From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v29 13/28] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2021 10:54:26 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210924175441.7943-14-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210924175441.7943-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy()
call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions
to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 3 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++----------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 17 ++++++------
5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 1f025ff1f011..dfa6cf5115c3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
/* LIM API function definitions */
int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
@@ -286,8 +286,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
/* IMA policy related functions */
int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
- int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 2c6c3a5228b5..aa27f2144476 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
* MAY_APPEND)
* @func: caller identifier
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
*
*/
int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, blob, func, mask,
flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
allowed_algos);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 2fedda131a39..d7244a5eb69d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -77,9 +77,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
return 0;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
- blob.secid[0], func, mask,
+ &blob, func, mask,
IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1a4f7b00253b..4789d5256693 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
- enum ima_hooks func)
+ struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid,
+ action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, blob,
mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
&allowed_algos);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
@@ -409,8 +409,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob,
NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
}
@@ -450,8 +449,8 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
- current_cred(), blob.secid[0], MAY_EXEC,
- MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
+ current_cred(), &blob, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+ &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -489,16 +488,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
- NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
if (ret)
return ret;
security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
- NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+ return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
}
/**
@@ -516,8 +513,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
struct lsmblob blob;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
}
@@ -714,9 +710,8 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL,
- 0, MAY_READ, func);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
+ MAY_READ, func);
}
const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
@@ -758,9 +753,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
- /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
- return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
- size, MAY_READ, func);
+ return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size,
+ MAY_READ, func);
}
/**
@@ -914,7 +908,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
/* scaffolding */
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
- blob.secid[0], 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+ &blob, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
func_data, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 67c7762b2533..99d6f6499094 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
* @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: a pointer to an inode
* @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: the lsm data of the task to be validated
* @func: LIM hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
@@ -570,8 +570,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
- u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
- const char *func_data)
+ struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func,
+ int mask, const char *func_data)
{
int i;
@@ -640,8 +640,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid);
- rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type,
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(blob, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
break;
@@ -685,7 +684,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
* being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -701,8 +700,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
- const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
- int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+ const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
+ enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
{
@@ -718,7 +717,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
- if (!ima_match_rules(entry, mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid,
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, mnt_userns, inode, cred, blob,
func, mask, func_data))
continue;
--
2.31.1
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-24 18:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20210924175441.7943-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 00/28] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 01/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 02/28] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 03/28] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 04/28] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 05/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 06/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 07/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 08/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 09/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 10/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 11/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 12/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 14/28] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 15/28] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 16/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 17/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 18/28] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 19/28] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 20/28] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 21/28] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 22/28] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 23/28] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 24/28] Audit: Add framework for auxiliary records Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 25/28] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 26/28] Audit: Add record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 27/28] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2021-09-24 17:54 ` [PATCH v29 28/28] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20210924175441.7943-14-casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=linux-audit@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).