From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 14:36:50 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cc239899-5c52-2fd0-286d-4bff18877937@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200108160713.GI2844@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
On 08.01.2020 19:07, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 12:25:35PM +0300, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>>
>> Open access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged
>> processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events
>> subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but
>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged
>> with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++---
>> kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++---
>> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
>> index 34c7c6910026..f46acd69425f 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
>> @@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
>>
>> static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
>> {
>> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
>> return -EACCES;
>>
>> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
>> @@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
>>
>> static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
>> {
>> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
>> return -EACCES;
>>
>> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
>> @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
>>
>> static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
>> {
>> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
>> return -EPERM;
>>
>> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
>
> These are OK I suppose.
>
>> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
>> index 059ee7116008..d9db414f2197 100644
>> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
>> @@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
>> if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)
>> return -ENOENT;
>>
>> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + if (!perfmon_capable())
>> return -EACCES;
>>
>> /*
>
> This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does
> not allow creation of kprobes.
This unblocks creation of local trace kprobes and uprobes by CAP_SYS_PERFMON
privileged process, exactly the same as for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process.
>
>> @@ -9116,7 +9116,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
>> if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)
>> return -ENOENT;
>>
>> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + if (!perfmon_capable())
>> return -EACCES;
>>
>> /*
>
> Idem, I presume.
>
>> @@ -11157,7 +11157,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
>> }
>>
>> if (attr.namespaces) {
>> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>> + if (!perfmon_capable())
>> return -EACCES;
>> }
>
> And given we basically make the entire kernel observable with this CAP,
> busting namespaces shoulnd't be a problem either.
>
> So yeah, I suppose that works.
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-09 11:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-18 9:16 [PATCH v4 0/7] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:24 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 19:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-28 3:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-01-13 20:25 ` Song Liu
2019-12-18 9:25 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-01-08 16:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-09 11:36 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2020-01-10 14:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-10 15:52 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 16:45 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-01-10 23:47 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-11 0:23 ` Song Liu
2020-01-10 16:41 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 17:34 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:26 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:27 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-19 9:10 ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-18 9:28 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-13 20:47 ` Song Liu
2019-12-18 9:28 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:29 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-27 8:52 ` Helge Deller
2019-12-18 9:30 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-17 10:51 ` Will Deacon
2020-01-17 21:33 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-18 18:48 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 9:31 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] drivers/oprofile: " Alexey Budankov
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