[PATCH BlueZ 0/4] Mesh: Fixes for friendship procedures

[PATCH BlueZ 0/4] Mesh: Fixes for friendship procedures

[Isak Westin]

Hello,

Here are a few patches targeting the mesh friendship behaviour. Found
during PTS testing of:
  - MESH/NODE/FRND/FN/*

Happy for any feedback.

Best regards,
Isak

Isak Westin (4):
  mesh: Correct size of friend cache
  mesh: Verify padding bits in Friend Poll messages
  mesh: Queue a friend update on IV Update change
  mesh: Always relay messages from Low Power nodes

 mesh/friend.c |  2 +-
 mesh/net.c    | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH BlueZ 1/4] mesh: Correct size of friend cache

[Isak Westin]

The cache size communicated to the Low Power node should be the same as
the cache size actually used.
---
 mesh/friend.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/mesh/friend.c b/mesh/friend.c
index 6c63032ac..5b73da689 100644
--- a/mesh/friend.c
+++ b/mesh/friend.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 
 #define MAX_FRND_GROUPS		20
 #define FRND_RELAY_WINDOW	250		/* 250 ms */
-#define FRND_CACHE_SIZE		16
+#define FRND_CACHE_SIZE		FRND_CACHE_MAX
 #define FRND_SUB_LIST_SIZE	8
 
 #define RESPONSE_DELAY		(100 - 12)	/*  100  ms - 12ms hw delay */
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH BlueZ 2/4] mesh: Verify padding bits in Friend Poll messages

[Isak Westin]

The padding bits in a Friend Poll message must be zero.
See MshPRFv1.0.1 section 3.6.5.1.
---
 mesh/net.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/mesh/net.c b/mesh/net.c
index 379a6e250..a8a527c2f 100644
--- a/mesh/net.c
+++ b/mesh/net.c
@@ -2059,7 +2059,7 @@ static bool ctl_received(struct mesh_net *net, uint32_t net_key_id,
 		break;
 
 	case NET_OP_FRND_POLL:
-		if (len != 1 || ttl)
+		if (len != 1 || ttl || pkt[0] > 1)
 			return false;
 
 		print_packet("Rx-NET_OP_FRND_POLL", pkt, len);
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH BlueZ 3/4] mesh: Queue a friend update on IV Update change

[Isak Westin]

A friend update should be queued when we receive a Secure Network beacon
that changes the IV Update state.
---
 mesh/net.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/mesh/net.c b/mesh/net.c
index a8a527c2f..577121f30 100644
--- a/mesh/net.c
+++ b/mesh/net.c
@@ -2703,6 +2703,7 @@ static bool update_iv_ivu_state(struct mesh_net *net, uint32_t iv_index,
 
 	net->iv_index = iv_index;
 	net->iv_update = ivu;
+	queue_friend_update(net);
 	return true;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH BlueZ 4/4] mesh: Always relay messages from Low Power nodes

[Isak Westin]

If we receive a message from one of our Low Power nodes, which is
encrypted using frendship credentials and where the destination is not
us, we must relay that message using master credentials.
See MshPRFv1.0.1 section 3.6.6.2.
---
 mesh/net.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mesh/net.c b/mesh/net.c
index 577121f30..a1b586a0b 100644
--- a/mesh/net.c
+++ b/mesh/net.c
@@ -1763,7 +1763,8 @@ not_for_friend:
 	return true;
 }
 
-static uint16_t key_id_to_net_idx(struct mesh_net *net, uint32_t net_key_id)
+static uint16_t key_id_to_net_idx(struct mesh_net *net,
+				uint32_t net_key_id, bool *frnd)
 {
 	struct mesh_subnet *subnet;
 	struct mesh_friend *friend;
@@ -1771,6 +1772,9 @@ static uint16_t key_id_to_net_idx(struct mesh_net *net, uint32_t net_key_id)
 	if (!net)
 		return NET_IDX_INVALID;
 
+	if (frnd)
+		*frnd = false;
+
 	subnet = l_queue_find(net->subnets, match_key_id,
 						L_UINT_TO_PTR(net_key_id));
 
@@ -1780,8 +1784,12 @@ static uint16_t key_id_to_net_idx(struct mesh_net *net, uint32_t net_key_id)
 	friend = l_queue_find(net->friends, match_friend_key_id,
 						L_UINT_TO_PTR(net_key_id));
 
-	if (friend)
+	if (friend) {
+		if (frnd)
+			*frnd = true;
+
 		return friend->net_idx;
+	}
 
 	friend = l_queue_find(net->negotiations, match_friend_key_id,
 						L_UINT_TO_PTR(net_key_id));
@@ -2078,7 +2086,7 @@ static bool ctl_received(struct mesh_net *net, uint32_t net_key_id,
 			return false;
 
 		print_packet("Rx-NET_OP_FRND_REQUEST", pkt, len);
-		net_idx = key_id_to_net_idx(net, net_key_id);
+		net_idx = key_id_to_net_idx(net, net_key_id, NULL);
 		friend_request(net, net_idx, src, pkt[0], pkt[1],
 				l_get_be32(pkt + 1) & 0xffffff,
 				l_get_be16(pkt + 5), pkt[7],
@@ -2269,7 +2277,8 @@ static void send_msg_pkt(struct mesh_net *net, uint8_t cnt, uint16_t interval,
 }
 
 static enum _relay_advice packet_received(void *user_data,
-				uint32_t net_key_id, uint32_t iv_index,
+				uint32_t net_key_id, uint16_t net_idx,
+				bool frnd, uint32_t iv_index,
 				const void *data, uint8_t size, int8_t rssi)
 {
 	struct mesh_net *net = user_data;
@@ -2278,16 +2287,11 @@ static enum _relay_advice packet_received(void *user_data,
 	uint8_t net_ttl, key_aid, net_segO, net_segN, net_opcode;
 	uint32_t net_seq, cache_cookie;
 	uint16_t net_src, net_dst, net_seqZero;
-	uint16_t net_idx;
 	uint8_t packet[31];
 	bool net_ctl, net_segmented, net_szmic, net_relay;
 
 	memcpy(packet + 2, data, size);
 
-	net_idx = key_id_to_net_idx(net, net_key_id);
-	if (net_idx == NET_IDX_INVALID)
-		return RELAY_NONE;
-
 	print_packet("RX: Network [clr] :", packet + 2, size);
 
 	if (!mesh_crypto_packet_parse(packet + 2, size, &net_ctl, &net_ttl,
@@ -2389,6 +2393,13 @@ static enum _relay_advice packet_received(void *user_data,
 			return RELAY_DISALLOWED;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Messages that are encrypted with friendship credentials
+	 * should *always* be relayed
+	 */
+	if (frnd)
+		return RELAY_ALWAYS;
+
 	/* If relay not enable, or no more hops allowed */
 	if (!net->relay.enable || net_ttl < 0x02)
 		return RELAY_NONE;
@@ -2414,7 +2425,9 @@ static void net_rx(void *net_ptr, void *user_data)
 	uint8_t *out;
 	size_t out_size;
 	uint32_t net_key_id;
+	uint16_t net_idx;
 	int8_t rssi = 0;
+	bool frnd;
 	bool ivi_net = !!(net->iv_index & 1);
 	bool ivi_pkt = !!(data->data[0] & 0x80);
 
@@ -2438,9 +2451,21 @@ static void net_rx(void *net_ptr, void *user_data)
 		rssi = data->info->rssi;
 	}
 
-	relay_advice = packet_received(net, net_key_id, iv_index, out, out_size,
-									rssi);
+	net_idx = key_id_to_net_idx(net, net_key_id, &frnd);
+
+	if (net_idx == NET_IDX_INVALID)
+		return;
+
+	relay_advice = packet_received(net, net_key_id, net_idx, frnd,
+						iv_index, out, out_size, rssi);
 	if (relay_advice > data->relay_advice) {
+		/*
+		 * If packet was encrypted with friendship credentials,
+		 * relay it using master credentials
+		 */
+		if (frnd && !mesh_net_get_key(net, false, net_idx, &net_key_id))
+			return;
+
 		data->iv_index = iv_index;
 		data->relay_advice = relay_advice;
 		data->net_key_id = net_key_id;
-- 
2.20.1

RE: Mesh: Fixes for friendship procedures

[bluez.test.bot]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1053 bytes --]

This is automated email and please do not reply to this email!

Dear submitter,

Thank you for submitting the patches to the linux bluetooth mailing list.
This is a CI test results with your patch series:
PW Link:https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/bluetooth/list/?series=682931

---Test result---

Test Summary:
CheckPatch                    PASS      2.69 seconds
GitLint                       PASS      1.83 seconds
Prep - Setup ELL              PASS      32.77 seconds
Build - Prep                  PASS      0.79 seconds
Build - Configure             PASS      10.20 seconds
Build - Make                  PASS      1074.82 seconds
Make Check                    PASS      12.10 seconds
Make Check w/Valgrind         PASS      347.39 seconds
Make Distcheck                PASS      287.27 seconds
Build w/ext ELL - Configure   PASS      10.21 seconds
Build w/ext ELL - Make        PASS      104.52 seconds
Incremental Build w/ patches  PASS      492.04 seconds
Scan Build                    PASS      642.46 seconds



---
Regards,
Linux Bluetooth

Re: [PATCH BlueZ 0/4] Mesh: Fixes for friendship procedures

[Gix, Brian]

Patchset Applied... Thanks!
On Tue, 2022-10-04 at 10:25 +0200, Isak Westin wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> Here are a few patches targeting the mesh friendship behaviour. Found
> during PTS testing of:
>   - MESH/NODE/FRND/FN/*
> 
> Happy for any feedback.
> 
> Best regards,
> Isak
> 
> Isak Westin (4):
>   mesh: Correct size of friend cache
>   mesh: Verify padding bits in Friend Poll messages
>   mesh: Queue a friend update on IV Update change
>   mesh: Always relay messages from Low Power nodes
> 
>  mesh/friend.c |  2 +-
>  mesh/net.c    | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> -
>  2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> 

Re: [PATCH BlueZ 0/4] Mesh: Fixes for friendship procedures

[patchwork-bot+bluetooth]

Hello:

This series was applied to bluetooth/bluez.git (master)
by Brian Gix <brian.gix@intel.com>:

On Tue,  4 Oct 2022 10:25:26 +0200 you wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> Here are a few patches targeting the mesh friendship behaviour. Found
> during PTS testing of:
>   - MESH/NODE/FRND/FN/*
> 
> Happy for any feedback.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [BlueZ,1/4] mesh: Correct size of friend cache
    https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/?id=e9a8e884109c
  - [BlueZ,2/4] mesh: Verify padding bits in Friend Poll messages
    https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/?id=7ff3e10d92ba
  - [BlueZ,3/4] mesh: Queue a friend update on IV Update change
    https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/?id=3f3a7b8e192f
  - [BlueZ,4/4] mesh: Always relay messages from Low Power nodes
    https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/bluetooth/bluez.git/?id=c89e9c4b22b4

You are awesome, thank you!
-- 
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