From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA50CC43387 for ; Fri, 18 Jan 2019 13:12:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C2CD020652 for ; Fri, 18 Jan 2019 13:12:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726881AbfARNMZ convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Jan 2019 08:12:25 -0500 Received: from coyote.holtmann.net ([212.227.132.17]:45102 "EHLO mail.holtmann.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726593AbfARNMZ (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Jan 2019 08:12:25 -0500 Received: from marcel-macpro.fritz.box (p4FF9FD60.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [79.249.253.96]) by mail.holtmann.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D355DCF2C5; Fri, 18 Jan 2019 14:20:09 +0100 (CET) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.2 \(3445.102.3\)) Subject: Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Verify that l2cap_get_conf_opt provides large enough buffer From: Marcel Holtmann In-Reply-To: <20190118125342.GA31025@kroah.com> Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 14:12:23 +0100 Cc: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Message-Id: <93BDB9CB-55F3-415A-8EED-DD532C36BC8A@holtmann.org> References: <20190118124319.12187-1-marcel@holtmann.org> <20190118125342.GA31025@kroah.com> To: Greg KH X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.102.3) Sender: linux-bluetooth-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org Hi Greg, >> The function l2cap_get_conf_opt will return L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len >> as length value. The opt->len however is in control over the remote user >> and can be used by an attacker to gain access beyond the bounds of the >> actual packet. >> >> To prevent any potential leak of heap memory, it is enough to check that >> the resulting len calculation after calling l2cap_get_conf_opt is not >> below zero. A well formed packet will always return >= 0 here and will >> end with the length value being zero after the last option has been >> parsed. In case of malformed packets messing with the opt->len field the >> length value will become negative. If that is the case, then just abort >> and ignore the option. >> >> In case an attacker uses a too short opt->len value, then garbage will >> be parsed, but that is protected by the unknown option handling and also >> the option parameter size checks. >> >> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann >> --- >> net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 6 ++++++ >> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c >> index 77799e7d5a34..ccdc5c67d22a 100644 >> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c >> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c >> @@ -3337,6 +3337,8 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data, size_t data >> >> while (len >= L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) { >> len -= l2cap_get_conf_opt(&req, &type, &olen, &val); >> + if (len < 0) >> + break; > > > > Patch looks good to me, thanks for fixing this all up: it would be still good if we can get this verified by the reporter. Regards Marcel