From: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: mlangsdo@redhat.com, julien.thierry@arm.com,
marc.zyngier@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
suzuki.poulose@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, steven.price@arm.com,
ykaukab@suse.de, dave.martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/12] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 21:05:39 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <602509505.322713.1549656339538@email.ionos.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190125180711.1970973-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com>
> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> hat am 25. Januar 2019 um 19:06 geschrieben:
>
>
> Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable
> vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
>
> This series enables that behavior by providing the expected
> functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature
> states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately
> to display the overall machine status. This means that in a
> heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated
> or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or
> mitigated.
>
The whole series is:
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
with a Raspberry Pi 3 B+
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-08 20:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-25 18:06 [PATCH v4 00/12] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 01/12] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:02 ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-06 19:24 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-02-06 21:06 ` André Przywara
2019-01-31 17:58 ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-07 0:25 ` Jonathan Corbet
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 02/12] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:03 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 03/12] arm64: Remove the ability to build a kernel without ssbd Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:04 ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-15 18:20 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-02-15 18:54 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 04/12] arm64: remove the ability to build a kernel without hardened branch predictors Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:04 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 05/12] arm64: remove the ability to build a kernel without kpti Jeremy Linton
2019-01-30 18:05 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 06/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:52 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 07/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 9:28 ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-31 21:48 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:54 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-31 21:53 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 08/12] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:54 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 09/12] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 10/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 11/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:55 ` Andre Przywara
2019-01-25 18:07 ` [PATCH v4 12/12] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2019-01-31 17:56 ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-08 20:05 ` Stefan Wahren [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=602509505.322713.1549656339538@email.ionos.de \
--to=stefan.wahren@i2se.com \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dave.martin@arm.com \
--cc=jeremy.linton@arm.com \
--cc=julien.thierry@arm.com \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=marc.zyngier@arm.com \
--cc=mlangsdo@redhat.com \
--cc=shankerd@codeaurora.org \
--cc=steven.price@arm.com \
--cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
--cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
--cc=ykaukab@suse.de \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).