From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-audit@redhat.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2020 08:53:23 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e2cb6f887a68495163ea2e0c3ffa06177ad2792f.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e260e8c5bbbb488052cbe1f5b528d43461bc4258.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 20:53 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 15:20 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > On 12/28/2020 2:14 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Mon, 2020-12-28 at 12:06 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > >> On 12/28/2020 11:24 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > >>>> -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> > >>>> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
> > >>>> {
> > >>>> - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> > >>>> + struct security_hook_list *hp;
> > >>>> + int rc;
> > >>>> +
> > >>>> + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
> > >>>> + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
> > >>>> + continue;
> > >>>> + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
> > >>>> + &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
> > >>>> + if (rc)
> > >>>> + return rc;
> > >>> Suppose that there is an IMA dont_measure or dont_appraise rule, if one
> > >>> LSM matches, then this returns true, causing any measurement or
> > >>> integrity verification to be skipped.
> > >> Yes, that is correct. Like the audit system, you're doing a string based
> > >> lookup, which pretty well has to work this way. I have proposed compound
> > >> label specifications in the past, but even if we accepted something like
> > >> "apparmor=dates,selinux=figs" we'd still have to be compatible with the
> > >> old style inputs.
> > >>
> > >>> Sample policy rules:
> > >>> dont_measure obj_type=foo_log
> > >>> dont_appraise obj_type=foo_log
> > > IMA could extend the existing policy rules like "lsm=[selinux] |
> > > [smack] | [apparmor]", but that assumes that the underlying
> > > infrastructure supports it.
> >
> > Yes, but you would still need rational behavior in the
> > case where someone has old IMA policy rules.
>
> From an IMA perspective, allowing multiple LSMs to define the same
> policy label is worse than requiring the label be constrained to a
> particular LSM.
If allowing multiple LSMs to define the same label is only an IMA
issue, then have security_audit_rule_init() return the number of LSMs
which define the label. IMA is already emitting a warning when an LSM
rule is not defined. Emitting an additional warning would be the
first step.
In addition, ima_parse_rule() could detect policy rules containing non
LSM specific labels. Based on policy, IMA would decide how to handle
it.
thanks,
Mimi
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Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-30 1:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20201120201507.11993-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v22 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2020-12-28 17:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-28 19:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 19:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 20:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-28 22:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-28 23:20 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-29 1:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-12-29 13:53 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2020-12-29 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-12-29 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 11/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 12/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 13/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 14/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 16/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 17/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 18/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 19/23] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 23:06 ` kernel test robot
2020-11-21 0:36 ` kernel test robot
2020-11-21 7:36 ` kernel test robot
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 22:51 ` kernel test robot
2020-11-21 0:02 ` kernel test robot
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
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