From: "michal.lowas-rzechonek@silvair.com" <michal.lowas-rzechonek@silvair.com>
To: "Gix, Brian" <brian.gix@intel.com>
Cc: "johan.hedberg@gmail.com" <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>,
"marcel@holtmann.org" <marcel@holtmann.org>,
"linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org>,
"Stotland, Inga" <inga.stotland@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH BlueZ 0/1] mesh: Add D-Bus Security for sensitive data
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2019 22:52:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190814205256.xkuqo4zqyl63erhc@kynes> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <dbffabec9a869204b4de1aab645fd727949e655e.camel@intel.com>
Hi Brian,
On 08/14, Gix, Brian wrote:
> I would like Marcel to weigh in on this since the security of exposing
> keys via D-Bus was initially a concern raised by him.
Ok.
> Also, we may be able to leave it in the hands of the Application that
> owns the node. It could be as simple as the Application decides to
> secure the D-Bus channel (for only itself) by performing the Public
> Key Exchange.
For the record - I understand the hesitation to "trust" the applications
to correctly handle security and I don't mean to dispute this. I
understand that once keys are exfiltrated from a network, all hell
might break loose.
Leaking meshd's tokens does not lead to that situation - at worst, one
could impersonate a single node.
I also agree that key export is sensitive and accesing these should
require some kind of authorization scheme.
> If the Application does *not* request a Public Key from the Daemon,
> and/or does not supply a Public Key during Attach/Join/Import, then
> the APIs work the same as they do today (albeit with extra ignored
> parameter(s)).
This sounds complex.
Stefan raised a point about app and net keys being visible in plaintext
when application attempts to configure a node (both local and remote).
This might lead to adding encryption to mesh payloads exchanged between
the daemon and the application. Such a thing would IMO defeat the whole
idea of mesh stack implemented as a system service - it would be easier
to implement this behaviour as a library and do all the crypto on the
application side.
> An app that knows it is opperating in a secure environment can then
> trust the system to provide all needed security, but if for instance,
> some sort of hybrid D-Bus that has an insecure link in the chain, thwe
> App can add the Public Key exchange and encrypt/decrypt as needed.
As far as I know, there are only a handful of D-Bus daemon
implementations out there, and I don't think that any of them is
inherently insecure. Sure, there might be bugs and vulnerabilities, but
I am not aware of any implementation that includes an "insecure link".
Please keep in mind that D-Bus is confined within a single machine -
yes, there is a TCP transport, but virtually all setups have this turned
off, and IIRC freedeskop.org explicitly states that this feature should
not be used in a production environment.
regards
--
Michał Lowas-Rzechonek <michal.lowas-rzechonek@silvair.com>
Silvair http://silvair.com
Jasnogórska 44, 31-358 Krakow, POLAND
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-14 20:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-14 1:43 [PATCH BlueZ 0/1] mesh: Add D-Bus Security for sensitive data Brian Gix
2019-08-14 1:43 ` [PATCH BlueZ 1/1] doc: Add Pub/Private ECC shared secret to obscure " Brian Gix
2019-08-14 8:14 ` Vallaster Stefan
2019-08-14 7:52 ` [PATCH BlueZ 0/1] mesh: Add D-Bus Security for " Michał Lowas-Rzechonek
2019-08-14 16:41 ` Gix, Brian
2019-08-14 20:52 ` michal.lowas-rzechonek [this message]
2019-08-14 21:02 ` Gix, Brian
2019-08-14 21:20 ` michal.lowas-rzechonek
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