From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 658B4C433B4 for ; Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:27:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D9186113D for ; Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:27:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234863AbhDOT1n (ORCPT ); Thu, 15 Apr 2021 15:27:43 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54550 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234859AbhDOT1m (ORCPT ); Thu, 15 Apr 2021 15:27:42 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B40ED61152; Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:27:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1618514838; bh=HYRrEmi7fOFNPZBkFQIEbPMVA5Mg61imnM16h5jqYeQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=GilKiLJcAiBC2S3okw3J98LUHvn7cozbOHDn48twsQTmDyWlX3eNEveQv0RkCw/rT DuCAEI5W2QZ6bJxLfEBGUWHcBWn+LlaadNzFGKjblVH8MujKQzV/PPl5whoH16hzwz my7ie8bWB/34TCUsNzkKNhBMcRaOYxFXqB4eXy5ruDp+Y3bfyg0lw6NgGCsHUlA3ee G8nqwUbtocvE1Equpnt7sf1HJ9ugAgG8N/QrBmEXKzvVncGj4jHnLf0gWTUwuXHlPS QOiz6Mgy4t7q5DwXwALBJ5NxKboOp9Gwo54S+owbZaRLXCjQK61aIEc/uEDHYfUlNS OQQJuVeEMoAqA== Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 12:27:17 -0700 From: Eric Biggers To: Satya Tangirala Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/8] dm,mmc,ufshcd: handle error from blk_ksm_register() Message-ID: References: <20210325212609.492188-1-satyat@google.com> <20210325212609.492188-3-satyat@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210325212609.492188-3-satyat@google.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-block@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 09:26:03PM +0000, Satya Tangirala wrote: > Handle any error from blk_ksm_register() in the callers. Previously, > the callers ignored the return value because blk_ksm_register() wouldn't > fail as long as the request_queue didn't have integrity support too, but > as this is no longer the case, it's safer for the callers to just handle > the return value appropriately. > > Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala > --- > drivers/md/dm-table.c | 3 ++- > drivers/mmc/core/crypto.c | 6 ++++-- > drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c | 6 ++++-- > 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) This probably should be 3 patches, one for each subsystem. > diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-table.c b/drivers/md/dm-table.c > index db18a58adad7..1225b9050f29 100644 > --- a/drivers/md/dm-table.c > +++ b/drivers/md/dm-table.c > @@ -1372,7 +1372,8 @@ static void dm_update_keyslot_manager(struct request_queue *q, > > /* Make the ksm less restrictive */ > if (!q->ksm) { > - blk_ksm_register(t->ksm, q); > + if (WARN_ON(!blk_ksm_register(t->ksm, q))) > + dm_destroy_keyslot_manager(t->ksm); > } else { > blk_ksm_update_capabilities(q->ksm, t->ksm); > dm_destroy_keyslot_manager(t->ksm); > diff --git a/drivers/mmc/core/crypto.c b/drivers/mmc/core/crypto.c > index 419a368f8402..616103393557 100644 > --- a/drivers/mmc/core/crypto.c > +++ b/drivers/mmc/core/crypto.c > @@ -21,8 +21,10 @@ void mmc_crypto_set_initial_state(struct mmc_host *host) > > void mmc_crypto_setup_queue(struct request_queue *q, struct mmc_host *host) > { > - if (host->caps2 & MMC_CAP2_CRYPTO) > - blk_ksm_register(&host->ksm, q); > + if (host->caps2 & MMC_CAP2_CRYPTO) { > + if (WARN_ON(!blk_ksm_register(&host->ksm, q))) > + host->caps2 &= ~MMC_CAP2_CRYPTO; > + } > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmc_crypto_setup_queue); > > diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c > index d70cdcd35e43..f47a72fefe9e 100644 > --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c > +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-crypto.c > @@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ void ufshcd_init_crypto(struct ufs_hba *hba) > void ufshcd_crypto_setup_rq_keyslot_manager(struct ufs_hba *hba, > struct request_queue *q) > { > - if (hba->caps & UFSHCD_CAP_CRYPTO) > - blk_ksm_register(&hba->ksm, q); > + if (hba->caps & UFSHCD_CAP_CRYPTO) { > + if (WARN_ON(!blk_ksm_register(&hba->ksm, q))) > + hba->caps &= ~UFSHCD_CAP_CRYPTO; > + } It would be helpful to add a comment in each case to explain why the WARN_ON should never trigger. Also, clearing UFSHCD_CAP_CRYPTO or MMC_CAP2_CRYPTO doesn't really make sense here because those capabilities apply to the whole UFS or MMC host controller, not just to the individual request_queue which failed. (A host controller can control multiple devices, each of which has its own request_queue.) Isn't blk_ksm_register() failing already enough to ensure that the inline crypto support isn't used on that particular request_queue? What is the benefit of clearing UFSHCD_CAP_CRYPTO and MMC_CAP2_CRYPTO too? - Eric