From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
To: "Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/8] random: trigger random_ready callback upon crng_init == 1
Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2017 23:12:50 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170118041250.x7wszcasd4dplj3h@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3576149.HSfW5KObBF@positron.chronox.de>
On Tue, Dec 27, 2016 at 11:39:57PM +0100, Stephan Müller wrote:
> The random_ready callback mechanism is intended to replicate the
> getrandom system call behavior to in-kernel users. As the getrandom
> system call unblocks with crng_init == 1, trigger the random_ready
> wakeup call at the same time.
It was deliberate that random_ready would only get triggered with
crng_init==2.
In general I'm assuming kernel callers really want real randomness (as
opposed to using prandom), where as there's a lot of b.s. userspace
users of kernel randomness (for things that really don't require
cryptographic randomness, e.g., for salting Python dictionaries,
systemd/udev using /dev/urandom for non-cryptographic, non-security
applications etc.)
- Ted
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-01-18 4:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-27 22:38 [PATCH 0/8] random: cleanup of code after removal of nonblocking pool Stephan Müller
2016-12-27 22:39 ` [PATCH 1/8] random: remove stale maybe_reseed_primary_crng Stephan Müller
2016-12-27 22:39 ` [PATCH 2/8] random: remove stale urandom_init_wait Stephan Müller
2016-12-27 22:39 ` [PATCH 3/8] random: trigger random_ready callback upon crng_init == 1 Stephan Müller
2017-01-18 4:12 ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2017-01-18 17:09 ` Stephan Müller
2016-12-27 22:40 ` [PATCH 4/8] random: remove unused branch in hot code path Stephan Müller
2017-01-18 4:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-04-27 11:23 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2016-12-27 22:40 ` [PATCH 5/8] random: remove variable limit Stephan Müller
2016-12-27 22:41 ` [PATCH 6/8] random: fix comment for unused random_min_urandom_seed Stephan Müller
2016-12-27 22:41 ` [PATCH 7/8] random: remove noop function call to xfer_secondary_pool Stephan Müller
2017-01-18 16:10 ` Theodore Ts'o
2016-12-27 22:42 ` [PATCH 8/8] random: move FIPS continuous test to output functions Stephan Müller
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