From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, io-uring@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2021 16:57:24 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210824205724.GB490529@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <162871480969.63873.9434591871437326374.stgit@olly>
On 2021-08-11 16:48, Paul Moore wrote:
> Draft #2 of the patchset which brings auditing and proper LSM access
> controls to the io_uring subsystem. The original patchset was posted
> in late May and can be found via lore using the link below:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/162163367115.8379.8459012634106035341.stgit@sifl/
>
> This draft should incorporate all of the feedback from the original
> posting as well as a few smaller things I noticed while playing
> further with the code. The big change is of course the selective
> auditing in the io_uring op servicing, but that has already been
> discussed quite a bit in the original thread so I won't go into
> detail here; the important part is that we found a way to move
> forward and this draft captures that. For those of you looking to
> play with these patches, they are based on Linus' v5.14-rc5 tag and
> on my test system they boot and appear to function without problem;
> they pass the selinux-testsuite and audit-testsuite and I have not
> noticed any regressions in the normal use of the system. If you want
> to get a copy of these patches straight from git you can use the
> "working-io_uring" branch in the repo below:
>
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
>
> Beyond the existing test suite tests mentioned above, I've cobbled
> together some very basic, very crude tests to exercise some of the
> things I care about from a LSM/audit perspective. These tests are
> pretty awful (I'm not kidding), but they might be helpful for the
> other LSM/audit developers who want to test things:
>
> https://drop.paul-moore.com/90.kUgq
>
> There are currently two tests: 'iouring.2' and 'iouring.3';
> 'iouring.1' was lost in a misguided and overzealous 'rm' command.
> The first test is standalone and basically tests the SQPOLL
> functionality while the second tests sharing io_urings across process
> boundaries and the credential/personality sharing mechanism. The
> console output of both tests isn't particularly useful, the more
> interesting bits are in the audit and LSM specific logs. The
> 'iouring.2' command requires no special arguments to run but the
> 'iouring.3' test is split into a "server" and "client"; the server
> should be run without argument:
>
> % ./iouring.3s
> >>> server started, pid = 11678
> >>> memfd created, fd = 3
> >>> io_uring created; fd = 5, creds = 1
>
> ... while the client should be run with two arguments: the first is
> the PID of the server process, the second is the "memfd" fd number:
>
> % ./iouring.3c 11678 3
> >>> client started, server_pid = 11678 server_memfd = 3
> >>> io_urings = 5 (server) / 5 (client)
> >>> io_uring ops using creds = 1
> >>> async op result: 36
> >>> async op result: 36
> >>> async op result: 36
> >>> async op result: 36
> >>> START file contents
> What is this life if, full of care,
> we have no time to stand and stare.
> >>> END file contents
>
> The tests were hacked together from various sources online,
> attribution and links to additional info can be found in the test
> sources, but I expect these tests to die a fiery death in the not
> to distant future as I work to add some proper tests to the SELinux
> and audit test suites.
>
> As I believe these patches should spend a full -rcX cycle in
> linux-next, my current plan is to continue to solicit feedback on
> these patches while they undergo additional testing (next up is
> verification of the audit filter code for io_uring). Assuming no
> critical issues are found on the mailing lists or during testing, I
> will post a proper patchset later with the idea of merging it into
> selinux/next after the upcoming merge window closes.
>
> Any comments, feedback, etc. are welcome.
Thanks for the tests. I have a bunch of userspace patches to add to the
last set I posted and these tests will help exercise them. I also have
one more kernel patch to post... I'll dive back into that now. I had
wanted to post them before now but got distracted with AUDIT_TRIM
breakage.
> ---
>
> Casey Schaufler (1):
> Smack: Brutalist io_uring support with debug
>
> Paul Moore (8):
> audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond
> syscalls
> audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring
> audit: dev/test patch to force io_uring auditing
> audit: add filtering for io_uring records
> fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to
> anon_inode_getfd_secure()
> io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface
> lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring
> selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls
>
>
> fs/anon_inodes.c | 29 ++
> fs/io-wq.c | 4 +
> fs/io_uring.c | 69 +++-
> include/linux/anon_inodes.h | 4 +
> include/linux/audit.h | 26 ++
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 +
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 +
> include/linux/security.h | 16 +
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 4 +-
> kernel/audit.h | 7 +-
> kernel/audit_tree.c | 3 +-
> kernel/audit_watch.c | 3 +-
> kernel/auditfilter.c | 15 +-
> kernel/auditsc.c | 483 +++++++++++++++++++-----
> security/security.c | 12 +
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 34 ++
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++
> 18 files changed, 678 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
>
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
--
Linux-audit mailing list
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-24 20:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-11 20:48 [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/9] audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/9] audit, io_uring, io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/9] audit: dev/test patch to force io_uring auditing Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/9] audit: add filtering for io_uring records Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/9] fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() Paul Moore
2021-08-12 9:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-08-12 14:32 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-12 15:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 6/9] io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 7/9] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:49 ` [RFC PATCH v2 8/9] selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls Paul Moore
2021-08-11 20:49 ` [RFC PATCH v2 9/9] Smack: Brutalist io_uring support with debug Paul Moore
2021-08-31 14:44 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-31 15:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-08-31 16:43 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-24 20:57 ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message]
2021-08-24 22:27 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-08-25 1:36 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26 1:16 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26 1:34 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-26 16:32 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-26 19:14 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-27 13:35 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-27 19:49 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-28 15:03 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-29 15:18 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-01 19:21 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-10 0:58 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-09-13 19:23 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-14 1:50 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-14 2:49 ` Paul Moore
2021-09-15 12:29 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-09-15 13:02 ` Steve Grubb
2021-09-15 14:12 ` Paul Moore
2021-10-02 13:16 ` Steve Grubb
2021-10-03 23:21 ` Paul Moore
2021-10-04 12:39 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-10-04 13:27 ` Paul Moore
2021-10-04 14:59 ` Steve Grubb
2021-10-28 20:07 ` Richard Guy Briggs
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