From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/chacha-sse3 - use unaligned loads for state array
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 12:11:18 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200708091118.1389-1-ardb@kernel.org> (raw)
Due to the fact that the x86 port does not support allocating objects
on the stack with an alignment that exceeds 8 bytes, we have a rather
ugly hack in the x86 code for ChaCha to ensure that the state array is
aligned to 16 bytes, allowing the SSE3 implementation of the algorithm
to use aligned loads.
Given that the performance benefit of using of aligned loads appears to
be limited (~0.25% for 1k blocks using tcrypt on a Corei7-8650U), and
the fact that this hack has leaked into generic ChaCha code, let's just
remove it.
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c | 17 ++---------------
include/crypto/chacha.h | 4 ----
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S
index a38ab2512a6f..ca1788bfee16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S
@@ -120,10 +120,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(chacha_block_xor_ssse3)
FRAME_BEGIN
# x0..3 = s0..3
- movdqa 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
- movdqa 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
- movdqa 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
- movdqa 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
+ movdqu 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
+ movdqu 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
+ movdqu 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
+ movdqu 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm8
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm10
@@ -205,10 +205,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(hchacha_block_ssse3)
# %edx: nrounds
FRAME_BEGIN
- movdqa 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
- movdqa 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
- movdqa 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
- movdqa 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
+ movdqu 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
+ movdqu 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
+ movdqu 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
+ movdqu 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
mov %edx,%r8d
call chacha_permute
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
index 22250091cdbe..e67a59130025 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/simd.h>
-#define CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN 16
-
asmlinkage void chacha_block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len, int nrounds);
asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
@@ -124,8 +122,6 @@ static void chacha_dosimd(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
{
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) || !crypto_simd_usable()) {
hchacha_block_generic(state, stream, nrounds);
} else {
@@ -138,8 +134,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_arch);
void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv)
{
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
chacha_init_generic(state, key, iv);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
@@ -147,8 +141,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes,
int nrounds)
{
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) || !crypto_simd_usable() ||
bytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE)
return chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
@@ -170,15 +162,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
static int chacha_simd_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
{
- u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8);
+ u32 state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS] __aligned(8);
struct skcipher_walk walk;
int err;
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN != 16);
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, iv);
while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
@@ -217,12 +206,10 @@ static int xchacha_simd(struct skcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8);
+ u32 state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS] __aligned(8);
struct chacha_ctx subctx;
u8 real_iv[16];
- BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN != 16);
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
if (req->cryptlen > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE && crypto_simd_usable()) {
diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h
index 2676f4fbd4c1..3a1c72fdb7cf 100644
--- a/include/crypto/chacha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h
@@ -25,11 +25,7 @@
#define CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE 64
#define CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE 12
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-#define CHACHA_STATE_WORDS ((CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE + 12) / sizeof(u32))
-#else
#define CHACHA_STATE_WORDS (CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32))
-#endif
/* 192-bit nonce, then 64-bit stream position */
#define XCHACHA_IV_SIZE 32
--
2.17.1
next reply other threads:[~2020-07-08 9:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-08 9:11 Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2020-07-08 11:56 ` [PATCH] crypto: x86/chacha-sse3 - use unaligned loads for state array Martin Willi
2020-07-08 16:19 ` Eric Biggers
2020-07-16 11:54 ` Herbert Xu
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