From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C8B4C4321E for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 669C4610FE for ; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 19:07:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239119AbhJMTJE (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:09:04 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:49068 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S238337AbhJMTIq (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:08:46 -0400 Received: from linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C6F4820B9D0C; Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:40 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com C6F4820B9D0C DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1634152000; bh=dQ+u9TNfPDEJUjM64WZr/miBrXoUBKgng6ViWxPtixc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=b29+pJ6FM1zVt4i4+Ggxjywi0M8X7qZH7waixVR0fsPRpL/piBDpiyAuyNzNbz4jC QDLyBe2h+hTdXATF3rhAnULcTDekL/bgYma24lzTqdbcoPJahAprHP5oS3HUEGlfDv 2VEsE4KlefPAKod+1IFdVvrg5PDcI2i/MqQTFPTI= From: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com To: corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 16/16] documentation: add ipe documentation Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 12:06:35 -0700 Message-Id: <1634151995-16266-17-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> References: <1634151995-16266-1-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org From: Deven Bowers Add IPE's admin and developer documentation to the kernel tree. Co-developed-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Fan Wu Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers --- Relevant changes since v6: * Add additional developer-level documentation * Update admin-guide docs to reflect changes. * Drop Acked-by due to significant changes --- Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst | 587 ++++++++++++++++++ .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 + Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/ipe.rst | 339 ++++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 2 + 6 files changed, 942 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/ipe.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst index a6ba95fbaa9f..ce63be6d64ad 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst @@ -47,3 +47,4 @@ subdirectories. tomoyo Yama SafeSetID + ipe diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..56a9fa2fe59b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst @@ -0,0 +1,587 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) +================================== + +.. NOTE:: + + This is the documentation for admins, system builders, or individuals + attempting to use IPE, without understanding all of its internal systems. + If you're looking for documentation to extend IPE, understand the design + decisions behind IPE, or are just curious about the internals, please + see :ref:`Documentation/security/ipe.rst` + +Overview +-------- + +IPE is a Linux Security Module which imposes a complimentary model +of mandatory access control to other LSMs. Whereas the existing LSMs +impose access control based on labels or paths, IPE imposes access +control based on the trust of the resource. Simply put, IPE +or restricts access to a resource based on the trust of said resource. + +Trust requirements are established via IPE's policy, sourcing multiple +different implementations within the kernel to build a cohesive trust +model, based on how the system was built. + +Trust vs Integrity +------------------ + +Trust, with respect to computing, is a concept that designates a set +of entities who will endorse a set of resources as non-malicious. +Traditionally, this is done via signatures, which is the act of endorsing +a resource. Integrity, on the other hand, is the concept of ensuring that a +resource has not been modified since a point of time. This is typically done +through cryptography or signatures. + +Trust and integrity are very closely tied together concepts, as integrity +is the way you can prove trust for a resource; otherwise it could have +been modified by an entity who is untrusted. + +IPE provides a way for a user to express trust of resources, by using +pre-existing systems which provide the integrity half of the equation. + +Use Cases +--------- + +IPE works best in fixed-function devices: Devices in which their purpose +is clearly defined and not supposed to be changed (e.g. network firewall +device in a data center, an IoT device, etcetera), where all software and +configuration is built and provisioned by the system owner. + +IPE is a long-way off for use in general-purpose computing: +the Linux community as a whole tends to follow a decentralized trust +model, known as the Web of Trust, which IPE has no support for as of yet. +Instead, IPE supports the PKI Trust Model, which generally designates a +set of entities that provide a measure absolute trust. + +Additionally, while most packages are signed today, the files inside +the packages (for instance, the executables), tend to be unsigned. This +makes it difficult to utilize IPE in systems where a package manager is +expected to be functional, without major changes to the package manager +and ecosystem behind it. + +For the highest level of security, platform firmware should verify the +the kernel and optionally the root filesystem (for example, via U-Boot +verified boot). This forms a chain of trust from the hardware, ensuring +that every stage of the system is trusted. + +Known Gaps +---------- + +IPE cannot verify the integrity of anonymous executable memory, such as +the trampolines created by gcc closures and libffi (<3.4.2), or JIT'd code. +Unfortunately, as this is dynamically generated code, there is no way +for IPE to ensure the integrity of this code to form a trust basis. In all +cases, the return result for these operations will be whatever the admin +configures the DEFAULT action for "EXECUTE". + +IPE cannot verify the integrity of interpreted languages' programs when +these scripts invoked via `` ``. This is because the +way interpreters execute these files, the scripts themselves are not +evaluated as executable code through one of IPE's hooks. Interpreters +can be enlightened to the usage of IPE by trying to mmap a file into +executable memory (+X), after opening the file and responding to the +error code appropriately. This also applies to included files, or high +value files, such as configuration files of critical system components [#]_. + +.. [#] Mickaël Salaün's `trusted_for patchset `_ + can be used to leverage this. + +Threat Model +------------ + +The threat type addressed by IPE is tampering of executable user-land +code beyond the initially booted kernel, and the initial verification of +kernel modules that are loaded in userland through ``modprobe`` or +``insmod``. + +Tampering violates integrity, and being unable to verify the integrity, +results in a lack of trust. IPE's role in mitigating this threat is to +verify the integrity (and authenticity) of all executable code and to +deny their use if they cannot be trusted (as integrity verification fails). +IPE generates audit logs which may be utilized to detect failures resulting +from failure to pass policy. + +Tampering threat scenarios include modification or replacement of +executable code by a range of actors including: + +- Actors with physical access to the hardware +- Actors with local network access to the system +- Actors with access to the deployment system +- Compromised internal systems under external control +- Malicious end users of the system +- Compromised end users of the system +- Remote (external) compromise of the system + +IPE does not mitigate threats arising from malicious authorized +developers, or compromised developer tools used by authorized +developers. Additionally, IPE draws hard security boundary between user +mode and kernel mode. As a result, IPE does not provide any protections +against a kernel level exploit, and a kernel-level exploit can disable +or tamper with IPE's protections. + +Policy +------ + +IPE policy is a plain-text [#]_ policy composed of multiple statements +over several lines. There is one required line, at the top of the +policy, indicating the policy name, and the policy version, for +instance:: + + policy_name="Ex Policy" policy_version=0.0.0 + +The policy name is a unique key identifying this policy in a human +readable name. This is used to create nodes under securityfs as well as +uniquely identify policies to deploy new policies vs update existing +policies. + +The policy version indicates the current version of the policy (NOT the +policy syntax version). This is used to prevent rollback of policy to +potentially insecure previous versions of the policy. + +The next portion of IPE policy, are rules. Rules are formed by key=value +pairs, known as properties. IPE rules require two properties: "action", +which determines what IPE does when it encounters a match against the +rule, and "op", which determines when that rule should be evaluated. +The ordering is significant, a rule must start with "op", and end with +"action". Thus, a minimal rule is:: + + op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + +This example will allow any execution. Additional properties are used to +restrict attributes about the files being evaluated. These properties +are intended to be descriptions of systems within the kernel, that can +provide a measure of integrity verification, such that IPE can determine +the trust of the resource based on the "value" half of the property. + +Rules are evaluated top-to-bottom. As a result, any revocation rules, +or denies should be placed early in the file to ensure that these rules +are evaluated before as rule with "action=ALLOW" is hit. + +IPE policy is designed to be only forward compatible. Userspace can read +what the parser's current configuration (supported statements, properties, +etcetera) via reading the securityfs entry, 'ipe/config' + +IPE policy supports comments. The character '#' will function as a +comment, ignoring all characters to the right of '#' until the newline. + +The default behavior of IPE evaluations can also be expressed in policy, +through the ``DEFAULT`` statement. This can be done at a global level, +or a per-operation level:: + + # Global + DEFAULT action=ALLOW + + # Operation Specific + DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + +A default must be set for all known operations in IPE. If you want to +preserve older policies being compatible with newer kernels that can introduce +new operations, please set a global default of 'ALLOW', and override the +defaults on a per-operation basis. + +With configurable policy-based LSMs, there's several issues with +enforcing the configurable policies at startup, around reading and +parsing the policy: + +1. The kernel *should* not read files from userland, so directly reading + the policy file is prohibited. +2. The kernel command line has a character limit, and one kernel module + should not reserve the entire character limit for its own + configuration. +3. There are various boot loaders in the kernel ecosystem, so handing + off a memory block would be costly to maintain. + +As a result, IPE has addressed this problem through a concept of a "boot +policy". A boot policy is a minimal policy, compiled into the kernel. +This policy is intended to get the system to a state where userland is +setup and ready to receive commands, at which point a more complex +policy ("user policies") can be deployed via securityfs. The boot policy +can be specified via the Kconfig, ``SECURITY_IPE_BOOT_POLICY``, which +accepts a path to a plain-text version of the IPE policy to apply. This +policy will be compiled into the kernel. If not specified, IPE will be +disabled until a policy is deployed and activated through securityfs. + +.. [#] Please see the :ref:`Documentation/security/ipe.rst` for more on this + topic. + +Deploying Policies +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +User policies as explained above, are policies that are deployed from +userland, through securityfs. These policies are signed to enforce some +level of authorization of the policies (prohibiting an attacker from +gaining root, and deploying an "allow all" policy), through the PKCS#7 +enveloped data format. These policies must be signed by a certificate +that chains to the ``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING``. Through openssl, the +signing can be done via:: + + openssl smime -sign -in "$MY_POLICY" -signer "$MY_CERTIFICATE" \ + -inkey "$MY_PRIVATE_KEY" -binary -outform der -noattr -nodetach \ + -out "$MY_POLICY.p7s" + +Deploying the policies is done through securityfs, through the +``new_policy`` node. To deploy a policy, simply cat the file into the +securityfs node:: + + cat "$MY_POLICY.p7s" > /sys/kernel/security/ipe/new_policy + +Upon success, this will create one subdirectory under +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/policies/``. The subdirectory will be the +``policy_name`` field of the policy deployed, so for the example above, +the directory will be ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/policies/Ex\ Policy``. +Within this directory, there will be five files: ``pkcs7``, ``policy``, +``active``, ``update``, and ``delete``. + +The ``pkcs7`` file is rw, reading will provide the raw PKCS#7 data that +was provided to the kernel, representing the policy. Writing, will +deploy an in-place policy update - if this policy is the currently +running policy, the new updated policy will replace it immediately upon +success. If the policy being read is the boot policy, when read, this +will return ENOENT. + +The ``policy`` file is read only. Reading will provide the PKCS#7 inner +content of the policy, which will be the plain text policy. + +The ``active`` file is used to set a policy as the currently active policy. +This file is rw, and accepts a value of ``"1"`` to set the policy as active. +Since only a single policy can be active at one time, all other policies +will be marked inactive. The policy being marked active must have a policy +version greater or equal to the currently-running version. + +The ``update`` file is used to update a policy that is already present in +the kernel. This file is write-only and accepts a PKCS#7 signed policy. +One check will be performed on this policy: the policy_names must match +with the updated version and the existing version. If the policy being +updated is the active policy, the updated policy must have a policy version +greater or equal to the currently-running version. + +The ``delete`` file is used to remove a policy that is no longer needed. +This file is write-only and accepts a value of ``"1"`` to delete the policy. +On deletion, the securityfs node representing the policy will be removed. +The policy that is currently active, cannot be deleted. + +Similarly, the writes to both ``update`` and ``new_policy`` above will +result in an error upon syntactically invalid or untrusted policies. +It will also error if a policy already exists with the same ``policy_name``, +in the case of ``new_policy``. + +Deploying these policies will *not* cause IPE to start enforcing this +policy. Once deployment is successful, a policy can be marked as active, +via ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/active``. IPE will enforce +whatever policy is marked as active. For our example, we can activate +the ``Ex Policy`` via:: + + echo "1" > "/sys/kernel/security/ipe/Ex Policy/active" + +At which point, ``Ex Policy`` will now be the enforced policy on the +system. + +IPE also provides a way to delete policies. This can be done via the +``delete`` securityfs node, ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/delete``. +Writing ``1`` to that file will delete that node:: + + echo "1" > "/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/delete" + +There is only one requirement to delete a policy: + +1. The policy being deleted must not be the active policy. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a traditional MAC system is enabled (SELinux, apparmor, smack), all + writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Modes +~~~~~ + +IPE supports two modes of operation: permissive (similar to SELinux's +permissive mode) and enforce. Permissive mode performs the same checks +as enforce mode, and logs policy violations, but will not enforce the +policy. This allows users to test policies before enforcing them. + +The default mode is enforce, and can be changed via the kernel command +line parameter ``ipe.enforce=(0|1)``, or the securityfs node +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/enforce``. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a traditional MAC system is enabled (SELinux, apparmor, smack, etcetera), + all writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Audit Events +~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Success Auditing +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +IPE supports success auditing. When enabled, all events that pass IPE +policy and are not blocked will emit an audit event. This is disabled by +default, and can be enabled via the kernel command line +``ipe.success_audit=(0|1)`` or the securityfs node, +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/success_audit``. + +This is very noisy, as IPE will check every user-mode binary on the +system, but is useful for debugging policies. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a traditional MAC system is enabled (SELinux, apparmor, smack, etcetera), + all writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Properties +-------------- + +As explained above, IPE properties are ``key=value`` pairs expressed in +IPE policy. Two properties are built-into the policy parser: 'op' and +'action'. The other properties are determinstic attributes to express +across files. Currently those properties are: 'boot_verified', +'dmverity_signature', 'dmverity_roothash', 'fsverity_signature', +'fsverity_digest'. A description of all properties supported by IPE +are listed below: + +op +~~ + +Indicates the operation for a rule to apply to. Must be in every rule, +as the first token. IPE supports the following operations: + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +``EXECUTE`` + + Pertains to any file attempting to be executed, or loaded as an + executable. + +``FIRMWARE``: + + Pertains to firmware being loaded via the firmware_class interface. + This covers both the preallocated buffer and the firmware file + itself. + +``KMODULE``: + + Pertains to loading kernel modules via ``modprobe`` or ``insmod``. + +``KEXEC_IMAGE``: + + Pertains to kernel images loading via ``kexec``. + +``KEXEC_INITRAMFS`` + + Pertains to initrd images loading via ``kexec --initrd``. + +``POLICY``: + + Controls loading IMA policies through the + ``/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy`` securityfs entry. + +``X509_CERT``: + + Controls loading IMA certificates through the Kconfigs, + ``CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH`` and ``CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH``. + +``KERNEL_READ``: + + Short hand for all of the following: ``FIRMWARE``, ``KMODULE``, + ``KEXEC_IMAGE``, ``KEXEC_INITRAMFS``, ``POLICY``, and ``X509_CERT``. + +action +~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +Determines what IPE should do when a rule matches. Must be in every +rule, as the final clause. Can be one of: + +``ALLOW``: + + If the rule matches, explicitly allow access to the resource to proceed + without executing any more rules. + +``DENY``: + + If the rule matches, explicitly prohibit access to the resource to + proceed without executing any more rules. + +boot_verified +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization of the first super-block +that executes a file. This is almost always init. Typically this is used +for systems with an initramfs or other initial disk, where this is unmounted +before the system becomes available, and is not covered by any other property. +This property is controlled by the Kconfig, ``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_BOOT_VERIFIED``. +The format of this property is:: + + boot_verified=(TRUE|FALSE) + + +.. WARNING:: + + This property will trust any disk where the first execution evaluation + occurs. If you do *NOT* have a startup disk that is unpacked and unmounted + (like initramfs), then it will automatically trust the root filesystem and + potentially overauthorize the entire disk. + +dmverity_roothash +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization or revocation of +specific dm-verity volumes, identified via root hash. It has a +dependency on the DM_VERITY module. This property is controlled by the +Kconfig ``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH``. The format of this property +is:: + + dmverity_roothash=HashHexDigest + +dmverity_signature +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization of all dm-verity volumes +that have a signed roothash that chains to a keyring specified by dm-verity's +configuration, either the system trusted keyring, or the secondary keyring. +It has an additional dependency on the ``DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG`` +Kconfig. This property is controlled by the Kconfig +``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE``. The format of this property is:: + + dmverity_signature=(TRUE|FALSE) + +fsverity_digest +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ +This property can be utilized for authorization or revocation of +specific fsverity enabled file, identified via its fsverity digest, +which is the hash of a struct contains the file's roothash and hashing +parameters. It has a dependency on the FS_VERITY module. +This property is controlled by the Kconfig +``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_DIGEST``. The format of this property is:: + + fsverity_digest=HashHexDigest + +fsverity_signature +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization of all fsverity enabled +files that is verified by fsverity. The keyring that is verifies against +is subject to fsverity's configuration, which is typically the fsverity +keyring. It has a dependency on the ``CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES`` +Kconfig. This property is controlled by the Kconfig +``CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_SIGNATURE``. The format of this property is:: + + fsverity_signature=(TRUE|FALSE) + +Policy Examples +--------------- + +Allow all +~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="Allow All" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=ALLOW + +Allow only initial superblock +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="Allow All Initial SB" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Allow any signed dm-verity volume and the initial superblock +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedAndInitial" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Prohibit execution from a specific dm-verity volume +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedAndInitial" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=401fcec5944823ae12f62726e8184407a5fa9599783f030dec146938 action=DENY + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Allow only a specific dm-verity volume +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedAndInitial" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=401fcec5944823ae12f62726e8184407a5fa9599783f030dec146938 action=ALLOW + +Allow any signed fs-verity file +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedFSVerity" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE fsverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Prohibit execution of a specific fs-verity file +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="ProhibitSpecificFSVF" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE fsverity_digest=fd88f2b8824e197f850bf4c5109bea5cf0ee38104f710843bb72da796ba5af9e action=DENY + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Additional Information +---------------------- + +- `Github Repository `_ +- `Design Documentation `_ + +FAQ +--- + +:Q: What's the difference between other LSMs which provide trust-based + access control, for instance, IMA? + +:A: IMA is a fantastic option when needing measurement in addition to the + trust-based access model. All of IMA is centered around their measurement + hashes, so you save time when doing both actions. IPE, on the other hand, + is a highly performant system that does not rely (and explicitly prohibits), + generating its own integrity mechanisms - separating measurement and access + control. Simply put, IPE provides only the enforcement of trust, while other + subsystems provide the integrity guarantee that IPE needs to determine the + trust of a resource. IMA provides both the integrity guarantee, and the + enforcement of trust. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 43dc35fe5bc0..85dd654e642f 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2096,6 +2096,18 @@ ipcmni_extend [KNL] Extend the maximum number of unique System V IPC identifiers from 32,768 to 16,777,216. + ipe.enforce= [IPE] + Format: + Determine whether IPE starts in permissive (0) or + enforce (1) mode. The default is enforce. + + ipe.success_audit= + [IPE] + Format: + Start IPE with success auditing enabled, emitting + an audit event when a binary is allowed. The default + is 0. + irqaffinity= [SMP] Set the default irq affinity mask The argument is a cpu list, as described above. diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst index 16335de04e8c..c06530b50514 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst @@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ Security Documentation tpm/index digsig landlock + ipe diff --git a/Documentation/security/ipe.rst b/Documentation/security/ipe.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e691e08e0303 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/ipe.rst @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) - Design Documents +===================================================== + +.. NOTE:: + + This is the documentation for kernel developers and other individuals + who want to understand the reason behind why IPE is designed the way it + is, as well as a tour of the implementation. If you're looking for + documentation on the usage of IPE, please see + :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst` + +Role and Scope +-------------- + +IPE originally started with a simple goal: create a system that can +ensure that only trusted usermode binaries are allowed to be executed. + +During the design phase it was apparent that there are multiple systems +within the Linux kernel that can provide some level of integrity +verification, and by association, trust for its content: + + 1. DM-Verity + 2. FS-Verity + 3. IMA + EVM + +However, of those systems only the third option has the ability to enforce +trust requirements on the whole system. Its architecture, however is centered +around its own form of verifications, and a multitude of actions surrounding +those verifications with various purposes, the most prominent being measurement +and verification (appraisal). This makes it unsuitable from a layering and +architectural purpose, as IPE's goal is limited to ensure just trusted usermode +binaries are executed, with the intentional goal of supporting multiple methods +from a higher subsystem layer (i.e. fs, block, or super_block). + +The two other options, dm-verity and fs-verity are missing a crucial component +to accomplish the goal of IPE: a policy to indicate the requirements of +answering the question "What is Trusted?" and a system-wide level of enforcing +those requirements. + +Therefore, IPE was designed around: + + 1. Easy configuration of trust mechanisms + 2. Ease of integration with other layers + 3. Ease of use for platform administrators. + +Design Decisions +---------------- + +Policy +~~~~~~ + +Plain Text +^^^^^^^^^^ + +Unlike other LSMs, IPE's policy is plain-text. This introduces slightly larger +policy files than other LSMs, but solves two major problems that occurs with +other trust-based access control systems. + +The first issue is one of code maintenance and duplication. To author policies, +the policy has to be some form of string representation (be it structured, +through XMl, JSON, YAML, etcetera), to allow the policy author to understand +what is being written. In a hypothetical binary policy design, that a serializer +must be written to write said binary form, for a *majority* of humans to be +able to utilize it properly. + +Additionally, a deserializer will eventually be needed to transform the binary +back into text with as much information preserved. Without a deserializer, a +user of this access control system will have to keep a lookup table of either +a checksum, or the file itself to try to understand what policies have been +deployed on this system and what policies have not. For a single user, this +may be alright, as old policies can be discarded almost immediately after +the update takes hold. + +For users that manage fleets in the thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, +this quickly becomes an issue, as stale policies from years ago may be present, +quickly resulting in the need to recover the policy or fund extensive +infrastructure to track what each policy contains. + +Secondly, a serializer is still needed with a plain-text policy (as the plain +text policy still has to be serialized to a data structure in the kernel), so +not much is saved. + +The second issue is one of transparency. As IPE controls access based on trust, +it's policy must also be trusted to be changed. This is done through signatures, +chaining to the SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING. The confidence of signing a plain-text +policy in which you can see every aspect of what is being signed is a step higher +than signing an opaque binary blob. + +Boot Policy +~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Additionally, IPE shouldn't have any obvious gaps in its enforcement story. +That means, a policy that configures trust requirements, if specified, must +be enforced as soon as the kernel starts up. That can be accomplished one +of three ways: + + 1. The policy file(s) live on disk and the kernel loads the policy prior + to an code path that would result in an enforcement decision. + 2. The policy file(s) are passed by the bootloader to the kernel, who + parses the policy. + 3. There is a policy file that is compiled into the kernel that is + parsed and enforced on initialization. + +The first option has problems: the kernel reading files from userspace +is typically discouraged and very uncommon in the kernel. + +The second option also has problems: Linux supports a variety of bootloaders +across its entire ecosystem - every bootloader would have to support this +new methodology or there must be an independent source. Additionally, it +would likely result in more drastic changes to the kernel startup than +necessary. + +The third option is the best but it's important to be aware that the policy +will take disk space against the kernel it's compiled in. It's important to +keep this policy generalized enough that userspace can load a new, more +complicated policy, but restrictive enough that it will not overauthorize +and cause security issues. + +The initramfs, provides a way that this bootup path can be established. The +kernel starts with a minimal policy, that just trusts the initramfs. Inside +the initramfs, when the real rootfs is mounted, but not yet transferred to, +it deploys and activates a policy that trusts the new root filesystem(s). +This prevents overauthorization at any step, and keeps the kernel policy +to a minimal size. + +Startup +^^^^^^^ + +Not every system, however starts with an initramfs, so the startup policy +compiled into the kernel will need some flexibility to express how trust +is established for the next phase of the bootup. To this end, if we just +make the compiled-in policy a full IPE policy, it allows system builders +to express the first stage bootup requirements appropriately. + +Updatable, Rebootless Policy +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +As time goes on, trust requirements are changed (vulnerabilities are found in +previously trusted applcations, keys roll, etcetera). Updating a kernel to +change the trust requirements is not always a suitable option, as updates +are not always risk-free and without consequence. This means IPE requires +a policy that can be completely updated from a source external to the kernel. + +Additionally, since the kernel is relatively stateless between invocations, +and we've established that reading policy files off the disk from kernel +space is a *bad idea*, then the policy updates have to be done rebootlessly. + +To allow an update from an external source, it could be potentially malicious, +so this policy needs to have a way to be identified as trusted. This will be +done via a signature, chained to a trust source in the kernel. Arbitrarily, +this will be the ``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING``, a keyring that is initially +populated at kernel compile-time, as this matches the expectation that the +author of the compiled-in policy described above is the same entity that can +deploy policy updates. + +Anti-Rollback / Anti-Replay +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Over time, vulnerabilities are found and trusted resources may not be +trusted anymore. IPE's policy has no exception to this. There can be +instances where a mistaken policy author deploys an insecure policy, +before correcting it with a secure policy. + +Assuming that as soon as the insecure policy was signed, an attacker +can acquire the insecure policy, IPE needs a way to prevent rollback +from the secure policy update, to the insecure policy update. + +Initially, IPE's policy can have a policy_version that states the +minimum required version across all policies that can be active on +the system. This will prevent rollback while the system is live. + +.. WARNING:: + + However, since the kernel is stateless across boots, this policy + version will be reset to 0.0.0 on the next boot. System builders + need to be aware of this, and ensure the new secure policies are + deployed ASAP after a boot to ensure that the window of + opportunity is minimal for an attacker to deploy the insecure policy[#]_. + +Implementation +-------------- + +Context +~~~~~~~ + +An ``ipe_context`` structure represent a context in which IPE can be enforced. +It contains all the typical values that one would expect are global: + + 1. Enforce/Permissive State + 2. Active Policy + 3. List of Policies + 4. Success Auditing State + +A context is created at boot time and attached to the ``task_struct`` as a +security blob. All new ``task_struct`` will inherit the original ``ipe_context`` +that the system boots with. This structure is reference counted. + +Initially, a system will only ever have one context; for ``init``, and since +all userspace processes are descendents of ``init``, all of usermode will have +this execution context. + +This architecture has some advantages - namely, it allows for a natural +extension for IPE to create new contexts - such as applying a different +policy for trust for a privledged container from that of its host. + +Anonymous Memory +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Anonymous memory isn't treated any differently than any other access in IPE. +When anonymous memory is mapped with ``+X``, it still comes into the ``file_mmap`` +hook, but with a ``NULL`` file object. This is submitted to the evaluation, like +any other file, however, all trust mechanisms will return false as there is +nothing to evaluate. This means anonymous memory execution is subject to +whatever the ``DEFAULT`` is for ``EXECUTE``. + +.. WARNING:: + + This also occurs with the ``kernel_load_data`` hook, which is used by signed + and compressed kernel modules. Using this with IPE will result in the + ``DEFAULT`` for ``KMODULE`` being taken. + +Policy Parser +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The policy parser is the staple of IPE's functionality, providing a +modular way to introduce new integrations. As such, it's functionality +is divided into 4 passes. This gives the benefit of clearly defined pre +and post-condition states after each pass, giving debugging benefits +when something goes wrong. + +In pass1, the policy is transformed into a 2D, jagged, array of tokens, +where a token is defined as a "key=value" pair, or a singular token, +for example, "DEFAULT". Quoted values are parsed as a single value-pair, +which is why ```` parser is insufficient - it does not +understand quoted values. + +In pass2, the jagged array produced in pass1 is partially ingested, +creating a partially populated policy, where no rules have been parsed +yet, but metadata and references are created that can be now used in +pass3. + +Examples of parsing that would be done in pass2:: + + policy_name="my-policy" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + +As these lines are not rules in of themselves, but effect the policy +itself. + +In pass3, the remaining lines in the jagged array produced in pass1 and +partially-consumed in pass2 is consumed completely, parsing all the +rules in IPE policy. This can leverage the data used in pass2. +Example lines parsed in pass3:: + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=DENY + +A rule is strictly defined as starts with the op token and ends with +the action token. + +After this pass, a policy is deemed fully constructed but not yet valid, +as there could be missing elements (such as a required DEFAULT for all +actions, missing a policy_name), etc. + +Additionally, as IPE policy supports operation aliases (an operation +that maps to two or more other operations), support is added here. + +The purpose in the division of pass2 and pass3 is to allow for +declarations in IPE's syntax. For example, in the future, if we were +to introduce this syntax:: + + CERTIFICATE=FakeCert thumbprint=DEADBEEF CN="Contoso" + +And use it like so:: + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=FakeCert action=ALLOW + +The ``CERTIFICATE`` lines can be grouped together at any place in the policy. + +After pass3, an IPE policy can still be technically invalid for use, as +a policy can be lacking required elements to eliminated the possibility +of undefined or unknown behavior. + +A concrete example is when a policy does not define a default action for +all possibilities:: + + DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + +At this point, while a technically syntactically and semantically valid +policy, it does not contain enough information to determine what should +be done for an operation other than "EXECUTE". As IPE's design +explicitly prohibits the implicit setting of a DEFAULT, it is important +for cases like these are prevented from occurring. + +To resolve all these cases, a final check on the policy is done to ensure +it valid for use. + +In all cases, the parser is the number one bottleneck when it comes to +IPE's performance, but has the benefit of happening rarely, and as a +direct consequence of user-input. + +Module vs Parser +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +A "module", "trust provider", or "property" as defined in IPE's code and +commits is an integration with an external subsystem that provides a way +to identify a resource as trusted. It's the code that powers the key=value +pairs in between the ``op`` token and the ``action`` token. These are called +in pass3 when parsing a policy (via the ``parse`` method), and during +evaluation when evaluating a access attempt (via the ``eval`` method). These +discrete modules are single files in ``security/ipe/modules`` and are +versioned independently. The documentation in the admin guide and be used +to cross reference what version supports what syntax. + +A "parser", on the other hand is a discrete unit of code that is *only* +used when parsing a policy in pass2. The intention is to make it easy +to introduce statements, like the ``DEFAULT`` statement:: + + DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + DEFAULT action=ALLOW + +or, the policy header:: + + policy_name="MyPolicy" policy_version=0.0.0 + +These individual fragments of code, as such, gain access to manipulating +IPE's policy structure directly, as opposed to the opaque ``void *`` that +modules get. + +.. [#] This is something we're interested in solving, using some + persistent storage + +Tests +~~~~~ + +IPE initially has KUnit Tests, testing primarily the parser and the context +structures. A majority of these are table-based testing, please contribute +to them, especially when adding new properties. diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index a84ca781199b..909db5ba6f87 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9283,6 +9283,8 @@ INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE) M: Deven Bowers M: Fan Wu S: Supported +F: Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst +F: Documentation/security/ipe.rst F: scripts/ipe/ F: security/ipe/ -- 2.33.0