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Mon, 28 Dec 2020 17:55:05 +0000 Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.58]) by b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 0BSHt3sR47055324 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 28 Dec 2020 17:55:03 GMT Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4007C4C046; Mon, 28 Dec 2020 17:55:03 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5171D4C040; Mon, 28 Dec 2020 17:55:00 +0000 (GMT) Received: from li-f45666cc-3089-11b2-a85c-c57d1a57929f.ibm.com (unknown [9.160.72.172]) by d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Mon, 28 Dec 2020 17:55:00 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: <903c37e9036d167958165ab700e646c1622a9c40.camel@linux.ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure. From: Mimi Zohar To: Casey Schaufler , casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2020 12:54:59 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20201120201507.11993-3-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20201120201507.11993-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> <20201120201507.11993-3-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.343, 18.0.737 definitions=2020-12-28_15:2020-12-28, 2020-12-28 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 lowpriorityscore=0 suspectscore=0 adultscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 priorityscore=1501 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2009150000 definitions=main-2012280107 X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.78 on 10.11.54.4 X-loop: linux-audit@redhat.com X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 29 Dec 2020 20:07:45 -0500 Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov X-BeenThere: linux-audit@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: junk List-Id: Linux Audit Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.14 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hi Casey, On Fri, 2020-11-20 at 12:14 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > When more than one security module is exporting data to > audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer > is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a > structure to be used instead. > > The lsmblob structure is currently an array of > u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the > security modules built into the system that would > use secids if active. The system assigns the module > a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are > compiled in but not registered there will be unused > slots. > > A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name > of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There > is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name > and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot. > > The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of > security module data rather than a single instance. > Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is > affected as well. This patch is quite large, even without the audit rule change. I would limit this patch to the new lsm_id structure changes. The audit rule change should be broken out as a separate patch so that the audit changes aren't hidden. In addition, here are a few high level nits: - The (patch description) body of the explanation, line wrapped at 75 columns, which will be copied to the permanent changelog to describe this patch. (Refer Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.) - The brief kernel-doc descriptions should not have a trailing period. Nor should kernel-doc variable definitions have a trailing period. Example(s) inline below. (The existing kernel-doc is mostly correct.) - For some reason existing comments that span multiple lines aren't formatted properly. In those cases, where there is another change, please fix the comment and function description. thanks, Mimi > > Acked-by: Stephen Smalley > Acked-by: Paul Moore > Acked-by: John Johansen > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler > Cc: > Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com > Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org > Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org > --- > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index bc2725491560..fdb6e95c98e8 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -132,6 +132,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason { > > extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1]; > > +/* > + * Data exported by the security modules > + * > + * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included. > + */ > +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \ > + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \ > + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \ > + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \ > + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0)) > + > +struct lsmblob { > + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; > +}; > + > +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1 /* Not a valid LSM slot number */ > +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2 /* Slot requested on initialization */ > +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3 /* Slot not requested */ > + > +/** > + * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure. Only this kernel-doc brief description is suffixed with a period. Please remove. > + * @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize > + * @secid: The initial secid value > + * > + * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value. > + */ > +static inline void lsmblob_init(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 secid) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) > + blob->secid[i] = secid; > +} > + > +/** > + * lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob > + * @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data > + * > + * Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise > + */ > +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set(struct lsmblob *blob) > +{ > + struct lsmblob empty = {}; > + > + return !!memcmp(blob, &empty, sizeof(*blob)); > +} > + > +/** > + * lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal > + * @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data > + * @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data > + * > + * Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise > + */ > +static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb) > +{ > + return !memcmp(bloba, blobb, sizeof(*bloba)); > +} > + > /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ > extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 9b5adeaa47fc..cd393aaa17d5 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; > @@ -88,6 +88,22 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { > struct ima_template_desc *template; > }; > > +/** > + * ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules > + * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check. Nor do kernel-doc variable definitions have a trailing period. > + * > + * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false. > + */ > +static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[]) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) > + if (rules[i]) > + return true; > + return false; > +} > + > /* > * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be > * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit