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[79.242.63.113]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id v13sm21108768wrf.55.2021.09.01.00.51.17 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 01 Sep 2021 00:51:18 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Re: [RFC] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory To: Sean Christopherson Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Paolo Bonzini , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , kvm list , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Borislav Petkov , Andrew Morton , Joerg Roedel , Andi Kleen , David Rientjes , Vlastimil Babka , Tom Lendacky , Thomas Gleixner , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Ingo Molnar , Varad Gautam , Dario Faggioli , the arch/x86 maintainers , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, "Kirill A. Shutemov" , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy , Dave Hansen , Yu Zhang References: <20210824005248.200037-1-seanjc@google.com> <307d385a-a263-276f-28eb-4bc8dd287e32@redhat.com> <40af9d25-c854-8846-fdab-13fe70b3b279@kernel.org> <73319f3c-6f5e-4f39-a678-7be5fddd55f2@www.fastmail.com> <949e6d95-266d-0234-3b86-6bd3c5267333@redhat.com> From: David Hildenbrand Organization: Red Hat Message-ID: Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 09:51:17 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.11.0 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-coco@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=david@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 31.08.21 22:45, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Tue, Aug 31, 2021, David Hildenbrand wrote: >> On 28.08.21 00:28, Sean Christopherson wrote: >>> On Fri, Aug 27, 2021, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>> >>>> On Thu, Aug 26, 2021, at 2:26 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote: >>>>> On 26.08.21 19:05, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Oof. That's quite a requirement. What's the point of the VMA once all >>>>>> this is done? >>>>> >>>>> You can keep using things like mbind(), madvise(), ... and the GUP code >>>>> with a special flag might mostly just do what you want. You won't have >>>>> to reinvent too many wheels on the page fault logic side at least. >>> >>> Ya, Kirill's RFC more or less proved a special GUP flag would indeed Just Work. >>> However, the KVM page fault side of things would require only a handful of small >>> changes to send private memslots down a different path. Compared to the rest of >>> the enabling, it's quite minor. >>> >>> The counter to that is other KVM architectures would need to learn how to use the >>> new APIs, though I suspect that there will be a fair bit of arch enabling regardless >>> of what route we take. >>> >>>> You can keep calling the functions. The implementations working is a >>>> different story: you can't just unmap (pte_numa-style or otherwise) a private >>>> guest page to quiesce it, move it with memcpy(), and then fault it back in. >>> >>> Ya, I brought this up in my earlier reply. Even the initial implementation (without >>> real NUMA support) would likely be painful, e.g. the KVM TDX RFC/PoC adds dedicated >>> logic in KVM to handle the case where NUMA balancing zaps a _pinned_ page and then >>> KVM fault in the same pfn. It's not thaaat ugly, but it's arguably more invasive >>> to KVM's page fault flows than a new fd-based private memslot scheme. >> >> I might have a different mindset, but less code churn doesn't necessarily >> translate to "better approach". > > I wasn't referring to code churn. By "invasive" I mean number of touchpoints in > KVM as well as the nature of the touchpoints. E.g. poking into how KVM uses > available bits in its shadow PTEs and adding multiple checks through KVM's page > fault handler, versus two callbacks to get the PFN and page size. > >> I'm certainly not pushing for what I proposed (it's a rough, broken sketch). >> I'm much rather trying to come up with alternatives that try solving the >> same issue, handling the identified requirements. >> >> I have a gut feeling that the list of requirements might not be complete >> yet. For example, I wonder if we have to protect against user space >> replacing private pages by shared pages or punishing random holes into the >> encrypted memory fd. > > Replacing a private page with a shared page for a given GFN is very much a > requirement as it's expected behavior for all VMM+guests when converting guest > memory between shared and private. > > Punching holes is a sort of optional requirement. It's a "requirement" in that > it's allowed if the backing store supports such a behavior, optional in that > support wouldn't be strictly necessary and/or could come with constraints. The > expected use case is that host userspace would punch a hole to free unreachable > private memory, e.g. after the corresponding GFN(s) is converted to shared, so > that it doesn't consume 2x memory for the guest. > Okay, that matches my understanding then. I was rather thinking about "what happens if we punch a hole where private memory was not converted to shared yet". AFAIU, we will simply crash the guest then. -- Thanks, David / dhildenb