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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-audit@redhat.com,
	Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, io-uring@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring
Date: Wed, 26 May 2021 10:38:38 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTAvcB0A2dpv1Xn7sa+Kh1n+e-dJr_8wSSRaxS4D0f9Sw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0a668302-b170-31ce-1651-ddf45f63d02a@gmail.com>

On Wed, May 26, 2021 at 6:19 AM Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 5/26/21 3:04 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 9:11 PM Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> wrote:
> >> On 5/24/21 1:59 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>> That said, audit is not for everyone, and we have build time and
> >>> runtime options to help make life easier.  Beyond simply disabling
> >>> audit at compile time a number of Linux distributions effectively
> >>> shortcut audit at runtime by adding a "never" rule to the audit
> >>> filter, for example:
> >>>
> >>>  % auditctl -a task,never
> >>
> >> As has been brought up, the issue we're facing is that distros have
> >> CONFIG_AUDIT=y and hence the above is the best real world case outside
> >> of people doing custom kernels. My question would then be how much
> >> overhead the above will add, considering it's an entry/exit call per op.
> >> If auditctl is turned off, what is the expectation in turns of overhead?
> >
> > I commented on that case in my last email to Pavel, but I'll try to go
> > over it again in a little more detail.
> >
> > As we discussed earlier in this thread, we can skip the req->opcode
> > check before both the _entry and _exit calls, so we are left with just
> > the bare audit calls in the io_uring code.  As the _entry and _exit
> > functions are small, I've copied them and their supporting functions
> > below and I'll try to explain what would happen in CONFIG_AUDIT=y,
> > "task,never" case.
> >
> > +  static inline struct audit_context *audit_context(void)
> > +  {
> > +    return current->audit_context;
> > +  }
> >
> > +  static inline bool audit_dummy_context(void)
> > +  {
> > +    void *p = audit_context();
> > +    return !p || *(int *)p;
> > +  }
> >
> > +  static inline void audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
> > +  {
> > +    if (unlikely(audit_enabled && audit_context()))
> > +      __audit_uring_entry(op);
> > +  }
>
> I'd rather agree that it's my cycle-picking. The case I care about
> is CONFIG_AUDIT=y (because everybody enable it), and io_uring
> tracing _not_ enabled at runtime. If enabled let them suffer
> the overhead, it will probably dip down the performance
>
> So, for the case I care about it's two of
>
> if (unlikely(audit_enabled && current->audit_context))
>
> in the hot path. load-test-jump + current, so it will
> be around 7x2 instructions. We can throw away audit_enabled
> as you say systemd already enables it, that will give
> 4x2 instructions including 2 conditional jumps.

We've basically got it down to the equivalent of two
"current->audit_context != NULL" checks in the case where audit is
built into the kernel but disabled at runtime, e.g. CONFIG_AUDIT=y and
"task,never".  I'm at a loss for how we can lower the overhead any
further, but I'm open to suggestions.

> That's not great at all. And that's why I brought up
> the question about need of pre and post hooks and whether
> can be combined. Would be just 4 instructions and that is
> ok (ish).

As discussed previously in this thread that isn't really an option
from an audit perspective.

> > We would need to check with the current security requirements (there
> > are distro people on the linux-audit list that keep track of that
> > stuff), but looking at the opcodes right now my gut feeling is that
> > most of the opcodes would be considered "security relevant" so
> > selective auditing might not be that useful in practice.  It would
> > definitely clutter the code and increase the chances that new opcodes
> > would not be properly audited when they are merged.
>
> I'm curious, why it's enabled by many distros by default? Are there
> use cases they use?

We've already talked about certain users and environments where audit
is an important requirement, e.g. public sector, health care,
financial institutions, etc.; without audit Linux wouldn't be an
option for these users, at least not without heavy modification,
out-of-tree/ISV patches, etc.  I currently don't have any direct ties
to any distros, "Enterprise" or otherwise, but in the past it has been
my experience that distros much prefer to have a single kernel build
to address the needs of all their users.  In the few cases I have seen
where a second kernel build is supported it is usually for hardware
enablement.  I'm sure there are other cases too, I just haven't seen
them personally; the big distros definitely seem to have a strong
desire to limit the number of supported kernel configs/builds.

> Tempting to add AUDIT_IOURING=default N, but won't work I guess

One of the nice things about audit is that it can give you a history
of what a user did on a system, which is very important for a number
of use cases.  If we selectively disable audit for certain subsystems
we create a blind spot in the audit log, and in the case of io_uring
this can be a very serious blind spot.  I fear that if we can't come
to some agreement here we will need to make io_uring and audit
mutually exclusive at build time which would be awful; forcing many
distros to either make a hard choice or carry out-of-tree patches.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

--
Linux-audit mailing list
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  reply	other threads:[~2021-05-26 14:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-21 21:49 [RFC PATCH 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:49 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:49 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] audit, io_uring, io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-05-22  0:22   ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] audit,io_uring,io-wq: " Pavel Begunkov
2021-05-22  2:36     ` Paul Moore
2021-05-23 20:26       ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-05-24 19:59         ` Paul Moore
2021-05-25  8:27           ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-05-25 14:53             ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26  1:11           ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26  2:04             ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 10:19               ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-05-26 14:38                 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2021-05-26 15:11                   ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] audit, io_uring, io-wq: " Steve Grubb
2021-05-26 15:17                   ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] audit,io_uring,io-wq: " Stefan Metzmacher
2021-05-26 15:49                     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-05-26 17:22                       ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-27 17:27                         ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-05-26 15:49                     ` Victor Stewart
2021-05-26 16:38                       ` Casey Schaufler
2021-05-26 17:15               ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26 17:31                 ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26 17:54                   ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26 18:01                     ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26 18:44                       ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 18:57                         ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-05-26 19:10                           ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 19:44                         ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26 20:19                           ` Paul Moore
2021-05-28 16:02                             ` Paul Moore
2021-06-02  8:26                               ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-06-02 15:46                                 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-06-03 10:39                                   ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-06-02 19:46                                 ` Paul Moore
2021-06-03 10:51                                   ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-06-03 15:54                                     ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-03 15:54                               ` Jens Axboe
2021-06-04  5:04                                 ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 18:38                     ` Paul Moore
2021-06-02 17:29   ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] audit, io_uring, io-wq: " Richard Guy Briggs
2021-06-02 20:46     ` Paul Moore
2021-08-25  1:21       ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-25 19:41         ` Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] audit: dev/test patch to force io_uring auditing Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] audit: add filtering for io_uring records Paul Moore
2021-05-28 22:35   ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-05-30 15:26     ` Paul Moore
2021-05-31 13:44       ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-06-02  1:40         ` Paul Moore
2021-06-02 15:37           ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-06-02 17:20             ` Paul Moore
2021-05-31 13:44       ` [PATCH 1/2] audit: add filtering for io_uring records, addendum Richard Guy Briggs
2021-05-31 16:08         ` kernel test robot
2021-05-31 17:38         ` kernel test robot
2021-06-07 23:15         ` Paul Moore
2021-06-08 12:55           ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-06-09  2:45             ` Paul Moore
2021-05-31 13:44       ` [PATCH 2/2] audit: block PERM fields being used with io_uring filtering Richard Guy Briggs
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-05-26 14:48   ` Stefan Metzmacher
2021-05-26 20:45     ` Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] Smack: Brutalist io_uring support with debug Paul Moore
2021-05-22  0:53 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Tetsuo Handa
2021-05-22  2:06   ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 15:00 ` Jeff Moyer
2021-05-26 18:49   ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 19:07     ` Jeff Moyer
2021-05-26 19:10       ` Paul Moore

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