From: Eric Biggers <email@example.com>
To: firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com
Cc: firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com,
Thara Gopinath <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Gaurav Kashyap <email@example.com>,
Satya Tangirala <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 0/3] Support for hardware-wrapped inline encryption keys
Date: Thu, 21 Oct 2021 11:16:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <email@example.com> (raw)
[ NOTE: this patchset is an RFC that isn't ready for merging yet because
it doesn't yet include the vendor-specific UFS or eMMC driver changes
needed to actually use the feature. I.e., this patchset isn't
sufficient to actually use hardware-wrapped keys with upstream yet.
For context, hardware-wrapped key support has been out-of-tree in the
Android kernels since January 2020; upstreaming has been blocked on
hardware availability and support. However, an SoC that supports this
feature (SM8350, a.k.a. Qualcomm Snapdragon 888) finally has been
publicly released and had basic SoC support upstreamed. Also, some
other SoCs will support the same feature soon, e.g. the "Tensor" SoC
which was recently announced. So, things should be progressing soon.
So while the driver changes are gotten ready, I wanted to get things
started and give people a chance to give early feedback on the plan
for how the kernel will support this type of hardware.]
This patchset adds framework-level support (i.e., block and fscrypt
support) for hardware-wrapped keys when the inline encryption hardware
supports them. Hardware-wrapped keys are inline encryption keys that
are wrapped (encrypted) by a key internal to the hardware. Except at
initial unlocking time, the wrapping key is an ephemeral, per-boot key.
Hardware-wrapped keys can only be unwrapped (decrypted) by the hardware,
e.g. when a key is programmed into a keyslot. They are never visible to
software in raw form, except optionally during key generation (the
hardware supports importing keys as well as generating keys itself).
This feature protects the encryption keys from read-only compromises of
kernel memory, such as that which can occur during a cold boot attack.
It does this without limiting the number of keys that can be used, as
would be the case with solutions that didn't use key wrapping.
The kernel changes to support this feature basically consist of changes
to blk-crypto to allow a blk_crypto_key to be hardware-wrapped and to
allow storage drivers to support hardware-wrapped keys, new block device
ioctls for creating and preparing hardware-wrapped keys, and changes to
fscrypt to allow the fscrypt master keys to be hardware-wrapped.
For full details, see the individual patches, especially the detailed
documentation they add to Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst and
This patchset is organized as follows:
- Patch 1 adds the block support and documentation, excluding the ioctls
needed to get a key ready to be used in the first place.
- Patch 2 adds new block device ioctls for creating and preparing
- Patch 3 adds the fscrypt support and documentation.
This patchset is based on top of linux-block/for-next
It can also be retrieved from tag "wrapped-keys-v3" of
Changed v2 => v3:
- Dropped some fscrypt cleanups that were applied.
- Rebased on top of the latest linux-block and fscrypt branches.
- Minor cleanups.
Changed v1 => v2:
- Added new ioctls for creating and preparing hardware-wrapped keys.
- Rebased onto my patchset which renames blk_keyslot_manager to
Eric Biggers (3):
block: add basic hardware-wrapped key support
block: add ioctls to create and prepare hardware-wrapped keys
fscrypt: add support for hardware-wrapped keys
Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst | 238 +++++++++++++++++++++-
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 154 ++++++++++++--
block/blk-crypto-fallback.c | 5 +-
block/blk-crypto-internal.h | 10 +
block/blk-crypto-profile.c | 97 +++++++++
block/blk-crypto.c | 158 +++++++++++++-
block/ioctl.c | 4 +
drivers/md/dm-table.c | 1 +
drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-crypto.c | 2 +
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c | 1 +
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 83 +++++++-
fs/crypto/hkdf.c | 4 +-
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c | 64 +++++-
fs/crypto/keyring.c | 119 ++++++++---
fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 74 ++++++-
fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c | 5 +-
fs/crypto/policy.c | 11 +-
include/linux/blk-crypto-profile.h | 80 ++++++++
include/linux/blk-crypto.h | 70 ++++++-
include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 19 ++
include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h | 7 +-
21 files changed, 1111 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-)
next reply other threads:[~2021-10-21 18:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-21 18:16 Eric Biggers [this message]
2021-10-21 18:16 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] block: add basic hardware-wrapped key support Eric Biggers
2021-10-21 18:16 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] block: add ioctls to create and prepare hardware-wrapped keys Eric Biggers
2021-10-21 18:16 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/3] fscrypt: add support for " Eric Biggers
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).