From: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
To: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-btrfs <linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Reproducer for "compressed data + hole data corruption bug, 2018 edition" still works on 4.20.7
Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 12:01:03 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190212165916.GA23918@hungrycats.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAL3q7H7T_NX=D8qimRC55g8V-p0k-ygUiW-K5bxF02r-6XT6Rg@mail.gmail.com>
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On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 03:35:37PM +0000, Filipe Manana wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 12, 2019 at 3:11 AM Zygo Blaxell
> <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org> wrote:
> >
> > Still reproducible on 4.20.7.
>
> I tried your reproducer when you first reported it, on different
> machines with different kernel versions.
That would have been useful to know last August... :-/
> Never managed to reproduce it, nor see anything obviously wrong in
> relevant code paths.
I built a fresh VM running Debian stretch and
reproduced the issue immediately. Mount options are
"rw,noatime,compress=zlib,space_cache,subvolid=5,subvol=/". Kernel is
Debian's "4.9.0-8-amd64" but the bug is old enough that kernel version
probably doesn't matter.
I don't have any configuration that can't reproduce this issue, so I don't
know how to help you. I've tested AMD and Intel CPUs, VM, baremetal,
hardware ranging in age from 0 to 9 years. Locally built kernels from
4.1 to 4.20 and the stock Debian kernel (4.9). SSDs and spinning rust.
All of these reproduce the issue immediately--wrong sha1sum appears in
the first 10 loops.
What is your test environment? I can try that here.
> >
> > The behavior is slightly different on current kernels (4.20.7, 4.14.96)
> > which makes the problem a bit more difficult to detect.
> >
> > # repro-hole-corruption-test
> > i: 91, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > i: 92, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > i: 93, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > i: 94, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > i: 95, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > i: 96, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > i: 97, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > i: 98, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > i: 99, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > 13107200 total bytes deduped in this operation
> > am: 4.8 MiB (4964352 bytes) converted to sparse holes.
> > 94a8acd3e1f6e14272f3262a8aa73ab6b25c9ce8 am
> > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> >
> > The sha1sum seems stable after the first drop_caches--until a second
> > process tries to read the test file:
> >
> > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > # cat am > /dev/null (in another shell)
> > 19294e695272c42edb89ceee24bb08c13473140a am
> > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 22, 2018 at 11:11:25PM -0400, Zygo Blaxell wrote:
> > > This is a repro script for a btrfs bug that causes corrupted data reads
> > > when reading a mix of compressed extents and holes. The bug is
> > > reproducible on at least kernels v4.1..v4.18.
> > >
> > > Some more observations and background follow, but first here is the
> > > script and some sample output:
> > >
> > > root@rescue:/test# cat repro-hole-corruption-test
> > > #!/bin/bash
> > >
> > > # Write a 4096 byte block of something
> > > block () { head -c 4096 /dev/zero | tr '\0' "\\$1"; }
> > >
> > > # Here is some test data with holes in it:
> > > for y in $(seq 0 100); do
> > > for x in 0 1; do
> > > block 0;
> > > block 21;
> > > block 0;
> > > block 22;
> > > block 0;
> > > block 0;
> > > block 43;
> > > block 44;
> > > block 0;
> > > block 0;
> > > block 61;
> > > block 62;
> > > block 63;
> > > block 64;
> > > block 65;
> > > block 66;
> > > done
> > > done > am
> > > sync
> > >
> > > # Now replace those 101 distinct extents with 101 references to the first extent
> > > btrfs-extent-same 131072 $(for x in $(seq 0 100); do echo am $((x * 131072)); done) 2>&1 | tail
> > >
> > > # Punch holes into the extent refs
> > > fallocate -v -d am
> > >
> > > # Do some other stuff on the machine while this runs, and watch the sha1sums change!
> > > while :; do echo $(sha1sum am); sysctl -q vm.drop_caches={1,2,3}; sleep 1; done
> > >
> > > root@rescue:/test# ./repro-hole-corruption-test
> > > i: 91, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > > i: 92, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > > i: 93, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > > i: 94, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > > i: 95, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > > i: 96, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > > i: 97, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > > i: 98, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > > i: 99, status: 0, bytes_deduped: 131072
> > > 13107200 total bytes deduped in this operation
> > > am: 4.8 MiB (4964352 bytes) converted to sparse holes.
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 072a152355788c767b97e4e4c0e4567720988b84 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > bf00d862c6ad436a1be2be606a8ab88d22166b89 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 0d44cdf030fb149e103cfdc164da3da2b7474c17 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 60831f0e7ffe4b49722612c18685c09f4583b1df am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > a19662b294a3ccdf35dbb18fdd72c62018526d7d am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > 6926a34e0ab3e0a023e8ea85a650f5b4217acab4 am
> > > ^C
> > >
> > > Corruption occurs most often when there is a sequence like this in a file:
> > >
> > > ref 1: hole
> > > ref 2: extent A, offset 0
> > > ref 3: hole
> > > ref 4: extent A, offset 8192
> > >
> > > This scenario typically arises due to hole-punching or deduplication.
> > > Hole-punching replaces one extent ref with two references to the same
> > > extent with a hole between them, so:
> > >
> > > ref 1: extent A, offset 0, length 16384
> > >
> > > becomes:
> > >
> > > ref 1: extent A, offset 0, length 4096
> > > ref 2: hole, length 8192
> > > ref 3: extent A, offset 12288, length 4096
> > >
> > > Deduplication replaces two distinct extent refs surrounding a hole with
> > > two references to one of the duplicate extents, turning this:
> > >
> > > ref 1: extent A, offset 0, length 4096
> > > ref 2: hole, length 8192
> > > ref 3: extent B, offset 0, length 4096
> > >
> > > into this:
> > >
> > > ref 1: extent A, offset 0, length 4096
> > > ref 2: hole, length 8192
> > > ref 3: extent A, offset 0, length 4096
> > >
> > > Compression is required (zlib, zstd, or lzo) for corruption to occur.
> > > I am not able to reproduce the issue with an uncompressed extent nor
> > > have I observed any such corruption in the wild.
> > >
> > > The presence or absence of the no-holes filesystem feature has no effect.
> > >
> > > Ordinary writes can lead to pairs of extent references to the same extent
> > > separated by a reference to a different extent; however, in this case
> > > there is data to be read from a real extent, instead of pages that have
> > > to be zero filled from a hole. If ordinary non-hole writes could trigger
> > > this bug, every page-oriented database engine would be crashing all the
> > > time on btrfs with compression enabled, and it's unlikely that would not
> > > have been noticed between 2015 and now. An ordinary write that splits
> > > an extent ref would look like this:
> > >
> > > ref 1: extent A, offset 0, length 4096
> > > ref 2: extent C, offset 0, length 8192
> > > ref 3: extent A, offset 12288, length 4096
> > >
> > > Sparse writes can lead to pairs of extent references surrounding a hole;
> > > however, in this case the extent references will point to different
> > > extents, avoiding the bug. If a sparse write could trigger the bug,
> > > the rsync -S option and qemu/kvm 'raw' disk image files (among many
> > > other tools that produce sparse files) would be unusable, and it's
> > > unlikely that would not have been noticed between 2015 and now either.
> > > Sparse writes look like this:
> > >
> > > ref 1: extent A, offset 0, length 4096
> > > ref 2: hole, length 8192
> > > ref 3: extent B, offset 0, length 4096
> > >
> > > The pattern or timing of read() calls seems to be relevant. It is very
> > > hard to see the corruption when reading files with 'hd', but 'cat | hd'
> > > will see the corruption just fine. Similar problems exist with 'cmp'
> > > but not 'sha1sum'. Two processes reading the same file at the same time
> > > seem to trigger the corruption very frequently.
> > >
> > > Some patterns of holes and data produce corruption faster than others.
> > > The pattern generated by the script above is based on instances of
> > > corruption I've found in the wild, and has a much better repro rate than
> > > random holes.
> > >
> > > The corruption occurs during reads, after csum verification and before
> > > decompression, so btrfs detects no csum failures. The data on disk
> > > seems to be OK and could be read correctly once the kernel bug is fixed.
> > > Repeated reads do eventually return correct data, but there is no way
> > > for userspace to distinguish between corrupt and correct data reliably.
> > >
> > > The corrupted data is usually data replaced by a hole or a copy of other
> > > blocks in the same extent.
> > >
> > > The behavior is similar to some earlier bugs related to holes and
> > > Compressed data in btrfs, but it's new and not fixed yet--hence,
> > > "2018 edition."
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> Filipe David Manana,
>
> “Whether you think you can, or you think you can't — you're right.”
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-12 17:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-23 3:11 Reproducer for "compressed data + hole data corruption bug, 2018 editiion" Zygo Blaxell
2018-08-23 5:10 ` Qu Wenruo
2018-08-23 16:44 ` Zygo Blaxell
2018-08-23 23:50 ` Qu Wenruo
2019-02-12 3:09 ` Reproducer for "compressed data + hole data corruption bug, 2018 edition" still works on 4.20.7 Zygo Blaxell
2019-02-12 15:33 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2019-02-12 15:35 ` Filipe Manana
2019-02-12 17:01 ` Zygo Blaxell [this message]
2019-02-12 17:56 ` Filipe Manana
2019-02-12 18:13 ` Zygo Blaxell
2019-02-13 7:24 ` Qu Wenruo
2019-02-13 17:36 ` Filipe Manana
2019-02-13 18:14 ` Filipe Manana
2019-02-14 1:22 ` Filipe Manana
2019-02-14 5:00 ` Zygo Blaxell
2019-02-14 12:21 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2019-02-15 5:40 ` Zygo Blaxell
2019-03-04 15:34 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2019-03-07 20:07 ` Zygo Blaxell
2019-03-08 10:37 ` Filipe Manana
2019-03-14 18:58 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2019-03-14 20:22 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2019-03-14 22:39 ` Filipe Manana
2019-03-08 12:20 ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2019-03-14 18:58 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2019-03-14 18:58 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2019-03-15 5:28 ` Zygo Blaxell
2019-03-16 22:11 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2019-03-17 2:54 ` Zygo Blaxell
2019-02-15 12:02 ` Filipe Manana
2019-03-04 15:46 ` Christoph Anton Mitterer
2019-02-12 18:58 ` Andrei Borzenkov
2019-02-12 21:48 ` Chris Murphy
2019-02-12 22:11 ` Zygo Blaxell
2019-02-12 22:53 ` Chris Murphy
2019-02-13 2:46 ` Zygo Blaxell
2019-02-13 7:47 ` Roman Mamedov
2019-02-13 8:04 ` Qu Wenruo
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