From: Konrad Dybcio <konradybcio@gmail.com>
To: Petr Vorel <petr.vorel@gmail.com>,
Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
MSM <linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Gross <agross@kernel.org>, Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org>,
Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@kernel.org>,
"open list:OPEN FIRMWARE AND FLATTENED DEVICE TREE BINDINGS"
<devicetree@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] arm64: dts: qcom: msm8994: Reserve gpio ranges
Date: Sat, 10 Apr 2021 11:16:35 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <10d2cd96-3c35-2b06-82f7-98800888e244@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YHE9Df/Ztq7VaoK2@pevik>
> Konrad, is there any public docs about GPIOs on this secure peripherals?
> It it somehow related to Chain of Trust? [1]. I guess it's not, because once we
> boot Linux all bootloader stuff is over.
No, Qualcomm pretty much does security through obscurity. It's *probably* not even that very secure considering how big in size their TZ+HYP stack is - number of bugs rises exponentially with code size. But not many people tried breaking into it considering the complexity and QCOM's legal team size.
There is no public documentation on that, and even if there were - you are not allowed to flash the "secure" partitions on *your device that you unlocked the bootloader of by choice* (which is absurd).
Also, while "all bootloader stuff is over", the platform is still under control of the proprietary hypervisor and the "Trust Zone". For example if you try to write to some IOMMU registers on certain platforms, the hypervisor will treat that as a security violation and shut down the entire device.
This is essentially the same as your issue. You're trying to poke a thing that Qualcomm *really* doesn't want you to (the fingerprint SPI pins) and since *they* are in control, they say "nonono" and your device dies. All you can do is comply with that (or find a way to replace the blobs or politely ask Google to release a set of unsecure binaries for your Nexus - which they won't do).
Konrad
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-10 9:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-05 20:02 [PATCH 1/1] arm64: dts: qcom: msm8994: Reserve gpio ranges Petr Vorel
2021-04-05 20:09 ` Ricardo Ribalda Delgado
2021-04-05 20:15 ` Petr Vorel
2021-04-05 22:52 ` Bjorn Andersson
2021-04-06 4:38 ` Petr Vorel
2021-04-08 7:17 ` Linus Walleij
2021-04-08 19:02 ` Petr Vorel
2021-04-08 20:05 ` Konrad Dybcio
2021-04-08 21:40 ` Linus Walleij
2021-04-09 3:19 ` Petr Vorel
2021-04-09 3:37 ` Bjorn Andersson
2021-04-10 5:52 ` Petr Vorel
2021-04-10 9:16 ` Konrad Dybcio [this message]
2021-04-10 17:20 ` Petr Vorel
2021-04-12 17:48 ` Petr Vorel
2021-04-08 21:35 ` Linus Walleij
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