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From: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Julien Thierry <Julien.Thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
	Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	mark.brown@arm.com, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v4.4 V2 42/43] arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaround
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 10:58:30 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e6ae4dd9fe11fe90e240f79d9414b35ecdce0c28.1562908075.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1562908074.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org>

From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

commit 3a0a397ff5ff8b56ca9f7908b75dee6bf0b5fabb upstream.

Now that we've standardised on SMCCC v1.1 to perform the branch
prediction invalidation, let's drop the previous band-aid.
If vendors haven't updated their firmware to do SMCCC 1.1, they
haven't updated PSCI either, so we don't loose anything.

Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
[ v4.4: Dropped switch.c changes ]
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S        | 24 ------------------
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 45 ++++++++++------------------------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S
index c72f261f4b64..dc4eb154e33b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S
@@ -54,30 +54,6 @@ ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start)
 	vectors __kvm_hyp_vector
 	.endr
 ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end)
-ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_start)
-	sub	sp, sp, #(8 * 18)
-	stp	x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)]
-	stp	x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)]
-	stp	x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)]
-	stp	x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)]
-	stp	x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)]
-	stp	x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)]
-	stp	x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)]
-	stp	x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)]
-	stp	x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)]
-	mov	x0, #0x84000000
-	smc	#0
-	ldp	x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)]
-	ldp	x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)]
-	ldp	x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)]
-	ldp	x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)]
-	ldp	x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)]
-	ldp	x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)]
-	ldp	x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)]
-	ldp	x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)]
-	ldp	x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)]
-	add	sp, sp, #(8 * 18)
-ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_end)
 
 .macro smccc_workaround_1 inst
 	sub	sp, sp, #(8 * 4)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index d5fd7be563bc..2a17789bb963 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM
-extern char __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start[], __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end[];
 extern char __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start[];
 extern char __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end[];
 extern char __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_start[];
@@ -97,8 +96,6 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
 	spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
 }
 #else
-#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start	NULL
-#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end		NULL
 #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start		NULL
 #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end		NULL
 #define __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_start		NULL
@@ -143,24 +140,25 @@ static void call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
 	arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
 }
 
-static bool check_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
+static int enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(void *data)
 {
+	const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data;
 	bp_hardening_cb_t cb;
 	void *smccc_start, *smccc_end;
 	struct arm_smccc_res res;
 
 	if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
-		return false;
+		return 0;
 
 	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
-		return false;
+		return 0;
 
 	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
 		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
 				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
 		if (res.a0)
-			return false;
+			return 0;
 		cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
 		smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_start;
 		smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_end;
@@ -170,35 +168,18 @@ static bool check_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *e
 		arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
 				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
 		if (res.a0)
-			return false;
+			return 0;
 		cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
 		smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start;
 		smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end;
 		break;
 
 	default:
-		return false;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	install_bp_hardening_cb(entry, cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
 
-	return true;
-}
-
-static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data)
-{
-	const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data;
-
-	if (psci_ops.get_version) {
-		if (check_smccc_arch_workaround_1(entry))
-			return 0;
-
-		install_bp_hardening_cb(entry,
-				       (bp_hardening_cb_t)psci_ops.get_version,
-				       __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start,
-				       __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end);
-	}
-
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
@@ -283,32 +264,32 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
-		.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+		.enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
-		.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+		.enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
-		.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+		.enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
-		.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+		.enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN),
-		.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+		.enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2),
-		.enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
+		.enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 #endif
 	{
-- 
2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-07-12  5:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-12  5:27 [PATCH v4.4 V2 00/43] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 01/43] arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 02/43] arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec() Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 03/43] arm64: move TASK_* definitions to <asm/processor.h> Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 04/43] arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 05/43] arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 06/43] arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 07/43] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 08/43] arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 09/43] mm/kasan: add API to check memory regions Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 10/43] arm64: kasan: instrument user memory access API Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:27 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 11/43] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31 12:37   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-01  3:38     ` Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 12/43] arm64: cpufeature: Test 'matches' pointer to find the end of the list Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 13/43] arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 14/43] arm64: Introduce cpu_die_early Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 15/43] arm64: Move cpu_die_early to smp.c Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31 12:35   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-01  3:35     ` Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 16/43] arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 17/43] arm64: errata: Calling enable functions for CPU errata too Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 18/43] arm64: Rearrange CPU errata workaround checks Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 19/43] arm64: Run enable method for errata work arounds on late CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 20/43] arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 21/43] drivers/firmware: Expose psci_get_version through psci_ops structure Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 22/43] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 23/43] arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C code Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 24/43] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31 16:45   ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-01  5:20     ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-06 12:18       ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-08 12:06         ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-28 10:23           ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-28 16:08           ` Mark Rutland
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 25/43] arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31 13:09   ` Julien Thierry
2019-08-01  5:09     ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-01  6:30       ` Julien Thierry
2019-08-01  6:35         ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-01  6:57           ` Greg KH
2019-08-01  7:05             ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-01  7:34               ` Will Deacon
2019-08-01  7:41                 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-01  8:43                 ` Greg KH
2019-08-01  8:49                   ` Julien Thierry
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 26/43] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 27/43] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0 Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 28/43] arm64: cputype: Add missing MIDR values for Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 29/43] arm64: cpu_errata: Allow an erratum to be match for all revisions of a core Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 30/43] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 31/43] arm64: cputype info for Broadcom Vulcan Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 32/43] arm64: cputype: Add MIDR values for Cavium ThunderX2 CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 33/43] arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2 Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 34/43] ARM: 8478/2: arm/arm64: add arm-smccc Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 35/43] arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1 Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 36/43] arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 37/43] firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 38/43] firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 39/43] arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 40/43] arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 41/43] arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-07-12  5:28 ` Viresh Kumar [this message]
2019-07-12  5:28 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 43/43] arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference Viresh Kumar
2019-07-15 13:09 ` [PATCH v4.4 V2 00/43] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Mark Rutland
2019-07-16  3:44   ` Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31  2:52 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-07-31 17:02   ` Mark Rutland

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