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Wed, 09 Feb 2022 13:18:51 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Paul Moore Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 16:18:40 -0500 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] audit: add support for the openat2 syscall To: Jeff Mahoney , Richard Guy Briggs X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.11.54.1 X-loop: linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: Tony Jones , LKML , Eric Paris , Linux-Audit Mailing List , Alexander Viro , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Eric Paris X-BeenThere: linux-audit@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: junk List-Id: Linux Audit Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Wed, Feb 9, 2022 at 10:57 AM Paul Moore wrote: > On Tue, Feb 8, 2022 at 10:44 PM Jeff Mahoney wrote: > > > > Hi Richard - > > > > On 5/19/21 16:00, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > The openat2(2) syscall was added in kernel v5.6 with commit fddb5d430ad9 > > > ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall") > > > > > > Add the openat2(2) syscall to the audit syscall classifier. > > > > > > Link: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/67 > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f5f1a4d8699613f8c02ce762807228c841c2e26f.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com > > > --- > > > > [...] > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > > > index d775ea16505b..3f59ab209dfd 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > > > @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ > > > #include > > > #include > > > #include > > > +#include > > > > > > #include "audit.h" > > > > > > @@ -196,6 +197,8 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) > > > return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); > > > case AUDITSC_EXECVE: > > > return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; > > > + case AUDITSC_OPENAT2: > > > + return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)((struct open_how *)ctx->argv[2])->flags); > > > default: > > > return 0; > > > } > > > > ctx->argv[2] holds a userspace pointer and can't be dereferenced like this. > > > > I'm getting oopses, like so: > > BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007fff961bbe70 > > Thanks Jeff. > > Yes, this is obviously the wrong thing to being doing; I remember > checking to make sure we placed the audit_openat2_how() hook after the > open_how was copied from userspace, but I missed the argv dereference > in the syscall exit path when reviewing the code. > > Richard, as we are already copying the open_how info into > audit_context::openat2 safely, the obvious fix is to convert > audit_match_perm() to use the previously copied value instead of argv. > If you can't submit a patch for this today please let me know. I haven't heard anything from Richard so I put together a patch which should fix the problem (link below). It's currently untested, but I've got a kernel building now with the patch ... https://lore.kernel.org/linux-audit/164444111699.153511.15656610495968926251.stgit@olly/T/#u -- paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit