Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: fix use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested()

["Wangshaobo (bobo)" <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>]

在 2021/7/15 5:50, Luiz Augusto von Dentz 写道:
> Hi,
>
> On Tue, Jul 13, 2021 at 8:20 PM Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com> wrote:
>> use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested() is reported:
>>
>> [  179.140137][ T3731] =====================================================
>> [  179.142675][ T3731] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0
>> [  179.145494][ T3731] CPU: 4 PID: 3731 Comm: kworker/4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #54
>> [  179.148432][ T3731] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
>> [  179.151806][ T3731] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
>> [  179.152730][ T3731] Call Trace:
>> [  179.153301][ T3731]  dump_stack+0x24c/0x2e0
>> [  179.154063][ T3731]  kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0
>> [  179.154855][ T3731]  __msan_warning+0x5c/0xa0
>> [  179.155579][ T3731]  lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0
>> [  179.156436][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
>> [  179.157257][ T3731]  l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0xb8/0x890
>> [  179.158154][ T3731]  ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20
>> [  179.159141][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
>> [  179.159994][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0
>> [  179.160959][ T3731]  ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x420/0x420
>> [  179.161834][ T3731]  l2cap_chan_del+0x3e1/0x1d50
>> [  179.162608][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
>> [  179.163435][ T3731]  ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0
>> [  179.164406][ T3731]  l2cap_chan_close+0xeea/0x1050
>> [  179.165189][ T3731]  ? kmsan_internal_unpoison_shadow+0x42/0x70
>> [  179.166180][ T3731]  l2cap_chan_timeout+0x1da/0x590
>> [  179.167066][ T3731]  ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20
>> [  179.168023][ T3731]  ? l2cap_chan_create+0x560/0x560
>> [  179.168818][ T3731]  process_one_work+0x121d/0x1ff0
>> [  179.169598][ T3731]  worker_thread+0x121b/0x2370
>> [  179.170346][ T3731]  kthread+0x4ef/0x610
>> [  179.171010][ T3731]  ? process_one_work+0x1ff0/0x1ff0
>> [  179.171828][ T3731]  ? kthread_blkcg+0x110/0x110
>> [  179.172587][ T3731]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
>> [  179.173348][ T3731]
>> [  179.173752][ T3731] Uninit was created at:
>> [  179.174409][ T3731]  kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0xf0
>> [  179.175373][ T3731]  kmsan_slab_free+0x76/0xc0
>> [  179.176060][ T3731]  kfree+0x3a5/0x1180
>> [  179.176664][ T3731]  __sk_destruct+0x8af/0xb80
>> [  179.177375][ T3731]  __sk_free+0x812/0x8c0
>> [  179.178032][ T3731]  sk_free+0x97/0x130
>> [  179.178686][ T3731]  l2cap_sock_release+0x3d5/0x4d0
>> [  179.179457][ T3731]  sock_close+0x150/0x450
>> [  179.180117][ T3731]  __fput+0x6bd/0xf00
>> [  179.180787][ T3731]  ____fput+0x37/0x40
>> [  179.181481][ T3731]  task_work_run+0x140/0x280
>> [  179.182219][ T3731]  do_exit+0xe51/0x3e60
>> [  179.182930][ T3731]  do_group_exit+0x20e/0x450
>> [  179.183656][ T3731]  get_signal+0x2dfb/0x38f0
>> [  179.184344][ T3731]  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xaa/0xe10
>> [  179.185266][ T3731]  exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2d2/0x560
>> [  179.186136][ T3731]  syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x35/0x60
>> [  179.186984][ T3731]  do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x140
>> [  179.187681][ T3731]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>> [  179.188604][ T3731] =====================================================
>>
>> In our case, there are two Thread A and B:
>>
>> Context: Thread A:              Context: Thread B:
>>
>> l2cap_chan_timeout()            __se_sys_shutdown()
>>    l2cap_chan_close()              l2cap_sock_shutdown()
>>      l2cap_chan_del()                l2cap_chan_close()
>>        l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()        l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()
>>
>> Once l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() excuted, this sock will be marked as SOCK_ZAPPED,
>> and can be treated as killable in l2cap_sock_kill() if sock_orphan() has
>> excuted, at this time we close sock through sock_close() which end to call
>> l2cap_sock_kill() like Thread C:
>>
>> Context: Thread C:
>>
>> sock_close()
>>    l2cap_sock_release()
>>      sock_orphan()
>>      l2cap_sock_kill()  #free sock if refcnt is 1
>>
>> If C completed, Once A or B reaches l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() again,
>> use-after-free happened.
>>
>> We should set chan->data to NULL if sock is freed, for telling teardown
>> operation is not allowed in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(), and also we should
>> avoid killing an already killed socket in l2cap_sock_close_cb().
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>   net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
>>   1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
>> index c99d65ef13b1..ddc6a692b237 100644
>> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
>> @@ -1215,14 +1215,18 @@ static int l2cap_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>>    */
>>   static void l2cap_sock_kill(struct sock *sk)
>>   {
>> +       struct l2cap_chan *chan;
>> +
>>          if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket)
>>                  return;
>>
>>          BT_DBG("sk %p state %s", sk, state_to_string(sk->sk_state));
>>
>>          /* Kill poor orphan */
>> -
>> -       l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
>> +       chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
>> +       l2cap_chan_put(chan);

There is a problem here, the above sentence `l2cap_chan_put(chan)` 
should put after

following sentence.

>> +       if (refcount_read(&sk->sk_refcnt) == 1)
>> +               chan->data = NULL;
> Instead of checking if it is the last reference here, wouldn't it be
> better to reset the chan->data to NULL on l2cap_sock_destruct?

Hi,

In my case it looks OK, this is the diff:

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index f1b1edd0b697..32ef3328ab49 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -1500,6 +1500,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_close_cb(struct l2cap_chan 
*chan)
  {
         struct sock *sk = chan->data;

+       if (!sk)
+               return;
+
         l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
  }

@@ -1508,6 +1511,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct 
l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
         struct sock *sk = chan->data;
         struct sock *parent;

+       if (!sk)
+               return;
+
         BT_DBG("chan %p state %s", chan, state_to_string(chan->state));

         /* This callback can be called both for server (BT_LISTEN)
@@ -1700,6 +1706,7 @@ static void l2cap_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
         BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);

         if (l2cap_pi(sk)->chan)
+              l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->data = NULL;
                  l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);

But if it has potential risk if l2cap_sock_destruct() can not be excuted 
in time ?

sk_free():

         if (refcount_dec_and_test(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc)) //is possible 
this condition false ?

               __sk_free(sk)   -> ... l2cap_sock_destruct()