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From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Serban Constantinescu <serbanc@google.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 16/21] kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 17:55:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+YF9bL8jRjVMfryr+LExYjH-rNdDEq2SvuQD+rGT4mVJQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ce573435398f21d3e604f104c29ba65eca70d9e7.1603372719.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

On Thu, Oct 22, 2020 at 3:20 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> wrote:
>
> Since kasan_kmalloc() always follows kasan_slab_alloc(), there's no need
> to reunpoison the object data, only to poison the redzone.
>
> This requires changing kasan annotation for early SLUB cache to
> kasan_slab_alloc(). Otherwise kasan_kmalloc() doesn't untag the object.
> This doesn't do any functional changes, as kmem_cache_node->object_size
> is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
>
> Similarly for kasan_krealloc(), as it's called after ksize(), which
> already unpoisoned the object, there's no need to do it again.

Have you considered doing this the other way around: make krealloc
call __ksize and unpoison in kasan_krealloc?
This has the advantage of more precise poisoning as ksize will
unpoison the whole underlying object.

But then maybe we will need to move first checks in ksize into __ksize
as we may need them in krealloc as well.





> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
> Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I4083d3b55605f70fef79bca9b90843c4390296f2
> ---
>  mm/kasan/common.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  mm/slub.c         |  3 +--
>  2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index c5ec60e1a4d2..a581937c2a44 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -360,8 +360,14 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
>         if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
>                 tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
>
> -       /* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
> -       kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
> +       /*
> +        * Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for:
> +        * 1. krealloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned via ksize();
> +        * 2. kmalloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned by kasan_kmalloc().
> +        * Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS.
> +        */
> +       if (!keep_tag)
> +               kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
>         kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
>                 KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
>
> @@ -384,10 +390,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
>
> -void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
> -                                               gfp_t flags)
> +static void * __must_check ____kasan_kmalloc_large(struct page *page, const void *ptr,
> +                                               size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool realloc)
>  {
> -       struct page *page;
>         unsigned long redzone_start;
>         unsigned long redzone_end;
>
> @@ -397,18 +402,24 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
>         if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
>                 return NULL;
>
> -       page = virt_to_page(ptr);
> -       redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
> -                               KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> +       redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
>         redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
>
> -       kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
> +       /* ksize() in __do_krealloc() already unpoisoned the memory. */
> +       if (!realloc)
> +               kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
>         kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
>                 KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
>
>         return (void *)ptr;
>  }
>
> +void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
> +                                               gfp_t flags)
> +{
> +       return ____kasan_kmalloc_large(virt_to_page(ptr), ptr, size, flags, false);
> +}
> +
>  void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
>  {
>         struct page *page;
> @@ -419,7 +430,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
>         page = virt_to_head_page(object);
>
>         if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
> -               return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
> +               return ____kasan_kmalloc_large(page, object, size, flags, true);
>         else
>                 return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
>                                                 flags, true);
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 1d3f2355df3b..afb035b0bf2d 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -3535,8 +3535,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
>         init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
>         init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
>  #endif
> -       n = kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
> -                     GFP_KERNEL);
> +       n = kasan_slab_alloc(kmem_cache_node, n, GFP_KERNEL);
>         page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmem_cache_node, n);
>         page->inuse = 1;
>         page->frozen = 0;
> --
> 2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2020-10-28 16:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-22 13:18 [PATCH RFC v2 00/21] kasan: hardware tag-based mode for production use on arm64 Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 01/21] kasan: simplify quarantine_put call site Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-27 12:40   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 02/21] kasan: rename get_alloc/free_info Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-27 12:40   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 03/21] kasan: introduce set_alloc_info Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-27 12:41   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 04/21] kasan: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-27 12:44   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-27 12:45     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-29 19:57     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 10:59       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-16 11:50         ` Marco Elver
2020-11-16 12:16           ` Catalin Marinas
2020-11-16 12:19             ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-11-16 12:45               ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-16 13:50                 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-16 14:50                   ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 05/21] kasan: allow VMAP_STACK for HW_TAGS mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-27 12:49   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-29 20:00     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 06/21] kasan: mark kasan_init_tags as __init Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 10:08   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-29 20:08     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:18 ` [PATCH RFC v2 07/21] kasan, arm64: move initialization message Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 10:55   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-29 20:14     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-03 15:33       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 08/21] kasan: remove __kasan_unpoison_stack Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 10:57   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 09/21] kasan: inline kasan_reset_tag for tag-based modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 11:05   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 16:19     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 10/21] kasan: inline random_tag for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 11:08   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 15:48     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-30 16:07       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 11/21] kasan: inline kasan_poison_memory and check_invalid_free Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 11:29   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 12/21] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 11:36   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 16:34     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-30 17:46       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 13/21] arm64: kasan: Add cpu_supports_tags helper Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 11:38   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 14/21] kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 18:50   ` Marco Elver
2020-10-22 20:28     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 12:27   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 19:30     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-30 14:45   ` Marco Elver
2020-10-30 19:30     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 15/21] kasan: check kasan_enabled in annotations Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 16:47   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-30 19:47     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 16/21] kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 16:55   ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message]
2020-11-02 15:17     ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 17/21] kasan: simplify kasan_poison_kfree Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 16:57   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 18/21] kasan: rename kasan_poison_kfree Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 16:58   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 19/21] kasan: don't round_up too much Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 17:01   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 20/21] kasan: simplify assign_tag and set_tag calls Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 17:03   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 13:19 ` [PATCH RFC v2 21/21] kasan: clarify comment in __kasan_kfree_large Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-28 17:04   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 15:15 ` [PATCH RFC v2 00/21] kasan: hardware tag-based mode for production use on arm64 Dmitry Vyukov
2020-10-22 17:00   ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-22 18:29     ` Kostya Serebryany

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