From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mail-oi1-f174.google.com (mail-oi1-f174.google.com [209.85.167.174]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1FB8C23A8 for ; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 20:48:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-oi1-f174.google.com with SMTP id w83so1058393oiw.1 for ; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:48:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=ghBL8B+VYZnSMGW+02Rnd6WA6Oi+9/f0M5wCqFvghoc=; b=I9cx70w3Sipdo0o6uZKXEUMrdV3T9V9/ZX8sHn3O+6S/yQCOtShpuI5fGHWVJhe336 Sd9hvaUatZk8dcRCKJzrK2r03U0fEEd2ZXfi+8LgFDC4UrT3wsS5tDiu7zFu4ay0LJ6O nza81P3M6EWdtEm8MkjNp1/ZY9uRZnyM0IGXPvck5eNqh96r/wXuNlpmPlK/U77E7uqK qUB210+F4cpA0GZqiHqbiTb4AVMsQiR2ZhWknTQbWEfDj9gvBHXr4jl3NusX2YUgJTRs EMB7H6mRNPu1NhC9bwE54cEQe1/0A2kIyWnuPCXdlb+FX07YNO8Ly5aluWVj6q6zbz3Y Dktw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=ghBL8B+VYZnSMGW+02Rnd6WA6Oi+9/f0M5wCqFvghoc=; b=Vzha4hft66i8u/EJj0QJbmqJBxwCjEgr5ykQ1Xj7X3uO40FWPlCRGcJzZCWAeJJVCd drsDux0eiCkiJAd0BzOBPeHtRss+cUVD5dYlKfkh2HMeCcBcicJVwCmppotLuoEMdDam AKgbQnUbqSTWMzJS+LWVPA/o6qMDHgA+JlAYFhrmGasB+VJ2OdWnTPbYdakkL4GNKBkb kVFjti9mw/Z11iovd9C2cvmEeS/bhAgEQTGOvQ17erHZ8kwmF8QFXrS0V0dQDB/1wpaW zxG+o9/b0b61SqsjXSgF2pqSagONpPDUyH4T/9po+F0b3WNSNeJ8lVwQ+dW5JXaoV64p f5gg== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora9Ghr4PuHjXZoGiIrSe7nDxezL0JPueuVaxwoIfVWGKAE3ZrwAY ye7MK5zYNN2DC1fQiMHEiIQKO6VP17/HPO5SFQdkTw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1tZUukGk0WYWTaAZndO4B+WbhHEg6ly52tuKeWVNEAYvaI1LeACu0B1pFOWVO8T/AOqt/jklnrY6m4gzyywiXA= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:140b:b0:335:30a3:25df with SMTP id w11-20020a056808140b00b0033530a325dfmr2262308oiv.110.1656017322863; Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:48:42 -0700 (PDT) Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <8f4eef289aba5067582d0d3535299c22a4e5c4c4.1655761627.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> In-Reply-To: <8f4eef289aba5067582d0d3535299c22a4e5c4c4.1655761627.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> From: Marc Orr Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:48:31 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v6 03/49] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support To: Ashish Kalra Cc: x86 , LKML , kvm list , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org, Linux Crypto Mailing List , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Joerg Roedel , "Lendacky, Thomas" , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ard Biesheuvel , Paolo Bonzini , Sean Christopherson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Jim Mattson , Andy Lutomirski , Dave Hansen , Sergio Lopez , Peter Gonda , Peter Zijlstra , Srinivas Pandruvada , David Rientjes , Dov Murik , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Borislav Petkov , "Roth, Michael" , Vlastimil Babka , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Andi Kleen , Tony Luck , Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy , Alper Gun , "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" , jarkko@kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" On Mon, Jun 20, 2022 at 4:02 PM Ashish Kalra wrote: > > From: Brijesh Singh > > The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new > structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data > structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K > page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. The goal of RMP is to > track the owner of each page of memory. Pages of memory can be owned by > the hypervisor, owned by a specific VM or owned by the AMD-SP. See APM2 > section 15.36.3 for more detail on RMP. > > The RMP table is used to enforce access control to memory. The table itself > is not directly writable by the software. New CPU instructions (RMPUPDATE, > PVALIDATE, RMPADJUST) are used to manipulate the RMP entries. > > Based on the platform configuration, the BIOS reserves the memory used > for the RMP table. The start and end address of the RMP table must be > queried by reading the RMP_BASE and RMP_END MSRs. If the RMP_BASE and > RMP_END are not set then disable the SEV-SNP feature. > > The SEV-SNP feature is enabled only after the RMP table is successfully > initialized. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- > arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 6 + > arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 144 +++++++++++++++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h > index 36369e76cc63..c1be3091a383 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h > @@ -68,6 +68,12 @@ > # define DISABLE_TDX_GUEST (1 << (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST & 31)) > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT > +# define DISABLE_SEV_SNP 0 > +#else > +# define DISABLE_SEV_SNP (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP & 31)) > +#endif > + > /* > * Make sure to add features to the correct mask > */ > @@ -91,7 +97,7 @@ > DISABLE_ENQCMD) > #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 > #define DISABLED_MASK18 0 > -#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 > +#define DISABLED_MASK19 (DISABLE_SEV_SNP) > #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) > > #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h > index 9e2e7185fc1d..57a8280e283a 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h > @@ -507,6 +507,8 @@ > #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT) > #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT) > #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT) > +#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE 0xc0010132 > +#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_END 0xc0010133 > > #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f > > @@ -581,6 +583,10 @@ > #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG 0xc0010010 > #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23 > #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT) > +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT 24 > +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT) > +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT 25 > +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT) nit: The alignment here looks off. The rest of the file left-aligns the macro definition column under a comment header. The bad alignment can be viewed on the github version of this patch: https://github.com/AMDESE/linux/commit/5101daef92f448c046207b701c0c420b1fce3eaf > #define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055 > /* C1E active bits in int pending message */ > #define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000 > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c > index f01f4550e2c6..3a233b5d47c5 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c > @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > > #include > #include > @@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > #define DR7_RESET_VALUE 0x400 > > @@ -57,6 +60,12 @@ > #define AP_INIT_CR0_DEFAULT 0x60000010 > #define AP_INIT_MXCSR_DEFAULT 0x1f80 > > +/* > + * The first 16KB from the RMP_BASE is used by the processor for the > + * bookkeeping, the range need to be added during the RMP entry lookup. > + */ > +#define RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ 0x4000 > + > /* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */ > static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); > > @@ -69,6 +78,10 @@ static struct ghcb *boot_ghcb __section(".data"); > /* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */ > static u64 sev_hv_features __ro_after_init; > > +static unsigned long rmptable_start __ro_after_init; > +static unsigned long rmptable_end __ro_after_init; > + > + > /* #VC handler runtime per-CPU data */ > struct sev_es_runtime_data { > struct ghcb ghcb_page; > @@ -2218,3 +2231,134 @@ static int __init snp_init_platform_device(void) > return 0; > } > device_initcall(snp_init_platform_device); > + > +#undef pr_fmt > +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt > + > +static int __snp_enable(unsigned int cpu) > +{ > + u64 val; > + > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) > + return 0; > + > + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); > + > + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN; > + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN; > + > + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static __init void snp_enable(void *arg) > +{ > + __snp_enable(smp_processor_id()); > +} > + > +static bool get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len) > +{ > + u64 calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end, nr_pages; > + > + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base); > + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end); > + > + if (!rmp_base || !rmp_end) { > + pr_info("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n"); > + return false; > + } > + > + rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1; > + > + /* > + * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to > + * address the full system RAM. The reserved memory should also cover the > + * RMP table itself. > + * > + * See PPR Family 19h Model 01h, Revision B1 section 2.1.4.2 for more > + * information on memory requirement. > + */ > + nr_pages = totalram_pages(); > + calc_rmp_sz = (((rmp_sz >> PAGE_SHIFT) + nr_pages) << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ; > + > + if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) { > + pr_info("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n", > + calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz); > + return false; > + } > + > + *start = rmp_base; > + *len = rmp_sz; > + > + pr_info("RMP table physical address 0x%016llx - 0x%016llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end); > + > + return true; > +} > + > +static __init int __snp_rmptable_init(void) > +{ > + u64 rmp_base, sz; > + void *start; > + u64 val; > + > + if (!get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &sz)) > + return 1; > + > + start = memremap(rmp_base, sz, MEMREMAP_WB); > + if (!start) { > + pr_err("Failed to map RMP table 0x%llx+0x%llx\n", rmp_base, sz); > + return 1; > + } > + > + /* > + * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen if we are coming from > + * kexec boot. > + */ > + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val); > + if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN) > + goto skip_enable; > + > + /* Initialize the RMP table to zero */ > + memset(start, 0, sz); > + > + /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */ > + wbinvd_on_all_cpus(); > + > + /* Enable SNP on all CPUs. */ > + on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1); > + > +skip_enable: > + rmptable_start = (unsigned long)start; > + rmptable_end = rmptable_start + sz; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) > +{ > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) > + return 0; > + > + if (!iommu_sev_snp_supported()) > + goto nosnp; > + > + if (__snp_rmptable_init()) > + goto nosnp; > + > + cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/rmptable_init:online", __snp_enable, NULL); > + > + return 0; > + > +nosnp: > + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP); > + return 1; Seems odd that we're returning 1 here, rather than 0. I tried to figure out how the initcall return values are used and failed. My impression was 0 means success and a negative number means failure. But maybe this is normal. > +} > + > +/* > + * This must be called after the PCI subsystem. This is because before enabling > + * the SNP feature we need to ensure that IOMMU supports the SEV-SNP feature. > + * The iommu_sev_snp_support() is used for checking the feature, and it is > + * available after subsys_initcall(). > + */ > +fs_initcall(snp_rmptable_init); > -- > 2.25.1 >