From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: David Miller Subject: Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 11:01:18 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <20170615.110118.912361155799259361.davem@davemloft.net> References: <20170608092320.GA6478@gondor.apana.org.au> <20170615005443.GA30435@gondor.apana.org.au> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org To: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Return-path: Received: from shards.monkeyblade.net ([184.105.139.130]:54058 "EHLO shards.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752927AbdFOPBU (ORCPT ); Thu, 15 Jun 2017 11:01:20 -0400 In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: From: Linus Torvalds Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 18:04:44 +0900 > There's a fair number of SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK users, are all the others > safe for some random reason that just happens to be about code > generation? Did people actually verify that? I looked at the code generated in every case. As a side note, ext4 does something similar with a private implementation, but it doesn't use something the evaluates to an alloca. Instead it uses a fixed 4-byte size for the shash context value in the on-stack declaration. We can tidy it up with abstraction macros as a follow-up, thanks for the suggestion. I'll look into it.