From: keescook@google.com (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] sh64: ascii armor the sh64 boot init stack canary
Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 09:35:38 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJafqLN7b7kPYYsY8pP1tig8O8TsFkWvWeHG5mT3Gz1rw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170524123446.78510066@annuminas.surriel.com>
On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 9:34 AM, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> wrote:
> Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
> from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
> somehow obtain the canary value.
>
> Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
>
> Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> ---
> arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h
> index d9df3a76847c..141515a43b78 100644
> --- a/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h
> +++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
> /* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
> get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
> canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
> + canary &= CANARY_MASK;
>
> current->stack_canary = canary;
> __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-24 16:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-24 15:57 [PATCH v2 0/5] stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary riel at redhat.com
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 1/5] random, stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function riel at redhat.com
2017-05-24 16:15 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 2/5] fork, random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary riel at redhat.com
2017-05-24 16:16 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86: ascii armor the x86_64 boot init stack canary riel at redhat.com
2017-05-24 16:16 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 4/5] arm64: ascii armor the arm64 " riel at redhat.com
2017-05-24 16:16 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 5/5] sh64: ascii armor the sh64 " riel at redhat.com
2017-05-24 16:34 ` Rik van Riel
2017-05-24 16:35 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-09-19 17:16 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/5] stackprotector: ascii armor the " Solar Designer
2017-09-19 20:22 ` Kees Cook
2017-09-19 21:10 ` Daniel Micay
2017-09-20 11:18 ` Yann Droneaud
2017-09-20 15:03 ` Solar Designer
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-05-19 21:26 riel at redhat.com
2017-05-19 21:26 ` [PATCH 5/5] sh64: ascii armor the sh64 boot init " riel at redhat.com
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