From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com, corbet@lwn.net, axboe@kernel.dk,
agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, ebiggers@kernel.org,
tytso@mit.edu, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
jannh@google.com, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-audit@redhat.com,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 05/16] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read
Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 13:04:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a358e0b0-2fc0-8b03-4bee-141675fdc73e@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1634151995-16266-6-git-send-email-deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
On 10/13/2021 12:06 PM, deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com wrote:
> From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
>
> IPE's initial goal is to control both execution and the loading of
> kernel modules based on the system's definition of trust. It
> accomplishes this by plugging into the security hooks for execve,
> mprotect, mmap, kernel_load_data and kernel_read_data.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>
> Relevant changes since v6:
> * Split up patch 02/12 into four parts:
> 1. context creation [01/16]
> 2. audit [07/16]
> 3. evaluation loop [03/16]
> 4. access control hooks [05/16] (this patch)
>
> ---
> security/ipe/hooks.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/ipe/hooks.h | 23 ++++++-
> security/ipe/ipe.c | 5 ++
> security/ipe/policy.c | 23 +++++++
> security/ipe/policy.h | 12 +++-
> 5 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c
> index ed0c886eaa5a..216242408a80 100644
> --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c
> @@ -6,11 +6,15 @@
> #include "ipe.h"
> #include "ctx.h"
> #include "hooks.h"
> +#include "eval.h"
>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/types.h>
> #include <linux/refcount.h>
> #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> +#include <linux/binfmts.h>
> +#include <linux/mman.h>
>
> /**
> * ipe_task_alloc: Assign a new context for an associated task structure.
> @@ -56,3 +60,148 @@ void ipe_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
> ipe_put_ctx(ctx);
> rcu_read_unlock();
> }
> +
> +/**
> + * ipe_on_exec: LSM hook called when a process is loaded through the exec
> + * family of system calls.
> + * @bprm: Supplies a pointer to a linux_binprm structure to source the file
> + * being evaluated.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * 0 - OK
> + * !0 - Error
> + */
> +int ipe_on_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +{
> + return ipe_process_event(bprm->file, ipe_operation_exec, ipe_hook_exec);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ipe_on_mmap: LSM hook called when a file is loaded through the mmap
> + * family of system calls.
> + * @f: File being mmap'd. Can be NULL in the case of anonymous memory.
> + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode.
> + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and
> + * system configuration.
> + * @flags: Unused.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * 0 - OK
> + * !0 - Error
> + */
> +int ipe_on_mmap(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
> + unsigned long flags)
> +{
> + if (prot & PROT_EXEC || reqprot & PROT_EXEC)
> + return ipe_process_event(f, ipe_operation_exec, ipe_hook_mmap);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ipe_on_mprotect: LSM hook called when a mmap'd region of memory is changing
> + * its protections via mprotect.
> + * @vma: Existing virtual memory area created by mmap or similar
> + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode.
> + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and
> + * system configuration.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * 0 - OK
> + * !0 - Error
> + */
> +int ipe_on_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> + unsigned long prot)
> +{
> + /* Already Executable */
> + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (((prot & PROT_EXEC) || reqprot & PROT_EXEC))
> + return ipe_process_event(vma->vm_file, ipe_operation_exec,
> + ipe_hook_mprotect);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ipe_on_kernel_read: LSM hook called when a file is being read in from
> + * disk.
> + * @file: Supplies a pointer to the file structure being read in from disk
> + * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read.
> + * @contents: Unused.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * 0 - OK
> + * !0 - Error
> + */
> +int ipe_on_kernel_read(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> + bool contents)
> +{
> + enum ipe_operation op;
> +
> + switch (id) {
> + case READING_FIRMWARE:
> + op = ipe_operation_firmware;
> + break;
> + case READING_MODULE:
> + op = ipe_operation_kernel_module;
> + break;
> + case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
> + op = ipe_operation_kexec_initramfs;
> + break;
> + case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
> + op = ipe_operation_kexec_image;
> + break;
> + case READING_POLICY:
> + op = ipe_operation_ima_policy;
> + break;
> + case READING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
> + op = ipe_operation_ima_x509;
> + break;
> + default:
> + op = ipe_operation_max;
> + }
> +
> + return ipe_process_event(file, op, ipe_hook_kernel_read);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ipe_on_kernel_load_data: LSM hook called when a buffer is being read in from
> + * disk.
> + * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read.
> + * @contents: Unused.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * 0 - OK
> + * !0 - Error
> + */
> +int ipe_on_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> +{
> + enum ipe_operation op;
> +
> + switch (id) {
> + case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
> + op = ipe_operation_firmware;
> + break;
> + case LOADING_MODULE:
> + op = ipe_operation_kernel_module;
> + break;
> + case LOADING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
> + op = ipe_operation_kexec_initramfs;
> + break;
> + case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
> + op = ipe_operation_kexec_image;
> + break;
> + case LOADING_POLICY:
> + op = ipe_operation_ima_policy;
> + break;
> + case LOADING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
> + op = ipe_operation_ima_x509;
> + break;
> + default:
> + op = ipe_operation_max;
> + }
> +
> + return ipe_process_event(NULL, op, ipe_hook_kernel_load);
> +}
> diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h
> index 58ed4a612e26..c99a0b7f45f7 100644
> --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h
> +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h
> @@ -5,11 +5,19 @@
> #ifndef IPE_HOOKS_H
> #define IPE_HOOKS_H
>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/types.h>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/binfmts.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
>
> enum ipe_hook {
> - ipe_hook_max = 0
> + ipe_hook_exec = 0,
> + ipe_hook_mmap,
> + ipe_hook_mprotect,
> + ipe_hook_kernel_read,
> + ipe_hook_kernel_load,
> + ipe_hook_max
> };
>
> int ipe_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
> @@ -17,4 +25,17 @@ int ipe_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
>
> void ipe_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
>
> +int ipe_on_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> +
> +int ipe_on_mmap(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
> + unsigned long flags);
> +
> +int ipe_on_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> + unsigned long prot);
> +
> +int ipe_on_kernel_read(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> + bool contents);
> +
> +int ipe_on_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
> +
> #endif /* IPE_HOOKS_H */
> diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c
> index b58b372327a1..3f9d43783293 100644
> --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c
> +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c
> @@ -25,6 +25,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, ipe_task_alloc),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, ipe_task_free),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_on_exec),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_on_mmap),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ipe_on_mprotect),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_on_kernel_read),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_on_kernel_load_data),
Please stick with the lsmname_hook_name convention, as you did
with ipe_task_alloc and ipe_task_free. Anyone who is looking at
more than one LSM is going to have a much harder time working
with your code the way you have it. Think
% find security | xargs grep '_bprm_check_security('
> };
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c
> index b766824cc08f..048500229365 100644
> --- a/security/ipe/policy.c
> +++ b/security/ipe/policy.c
> @@ -483,6 +483,14 @@ int ipe_parse_op(const struct ipe_policy_token *tok,
> {
> substring_t match[MAX_OPT_ARGS] = { 0 };
> const match_table_t ops = {
> + { ipe_operation_exec, "EXECUTE" },
> + { ipe_operation_firmware, "FIRMWARE" },
> + { ipe_operation_kernel_module, "KMODULE" },
> + { ipe_operation_kexec_image, "KEXEC_IMAGE" },
> + { ipe_operation_kexec_initramfs, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS"},
> + { ipe_operation_ima_policy, "IMA_POLICY" },
> + { ipe_operation_ima_x509, "IMA_X509_CERT" },
> + { ipe_op_alias_kernel_read, "KERNEL_READ" },
> { ipe_op_alias_max, NULL },
> };
>
> @@ -838,6 +846,15 @@ static int parse_policy(struct ipe_policy *p)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static const enum ipe_operation alias_kread[] = {
> + ipe_operation_firmware,
> + ipe_operation_kernel_module,
> + ipe_operation_ima_policy,
> + ipe_operation_ima_x509,
> + ipe_operation_kexec_image,
> + ipe_operation_kexec_initramfs,
> +};
> +
> /**
> * ipe_is_op_alias: Determine if @op is an alias for one or more operations
> * @op: Supplies the operation to check. Should be either ipe_operation or
> @@ -852,9 +869,15 @@ static int parse_policy(struct ipe_policy *p)
> bool ipe_is_op_alias(int op, const enum ipe_operation **map, size_t *size)
> {
> switch (op) {
> + case ipe_op_alias_kernel_read:
> + *map = alias_kread;
> + *size = ARRAY_SIZE(alias_kread);
> + break;
> default:
> return false;
> }
> +
> + return true;
> }
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.h b/security/ipe/policy.h
> index 6818f6405dd0..ca37af46e5af 100644
> --- a/security/ipe/policy.h
> +++ b/security/ipe/policy.h
> @@ -26,7 +26,14 @@ struct ipe_policy_line {
> struct ipe_module;
>
> enum ipe_operation {
> - ipe_operation_max = 0,
> + ipe_operation_exec = 0,
> + ipe_operation_firmware,
> + ipe_operation_kernel_module,
> + ipe_operation_kexec_image,
> + ipe_operation_kexec_initramfs,
> + ipe_operation_ima_policy,
> + ipe_operation_ima_x509,
> + ipe_operation_max
> };
>
> /*
> @@ -34,7 +41,8 @@ enum ipe_operation {
> * that are just one or more operations under the hood
> */
> enum ipe_op_alias {
> - ipe_op_alias_max = ipe_operation_max,
> + ipe_op_alias_kernel_read = ipe_operation_max,
> + ipe_op_alias_max,
> };
>
> enum ipe_action {
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-13 20:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-13 19:06 [RFC PATCH v7 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 01/16] security: add ipe lsm & initial context creation deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 02/16] ipe: add policy parser deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 03/16] ipe: add evaluation loop deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 04/16] ipe: add userspace interface deven.desai
2021-11-03 9:42 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-11-04 16:50 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 05/16] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read deven.desai
2021-10-13 20:04 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2021-10-15 19:25 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-25 12:22 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-10-26 19:03 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-27 8:56 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 06/16] uapi|audit: add trust audit message definitions deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 07/16] ipe: add auditing support deven.desai
2021-10-13 20:02 ` Steve Grubb
2021-10-15 19:25 ` Deven Bowers
2021-11-02 19:44 ` Steve Grubb
2021-11-04 16:59 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-13 22:54 ` Randy Dunlap
2021-10-15 19:25 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-15 19:50 ` Randy Dunlap
2021-10-26 19:03 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 08/16] ipe: add permissive toggle deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 09/16] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 10/16] fs|dm-verity: add block_dev LSM blob and submit dm-verity data deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 11/16] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider deven.desai
2021-11-25 9:37 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-11-30 18:55 ` Deven Bowers
2021-12-01 16:37 ` [RFC][PATCH] device mapper: Add builtin function dm_get_status() Roberto Sassu
2021-12-01 16:43 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-12-02 7:20 ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-12-02 7:59 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-12-02 8:44 ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-12-02 9:29 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-12-03 6:52 ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-12-03 10:20 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-12-06 10:57 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 12/16] fsverity|security: add security hooks to fsverity digest and signature deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:24 ` Eric Biggers
2021-10-15 19:25 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-15 20:11 ` Eric Biggers
2021-10-20 15:08 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-10-22 16:31 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-10-26 19:03 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-27 8:41 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-10-26 19:03 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-27 9:34 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-10-28 3:48 ` Eric Biggers
2021-10-28 18:11 ` Deven Bowers
2021-11-03 12:28 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-11-04 17:12 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 13/16] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 14/16] scripts: add boot policy generation program deven.desai
2021-11-03 16:43 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-11-03 16:53 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-11-04 16:52 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 15/16] ipe: kunit tests deven.desai
2021-10-13 19:06 ` [RFC PATCH v7 16/16] documentation: add ipe documentation deven.desai
2021-10-25 11:30 ` [RFC PATCH v7 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) Roberto Sassu
2021-10-26 19:03 ` Deven Bowers
2021-10-27 8:26 ` Roberto Sassu
2021-10-28 20:36 ` Deven Bowers
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