* [PATCH v2] btrfs-progs: Improve the parse_size() error message.
@ 2014-05-29 1:42 Qu Wenruo
2014-06-12 10:15 ` David Sterba
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Qu Wenruo @ 2014-05-29 1:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-btrfs
When using parse_size(), even non-numeric value is passed, it will only
give error message "ERROR: size value is empty", which is quite
confusing for end users.
This patch will introduce more meaningful error message for the
following new cases
1) Invalid size string (non-numeric string)
2) Minus size value (like "-1K")
Also this patch will take full use of endptr returned by strtoll() to
reduce unneeded loop.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
---
utils.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/utils.c b/utils.c
index 392c5cf..499f08f 100644
--- a/utils.c
+++ b/utils.c
@@ -1612,18 +1612,45 @@ scan_again:
u64 parse_size(char *s)
{
- int i;
char c;
+ char *endptr;
u64 mult = 1;
+ long long int signed_ret;
+ u64 ret;
- for (i = 0; s && s[i] && isdigit(s[i]); i++) ;
- if (!i) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: size value is empty\n");
- exit(50);
+ if (!s) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Size value is empty\n");
+ exit(1);
}
-
- if (s[i]) {
- c = tolower(s[i]);
+ signed_ret = strtoll(s, &endptr, 10);
+ if (endptr == s) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Size value '%s' is invalid\n", s);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (endptr[0] && endptr[1]) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Illegal suffix contains character '%c' in wrong position\n",
+ endptr[1]);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (signed_ret <= 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ERROR: Size value '%s' is less equal than 0\n", s);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* strtoll returns LLONG_MAX when overflow, if this happens,
+ * need to call strtoull to get the real size */
+ if (errno == ERANGE && signed_ret == LLONG_MAX) {
+ ret = strtoull(s, NULL, 10);
+ if (errno == ERANGE && ret == ULLONG_MAX) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "ERROR: Size value '%s' is too large for u64\n",
+ s);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = signed_ret;
+ if (endptr[0]) {
+ c = tolower(endptr[0]);
switch (c) {
case 'e':
mult *= 1024;
@@ -1646,18 +1673,13 @@ u64 parse_size(char *s)
case 'b':
break;
default:
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Unknown size descriptor "
- "'%c'\n", c);
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Unknown size descriptor '%c'\n", c);
exit(1);
}
}
- if (s[i] && s[i+1]) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Illegal suffix contains "
- "character '%c' in wrong position\n",
- s[i+1]);
- exit(51);
- }
- return strtoull(s, NULL, 10) * mult;
+
+ ret *= mult;
+ return ret;
}
int open_file_or_dir3(const char *fname, DIR **dirstream, int open_flags)
--
1.9.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2] btrfs-progs: Improve the parse_size() error message.
2014-05-29 1:42 [PATCH v2] btrfs-progs: Improve the parse_size() error message Qu Wenruo
@ 2014-06-12 10:15 ` David Sterba
2014-06-13 1:19 ` Qu Wenruo
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: David Sterba @ 2014-06-12 10:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Qu Wenruo; +Cc: linux-btrfs
On Thu, May 29, 2014 at 09:42:11AM +0800, Qu Wenruo wrote:
> When using parse_size(), even non-numeric value is passed, it will only
> give error message "ERROR: size value is empty", which is quite
> confusing for end users.
>
> This patch will introduce more meaningful error message for the
> following new cases
> 1) Invalid size string (non-numeric string)
> 2) Minus size value (like "-1K")
>
> Also this patch will take full use of endptr returned by strtoll() to
> reduce unneeded loop.
>
> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
> ---
> utils.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/utils.c b/utils.c
> index 392c5cf..499f08f 100644
> --- a/utils.c
> +++ b/utils.c
> @@ -1612,18 +1612,45 @@ scan_again:
>
> u64 parse_size(char *s)
> {
> - int i;
> char c;
> + char *endptr;
> u64 mult = 1;
> + long long int signed_ret;
> + u64 ret;
>
> - for (i = 0; s && s[i] && isdigit(s[i]); i++) ;
> - if (!i) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: size value is empty\n");
> - exit(50);
> + if (!s) {
> + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Size value is empty\n");
> + exit(1);
We never pass a NULL pointer to parse_size so this check will be always
false. Previously it verified that there are at least some digits.
> }
> -
> - if (s[i]) {
> - c = tolower(s[i]);
> + signed_ret = strtoll(s, &endptr, 10);
> + if (endptr == s) {
> + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Size value '%s' is invalid\n", s);
> + exit(1);
> + }
> + if (endptr[0] && endptr[1]) {
> + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Illegal suffix contains character '%c' in wrong position\n",
> + endptr[1]);
> + exit(1);
> + }
> + if (signed_ret <= 0) {
> + fprintf(stderr,
> + "ERROR: Size value '%s' is less equal than 0\n", s);
> + exit(1);
> + }
> + /* strtoll returns LLONG_MAX when overflow, if this happens,
> + * need to call strtoull to get the real size */
> + if (errno == ERANGE && signed_ret == LLONG_MAX) {
> + ret = strtoull(s, NULL, 10);
Why do you parse the number twice? Negative sizes are currently not used
so you can reject them.
> + if (errno == ERANGE && ret == ULLONG_MAX) {
> + fprintf(stderr,
> + "ERROR: Size value '%s' is too large for u64\n",
> + s);
> + exit(1);
> + }
> + } else
> + ret = signed_ret;
> + if (endptr[0]) {
> + c = tolower(endptr[0]);
> switch (c) {
> case 'e':
> mult *= 1024;
> @@ -1646,18 +1673,13 @@ u64 parse_size(char *s)
> case 'b':
> break;
> default:
> - fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Unknown size descriptor "
> - "'%c'\n", c);
> + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Unknown size descriptor '%c'\n", c);
> exit(1);
> }
> }
> - if (s[i] && s[i+1]) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Illegal suffix contains "
> - "character '%c' in wrong position\n",
> - s[i+1]);
> - exit(51);
> - }
> - return strtoull(s, NULL, 10) * mult;
> +
> + ret *= mult;
Although there was no overflow check before, I think it should be here.
Eg. 12345678P is a valid size string but the result does not fit u64.
> + return ret;
> }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2] btrfs-progs: Improve the parse_size() error message.
2014-06-12 10:15 ` David Sterba
@ 2014-06-13 1:19 ` Qu Wenruo
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Qu Wenruo @ 2014-06-13 1:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dsterba, linux-btrfs
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] btrfs-progs: Improve the parse_size() error message.
From: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
To: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: 2014年06月12日 18:15
> On Thu, May 29, 2014 at 09:42:11AM +0800, Qu Wenruo wrote:
>> When using parse_size(), even non-numeric value is passed, it will only
>> give error message "ERROR: size value is empty", which is quite
>> confusing for end users.
>>
>> This patch will introduce more meaningful error message for the
>> following new cases
>> 1) Invalid size string (non-numeric string)
>> 2) Minus size value (like "-1K")
>>
>> Also this patch will take full use of endptr returned by strtoll() to
>> reduce unneeded loop.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
>> ---
>> utils.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
>> 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/utils.c b/utils.c
>> index 392c5cf..499f08f 100644
>> --- a/utils.c
>> +++ b/utils.c
>> @@ -1612,18 +1612,45 @@ scan_again:
>>
>> u64 parse_size(char *s)
>> {
>> - int i;
>> char c;
>> + char *endptr;
>> u64 mult = 1;
>> + long long int signed_ret;
>> + u64 ret;
>>
>> - for (i = 0; s && s[i] && isdigit(s[i]); i++) ;
>> - if (!i) {
>> - fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: size value is empty\n");
>> - exit(50);
>> + if (!s) {
>> + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Size value is empty\n");
>> + exit(1);
> We never pass a NULL pointer to parse_size so this check will be always
> false. Previously it verified that there are at least some digits.
Command like 'mkfs.btrfs -b /dev/sda' *WILL* pass NULL pointer to
parse_size(), so the check is needed.
>
>> }
>> -
>> - if (s[i]) {
>> - c = tolower(s[i]);
>> + signed_ret = strtoll(s, &endptr, 10);
>> + if (endptr == s) {
>> + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Size value '%s' is invalid\n", s);
>> + exit(1);
>> + }
>> + if (endptr[0] && endptr[1]) {
>> + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Illegal suffix contains character '%c' in wrong position\n",
>> + endptr[1]);
>> + exit(1);
>> + }
>> + if (signed_ret <= 0) {
>> + fprintf(stderr,
>> + "ERROR: Size value '%s' is less equal than 0\n", s);
>> + exit(1);
>> + }
>> + /* strtoll returns LLONG_MAX when overflow, if this happens,
>> + * need to call strtoull to get the real size */
>> + if (errno == ERANGE && signed_ret == LLONG_MAX) {
>> + ret = strtoull(s, NULL, 10);
> Why do you parse the number twice? Negative sizes are currently not used
> so you can reject them.
I will change the patch to judgement leading '-' and reject the value.
>
>> + if (errno == ERANGE && ret == ULLONG_MAX) {
>> + fprintf(stderr,
>> + "ERROR: Size value '%s' is too large for u64\n",
>> + s);
>> + exit(1);
>> + }
>> + } else
>> + ret = signed_ret;
>> + if (endptr[0]) {
>> + c = tolower(endptr[0]);
>> switch (c) {
>> case 'e':
>> mult *= 1024;
>> @@ -1646,18 +1673,13 @@ u64 parse_size(char *s)
>> case 'b':
>> break;
>> default:
>> - fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Unknown size descriptor "
>> - "'%c'\n", c);
>> + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Unknown size descriptor '%c'\n", c);
>> exit(1);
>> }
>> }
>> - if (s[i] && s[i+1]) {
>> - fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: Illegal suffix contains "
>> - "character '%c' in wrong position\n",
>> - s[i+1]);
>> - exit(51);
>> - }
>> - return strtoull(s, NULL, 10) * mult;
>> +
>> + ret *= mult;
> Although there was no overflow check before, I think it should be here.
> Eg. 12345678P is a valid size string but the result does not fit u64.
Right, I will check the overflow here.
Thanks,
Qu
>
>> + return ret;
>> }
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2014-05-29 1:42 [PATCH v2] btrfs-progs: Improve the parse_size() error message Qu Wenruo
2014-06-12 10:15 ` David Sterba
2014-06-13 1:19 ` Qu Wenruo
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