {
-		if (!(aes_algs[i].base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
-			continue;
-
-		algname = aes_algs[i].base.cra_name + 2;
-		drvname = aes_algs[i].base.cra_driver_name + 2;
-		basename = aes_algs[i].base.cra_driver_name;
-		simd = simd_skcipher_create_compat(algname, drvname, basename);
-		err = PTR_ERR(simd);
-		if (IS_ERR(simd))
-			goto unregister_simds;
-
-		aes_simd_algs[i] = simd;
-	}
-	return 0;
-
-unregister_simds:
-	aes_exit();
-	return err;
+	return crypto_register_skciphers(aes_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(aes_algs));
 }
 
 module_init(aes_init);
-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v4 6/7] crypto: arm64/aes-ce - stop using SIMD helper for skciphers

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Calls into the skcipher API can only occur from contexts where the SIMD
unit is available, so there is no need for the SIMD helper.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig    |   4 -
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 102 +++-----------------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig
index ed1e8cadeb3a..454621a20eaa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -88,16 +88,12 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_ARM64_CE_BLK
 	depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
 	select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
 	select CRYPTO_AES_ARM64_CE
-	select CRYPTO_AES_ARM64
-	select CRYPTO_SIMD
 
 config CRYPTO_AES_ARM64_NEON_BLK
 	tristate "AES in ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS modes using NEON instructions"
 	depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
 	select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
-	select CRYPTO_AES_ARM64
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
-	select CRYPTO_SIMD
 
 config CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON
 	tristate "ChaCha20, XChaCha20, and XChaCha12 stream ciphers using NEON instructions"
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index 17e735931a0c..30b7cc6a7079 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused essiv_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return err ?: cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
 }
 
-static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int __maybe_unused ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
@@ -485,29 +485,6 @@ static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static void ctr_encrypt_one(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *src, u8 *dst)
-{
-	const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	/*
-	 * Temporarily disable interrupts to avoid races where
-	 * cachelines are evicted when the CPU is interrupted
-	 * to do something else.
-	 */
-	local_irq_save(flags);
-	aes_encrypt(ctx, dst, src);
-	local_irq_restore(flags);
-}
-
-static int __maybe_unused ctr_encrypt_sync(struct skcipher_request *req)
-{
-	if (!crypto_simd_usable())
-		return crypto_ctr_encrypt_walk(req, ctr_encrypt_one);
-
-	return ctr_encrypt(req);
-}
-
 static int __maybe_unused xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -656,10 +633,9 @@ static int __maybe_unused xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 #if defined(USE_V8_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS) || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_ARM64_BS)
 	.base = {
-		.cra_name		= "__ecb(aes)",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "__ecb-aes-" MODE,
+		.cra_name		= "ecb(aes)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "ecb-aes-" MODE,
 		.cra_priority		= PRIO,
-		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
 		.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
 		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
@@ -671,10 +647,9 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.decrypt	= ecb_decrypt,
 }, {
 	.base = {
-		.cra_name		= "__cbc(aes)",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "__cbc-aes-" MODE,
+		.cra_name		= "cbc(aes)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "cbc-aes-" MODE,
 		.cra_priority		= PRIO,
-		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
 		.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
 		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
@@ -687,10 +662,9 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.decrypt	= cbc_decrypt,
 }, {
 	.base = {
-		.cra_name		= "__ctr(aes)",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "__ctr-aes-" MODE,
+		.cra_name		= "ctr(aes)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "ctr-aes-" MODE,
 		.cra_priority		= PRIO,
-		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
 		.cra_blocksize		= 1,
 		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
 		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
@@ -704,26 +678,9 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.decrypt	= ctr_encrypt,
 }, {
 	.base = {
-		.cra_name		= "ctr(aes)",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "ctr-aes-" MODE,
-		.cra_priority		= PRIO - 1,
-		.cra_blocksize		= 1,
-		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
-		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
-	},
-	.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
-	.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
-	.ivsize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	.chunksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	.setkey		= skcipher_aes_setkey,
-	.encrypt	= ctr_encrypt_sync,
-	.decrypt	= ctr_encrypt_sync,
-}, {
-	.base = {
-		.cra_name		= "__xts(aes)",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "__xts-aes-" MODE,
+		.cra_name		= "xts(aes)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "xts-aes-" MODE,
 		.cra_priority		= PRIO,
-		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
 		.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_xts_ctx),
 		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
@@ -738,10 +695,9 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 }, {
 #endif
 	.base = {
-		.cra_name		= "__cts(cbc(aes))",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "__cts-cbc-aes-" MODE,
+		.cra_name		= "cts(cbc(aes))",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "cts-cbc-aes-" MODE,
 		.cra_priority		= PRIO,
-		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
 		.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
 		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
@@ -755,10 +711,9 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.decrypt	= cts_cbc_decrypt,
 }, {
 	.base = {
-		.cra_name		= "__essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
-		.cra_driver_name	= "__essiv-cbc-aes-sha256-" MODE,
+		.cra_name		= "essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "essiv-cbc-aes-sha256-" MODE,
 		.cra_priority		= PRIO + 1,
-		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
 		.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx),
 		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
@@ -997,28 +952,15 @@ static struct shash_alg mac_algs[] = { {
 	.descsize		= sizeof(struct mac_desc_ctx),
 } };
 
-static struct simd_skcipher_alg *aes_simd_algs[ARRAY_SIZE(aes_algs)];
-
 static void aes_exit(void)
 {
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(aes_simd_algs); i++)
-		if (aes_simd_algs[i])
-			simd_skcipher_free(aes_simd_algs[i]);
-
 	crypto_unregister_shashes(mac_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs));
 	crypto_unregister_skciphers(aes_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(aes_algs));
 }
 
 static int __init aes_init(void)
 {
-	struct simd_skcipher_alg *simd;
-	const char *basename;
-	const char *algname;
-	const char *drvname;
 	int err;
-	int i;
 
 	err = crypto_register_skciphers(aes_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(aes_algs));
 	if (err)
@@ -1028,26 +970,8 @@ static int __init aes_init(void)
 	if (err)
 		goto unregister_ciphers;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(aes_algs); i++) {
-		if (!(aes_algs[i].base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL))
-			continue;
-
-		algname = aes_algs[i].base.cra_name + 2;
-		drvname = aes_algs[i].base.cra_driver_name + 2;
-		basename = aes_algs[i].base.cra_driver_name;
-		simd = simd_skcipher_create_compat(algname, drvname, basename);
-		err = PTR_ERR(simd);
-		if (IS_ERR(simd))
-			goto unregister_simds;
-
-		aes_simd_algs[i] = simd;
-	}
-
 	return 0;
 
-unregister_simds:
-	aes_exit();
-	return err;
 unregister_ciphers:
 	crypto_unregister_skciphers(aes_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(aes_algs));
 	return err;
-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v4 7/7] crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - remove non-SIMD fallback path

[Ard Biesheuvel]

AES/CCM on arm64 is implemented as a synchronous AEAD, and so it is
guaranteed by the API that it is only invoked in task or softirq
context. Since softirqs are now only handled when the SIMD is not
being used in the task context that was interrupted to service the
softirq, we no longer need a fallback path. Let's remove it.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S |   1 +
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c | 183 ++++++--------------
 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S
index 99a028e298ed..8adff299fcd3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-core.S
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(ce_aes_ccm_final)
 SYM_FUNC_END(ce_aes_ccm_final)
 
 	.macro	aes_ccm_do_crypt,enc
+	cbz	x2, 5f
 	ldr	x8, [x6, #8]			/* load lower ctr */
 	ld1	{v0.16b}, [x5]			/* load mac */
 CPU_LE(	rev	x8, x8			)	/* keep swabbed ctr in reg */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c
index f6d19b0dc893..a36df98f6fae 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c
@@ -99,36 +99,8 @@ static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen)
 static void ccm_update_mac(struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, u8 mac[], u8 const in[],
 			   u32 abytes, u32 *macp)
 {
-	if (crypto_simd_usable()) {
-		kernel_neon_begin();
-		ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, in, abytes, macp, key->key_enc,
-				     num_rounds(key));
-		kernel_neon_end();
-	} else {
-		if (*macp > 0 && *macp < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-			int added = min(abytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - *macp);
-
-			crypto_xor(&mac[*macp], in, added);
-
-			*macp += added;
-			in += added;
-			abytes -= added;
-		}
-
-		while (abytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-			aes_encrypt(key, mac, mac);
-			crypto_xor(mac, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
-			in += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-			abytes -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-		}
-
-		if (abytes > 0) {
-			aes_encrypt(key, mac, mac);
-			crypto_xor(mac, in, abytes);
-			*macp = abytes;
-		}
-	}
+	ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, in, abytes, macp, key->key_enc,
+			     num_rounds(key));
 }
 
 static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[])
@@ -171,54 +143,6 @@ static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[])
 	} while (len);
 }
 
-static int ccm_crypt_fallback(struct skcipher_walk *walk, u8 mac[], u8 iv0[],
-			      struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, bool enc)
-{
-	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-	int err = 0;
-
-	while (walk->nbytes) {
-		int blocks = walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-		u32 tail = walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-		u8 *dst = walk->dst.virt.addr;
-		u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr;
-		u32 nbytes = walk->nbytes;
-
-		if (nbytes == walk->total && tail > 0) {
-			blocks++;
-			tail = 0;
-		}
-
-		do {
-			u32 bsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
-			if (nbytes < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
-				bsize = nbytes;
-
-			crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-			aes_encrypt(ctx, buf, walk->iv);
-			aes_encrypt(ctx, mac, mac);
-			if (enc)
-				crypto_xor(mac, src, bsize);
-			crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, buf, bsize);
-			if (!enc)
-				crypto_xor(mac, dst, bsize);
-			dst += bsize;
-			src += bsize;
-			nbytes -= bsize;
-		} while (--blocks);
-
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, tail);
-	}
-
-	if (!err) {
-		aes_encrypt(ctx, buf, iv0);
-		aes_encrypt(ctx, mac, mac);
-		crypto_xor(mac, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	}
-	return err;
-}
-
 static int ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
@@ -233,41 +157,40 @@ static int ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (req->assoclen)
-		ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac);
-
 	/* preserve the original iv for the final round */
 	memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
 
-	if (crypto_simd_usable()) {
-		while (walk.nbytes) {
-			u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	kernel_neon_begin();
 
-			if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
-				tail = 0;
+	if (req->assoclen)
+		ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac);
 
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr,
-					   walk.src.virt.addr,
-					   walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc,
-					   num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
+	do {
+		u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail);
-		}
-		if (!err) {
+		if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
+			tail = 0;
+
+		ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				   walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc,
+				   num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv);
+
+		if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
+			ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx));
+
+		kernel_neon_end();
+
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail);
+		if (unlikely(err))
+			return err;
+
+		if (unlikely(walk.nbytes))
 			kernel_neon_begin();
-			ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc,
-					 num_rounds(ctx));
-			kernel_neon_end();
-		}
-	} else {
-		err = ccm_crypt_fallback(&walk, mac, buf, ctx, true);
-	}
-	if (err)
-		return err;
+	} while (walk.nbytes);
 
 	/* copy authtag to end of dst */
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(mac, req->dst, req->assoclen + req->cryptlen,
@@ -291,42 +214,40 @@ static int ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (req->assoclen)
-		ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac);
-
 	/* preserve the original iv for the final round */
 	memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
 
-	if (crypto_simd_usable()) {
-		while (walk.nbytes) {
-			u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	kernel_neon_begin();
 
-			if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
-				tail = 0;
+	if (req->assoclen)
+		ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac);
 
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr,
-					   walk.src.virt.addr,
-					   walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc,
-					   num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
+	do {
+		u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail);
-		}
-		if (!err) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc,
-					 num_rounds(ctx));
-			kernel_neon_end();
-		}
-	} else {
-		err = ccm_crypt_fallback(&walk, mac, buf, ctx, false);
-	}
+		if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
+			tail = 0;
 
-	if (err)
-		return err;
+		ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				   walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc,
+				   num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv);
+
+		if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
+			ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx));
+
+		kernel_neon_end();
+
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail);
+		if (unlikely(err))
+			return err;
+
+		if (unlikely(walk.nbytes))
+			kernel_neon_begin();
+	} while (walk.nbytes);
 
 	/* compare calculated auth tag with the stored one */
 	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(buf, req->src,
-- 
2.20.1


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Re: [PATCH v4 2/7] crypto: aead - disallow en/decrypt for non-task or non-softirq context

[Herbert Xu]

On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 01:22:34PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>
>  	crypto_stats_get(alg);
> -	if (crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
> +	if (!(alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) &&
> +	    WARN_ONCE(!in_task() && !in_serving_softirq(),
> +		      "synchronous call from invalid context\n"))
> +		ret = -EBUSY;

I don't think we've ever supported crypto in hard IRQ contexts.
So this should be done regardless of ASYNC.

Then again, do we really need this since the assumption has
always been that the crypto API can only be invoked in user or
softirq context?

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

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Re: [PATCH v4 2/7] crypto: aead - disallow en/decrypt for non-task or non-softirq context

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On Wed, 19 May 2021 at 13:29, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 01:22:34PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >
> >       crypto_stats_get(alg);
> > -     if (crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
> > +     if (!(alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) &&
> > +         WARN_ONCE(!in_task() && !in_serving_softirq(),
> > +                   "synchronous call from invalid context\n"))
> > +             ret = -EBUSY;
>
> I don't think we've ever supported crypto in hard IRQ contexts.
> So this should be done regardless of ASYNC.
>

OK.

> Then again, do we really need this since the assumption has
> always been that the crypto API can only be invoked in user or
> softirq context?
>

With this series applied, some of the arm64 accelerated s/w
implementations will no longer work correctly when this rule is
violated, and so it would be nice to have a sanity check somewhere.
And policing rules like these is best done in generic code, right?

So if we do need to check this, we should check it here. If we don't,
then we can drop these patches.

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Re: [PATCH v4 2/7] crypto: aead - disallow en/decrypt for non-task or non-softirq context

[Herbert Xu]

On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 01:36:37PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> 
> So if we do need to check this, we should check it here. If we don't,
> then we can drop these patches.

Historically other things would break in nasty ways if you tried
to do crypto in hard IRQ contexts, e.g., overwritten kmap slots
back when we had individual slots for each context, but I don't
think we've ever found anyone crazy enough to do that to warrant
a run-time check.

I'd just leave it out for now.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

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Re: [PATCH v4 2/7] crypto: aead - disallow en/decrypt for non-task or non-softirq context

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On Wed, 19 May 2021 at 13:51, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 01:36:37PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >
> > So if we do need to check this, we should check it here. If we don't,
> > then we can drop these patches.
>
> Historically other things would break in nasty ways if you tried
> to do crypto in hard IRQ contexts, e.g., overwritten kmap slots
> back when we had individual slots for each context, but I don't
> think we've ever found anyone crazy enough to do that to warrant
> a run-time check.
>
> I'd just leave it out for now.
>

Fair enough. Would you like me to resend the series with these patches
left out Or are you ok to just take the remaining ones (assuming there
are no issues reported with those)?

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