[PATCH v2 5/5] arm64: add KASan support

[ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com (Andrey Ryabinin)]

2015-08-24 16:45 GMT+03:00 Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>:
> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 3:15 PM, Russell King - ARM Linux
> <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>> On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 11:27:56PM +0200, Linus Walleij wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 4:27 PM, Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> > I used vexpress. Anyway, it doesn't matter now, since I have an update
>>> > with a lot of stuff fixed, and it works on hardware.
>>> > I still need to do some work on it and tomorrow, probably, I will share.
>>>
>>> Ah awesome. I have a stash of ARM boards so I can test it on a
>>> range of hardware once you feel it's ready.
>>>
>>> Sorry for pulling stuff out of your hands, people are excited about
>>> KASan ARM32 as it turns out.
>>
>> People may be excited about it because it's a new feature, but we really
>> need to consider whether gobbling up 512MB of userspace for it is a good
>> idea or not.  There are programs around which like to map large amounts
>> of memory into their process space, and the more we steal from them, the
>> more likely these programs are to fail.
>
> I looked at some different approaches over the last weeks for this
> when playing around with KASan.
>
> It seems since KASan was developed on 64bit systems, this was
> not much of an issue for them as they could take their shadow
> memory from the vmalloc space.
>
> I think it is possible to actually just steal as much memory as is
> needed to cover the kernel, and not 1/8 of the entire addressable
> 32bit space. So instead of covering all from 0x0-0xffffffff
> at least just MODULES_VADDR thru 0xffffffff should be enough.
> So if that is 0xbf000000-0xffffffff in most cases, 0x41000000
> bytes, then 1/8 of that, 0x8200000, 130MB should be enough.
> (Andrey need to say if this is possible.)
>

Yes, ~130Mb (3G/1G split) should work. 512Mb shadow is optional.
The only advantage of 512Mb shadow is better handling of user memory
accesses bugs
(access to user memory without copy_from_user/copy_to_user/strlen_user etc API).
In case of 512Mb shadow we could to not map anything in shadow for
user addresses, so such bug will
guarantee  to crash the kernel.
In case of 130Mb, the behavior will depend on memory layout of the
current process.
So, I think it's fine to keep shadow only for kernel addresses.

> That will probably miss some usecases I'm not familiar with, where
> the kernel is actually executing something below 0xbf000000...
>
> I looked at taking memory from vmalloc instead, but ran into
> problems since this is subject to the highmem split and KASan
> need to have it's address offset at compile time. On
> Ux500 I managed to remove all the static maps and steal memory
> from the top of the vmalloc area instead of the beginning, but
> that is probably not generally feasible.
>
> I suspect you have better ideas than what I can come up
> with though.
>
> Yours,
> Linus Walleij