From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: syzbot <syzbot+6a6bca8169ffda8ce77b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: bp@alien8.de, davem@davemloft.net, elver@google.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: KCSAN: data-race in glue_cbc_decrypt_req_128bit / glue_cbc_decrypt_req_128bit
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2020 13:27:06 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200331202706.GA127606@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0000000000009d5cef05a22baa95@google.com>
On Tue, Mar 31, 2020 at 12:35:13PM -0700, syzbot wrote:
> Hello,
>
> syzbot found the following crash on:
>
> HEAD commit: b12d66a6 mm, kcsan: Instrument SLAB free with ASSERT_EXCLU..
> git tree: https://github.com/google/ktsan.git kcsan
> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=111f0865e00000
> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=10bc0131c4924ba9
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6a6bca8169ffda8ce77b
> compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
>
> Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.
>
> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
> Reported-by: syzbot+6a6bca8169ffda8ce77b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KCSAN: data-race in glue_cbc_decrypt_req_128bit / glue_cbc_decrypt_req_128bit
>
> write to 0xffff88809966e128 of 8 bytes by task 24119 on cpu 0:
> u128_xor include/crypto/b128ops.h:67 [inline]
> glue_cbc_decrypt_req_128bit+0x396/0x460 arch/x86/crypto/glue_helper.c:144
> cbc_decrypt+0x26/0x40 arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx2_glue.c:152
> crypto_skcipher_decrypt+0x65/0x90 crypto/skcipher.c:652
> _skcipher_recvmsg crypto/algif_skcipher.c:142 [inline]
> skcipher_recvmsg+0x7fa/0x8c0 crypto/algif_skcipher.c:161
> skcipher_recvmsg_nokey+0x5e/0x80 crypto/algif_skcipher.c:279
> sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:886 [inline]
> sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:904 [inline]
> sock_recvmsg+0x92/0xb0 net/socket.c:900
> ____sys_recvmsg+0x167/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2566
> ___sys_recvmsg+0xb2/0x100 net/socket.c:2608
> __sys_recvmsg+0x9d/0x160 net/socket.c:2642
> __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2652 [inline]
> __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2649 [inline]
> __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x51/0x70 net/socket.c:2649
> do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
>
> read to 0xffff88809966e128 of 8 bytes by task 24118 on cpu 1:
> u128_xor include/crypto/b128ops.h:67 [inline]
> glue_cbc_decrypt_req_128bit+0x37c/0x460 arch/x86/crypto/glue_helper.c:144
> cbc_decrypt+0x26/0x40 arch/x86/crypto/serpent_avx2_glue.c:152
> crypto_skcipher_decrypt+0x65/0x90 crypto/skcipher.c:652
> _skcipher_recvmsg crypto/algif_skcipher.c:142 [inline]
> skcipher_recvmsg+0x7fa/0x8c0 crypto/algif_skcipher.c:161
> skcipher_recvmsg_nokey+0x5e/0x80 crypto/algif_skcipher.c:279
> sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:886 [inline]
> sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:904 [inline]
> sock_recvmsg+0x92/0xb0 net/socket.c:900
> ____sys_recvmsg+0x167/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2566
> ___sys_recvmsg+0xb2/0x100 net/socket.c:2608
> __sys_recvmsg+0x9d/0x160 net/socket.c:2642
> __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2652 [inline]
> __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2649 [inline]
> __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x51/0x70 net/socket.c:2649
> do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
>
> Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> CPU: 1 PID: 24118 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> ==================================================================
>
I think this is a problem for almost all the crypto code. Due to AF_ALG, both
the source and destination buffers can be userspace pages that were gotten with
get_user_pages(). Such pages can be concurrently modified, not just by the
kernel but also by userspace.
I'm not sure what can be done about this.
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-31 20:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-31 19:35 KCSAN: data-race in glue_cbc_decrypt_req_128bit / glue_cbc_decrypt_req_128bit syzbot
2020-03-31 20:27 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2020-04-01 7:04 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-04-01 10:24 ` Marco Elver
2020-04-01 16:20 ` Eric Biggers
2020-04-01 22:53 ` Herbert Xu
2020-04-14 17:49 ` Marco Elver
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