From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC/RFT PATCH 00/16] arm64: backport SSBS handling to v4.19-stable
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2019 10:12:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu9sg0kpkHWDTdSO1Gz2iCpi2uKr0STQVOWReqw0UxUM4Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191004120430.11929-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On Fri, 4 Oct 2019 at 14:04, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> This is a fairly mechnical backport to v4.19 of the changes needed to support
> managing the SSBS state, which controls whether Speculative Store Bypass is
> permitted.
>
> I have included Jeremy's sysfs changes as well, since they are equally
> suitable for stable and made for a much cleaner backport, so it made
> little sense to handle them separately.
>
> These patches are presented for review, and are not being cc'ed to the
> -stable maintainers just yet.
>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
> Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
>
If nobody has any objections, I'll send these out to -stable end of today.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-08 8:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-04 12:04 [RFC/RFT PATCH 00/16] arm64: backport SSBS handling to v4.19-stable Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 01/16] arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 14:35 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-08 14:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 02/16] arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 03/16] KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 04/16] arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 05/16] arm64: fix SSBS sanitization Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 06/16] arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 07/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 08/16] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 09/16] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 10/16] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 11/16] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:05 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 12/16] arm64: Always enable ssb " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 13/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 14/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 15/16] arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 16/16] arm64: Force SSBS on context switch Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 8:12 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2019-10-08 15:09 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 00/16] arm64: backport SSBS handling to v4.19-stable Mark Rutland
2019-10-08 15:10 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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