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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@gmail.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com,
	vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com, pgonda@google.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com,
	rientjes@google.com, tobin@ibm.com, bp@alien8.de, vbabka@suse.cz,
	kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
	alpergun@google.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
	ashish.kalra@amd.com, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v8 52/56] ccp: Add support to decrypt the page
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2023 08:33:45 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <36734887-6474-b43e-51ae-34f37e6670a5@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e63ba525-644d-1a8c-afe7-2ced4a8fbb93@linux.ibm.com>

On 3/1/23 23:59, Dov Murik wrote:
> Hi Mike, Zhi,
> 
> On 01/03/2023 23:20, Zhi Wang wrote:
>> On Mon, 20 Feb 2023 12:38:43 -0600
>> Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote:
>>
>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>
>>> Add support to decrypt guest encrypted memory. These API interfaces can
>>> be used for example to dump VMCBs on SNP guest exit.
>>>
>>
>> What kinds of check will be applied from firmware when VMM decrypts this
>> page? I suppose there has to be kinda mechanism to prevent VMM to decrypt
>> any page in the guest. It would be nice to have some introduction about
>> it in the comments.
>>
> 
> The SNP ABI spec says (section 8.27.2 SNP_DBG_DECRYPT):
> 
>    The firmware checks that the guest's policy allows debugging. If not,
>    the firmware returns POLICY_FAILURE.
> 
> and in the Guest Policy (section 4.3):
> 
>    Bit 19 - DEBUG
>    0: Debugging is disallowed.
>    1: Debugging is allowed.
> 
> In the kernel, that firmware error code is defined as
> SEV_RET_POLICY_FAILURE.
> 
> 
>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>>> [mdr: minor commit fixups]
>>> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
>>> ---
>>>   drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>   include/linux/psp-sev.h      | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>   2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>>> index e65563bc8298..bf5167b2acfc 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>>> @@ -2017,6 +2017,38 @@ int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error)
>>>   }
>>>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_df_flush);
>>>   
>>> +int snp_guest_dbg_decrypt_page(u64 gctx_pfn, u64 src_pfn, u64 dst_pfn, int *error)
>>> +{
>>> +	struct sev_data_snp_dbg data = {0};
>>> +	struct sev_device *sev;
>>> +	int ret;
>>> +
>>> +	if (!psp_master || !psp_master->sev_data)
>>> +		return -ENODEV;
>>> +
>>> +	sev = psp_master->sev_data;
>>> +
>>> +	if (!sev->snp_initialized)
>>> +		return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> +	data.gctx_paddr = sme_me_mask | (gctx_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>> +	data.src_addr = sme_me_mask | (src_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
>>> +	data.dst_addr = sme_me_mask | (dst_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
> 
> I guess this works, but I wonder why we need to turn on sme_me_mask on
> teh dst_addr.  I thought that the firmware decrypts the guest page
> (src_addr) to a plaintext page.  Couldn't find this requirement in the
> SNP spec.

This sme_me_mask tells the firmware how to access the host memory (similar 
to how DMA uses sme_me_mask when supplying addresses to devices under 
SME). This needs to match the pagetable mapping being used by the host, 
otherwise the contents will appears as ciphertext to the host if they are 
not in sync. Since the default pagetable mapping is encrypted, the 
sme_me_mask bit must be provided on the destination address. So it is not 
a spec requirement, but an SME implementation requirement.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> 
>>> +
>>> +	/* The destination page must be in the firmware state. */
>>> +	if (rmp_mark_pages_firmware(data.dst_addr, 1, false))
>>> +		return -EIO;
>>> +
>>> +	ret = sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_SNP_DBG_DECRYPT, &data, error);
>>> +
>>> +	/* Restore the page state */
>>> +	if (snp_reclaim_pages(data.dst_addr, 1, false))
>>> +		ret = -EIO;
>>> +
>>> +	return ret;
>>> +}
>>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_guest_dbg_decrypt_page);
>>> +
>>>   int snp_guest_ext_guest_request(struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data,
>>>   				unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long *npages, unsigned long *fw_err)
>>>   {
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
>>> index 81bafc049eca..92116e2b74fd 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
>>> @@ -710,7 +710,6 @@ struct sev_data_snp_dbg {
>>>   	u64 gctx_paddr;				/* In */
>>>   	u64 src_addr;				/* In */
>>>   	u64 dst_addr;				/* In */
>>> -	u32 len;				/* In */
>>>   } __packed;
> 
> The comment above this ^^^ struct still lists the 'len' field, and also
> calls the first field 'handle' instead of 'gctx_paddr'.
> 
> Also - why is this change happening in this patch? Why was the incorrect
> 'len' field added in the first place in "[PATCH RFC v8 20/56]
> crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands" ? (the comment fixes should
> probably go there too).
> 
> 
> 
>>>   
>>>   /**
>>> @@ -913,13 +912,27 @@ int sev_guest_decommission(struct sev_data_decommission *data, int *error);
>>>    * @error: SEV command return code
>>>    *
>>>    * Returns:
>>> + * 0 if the sev successfully processed the command
>>> + * -%ENODEV    if the sev device is not available
>>> + * -%ENOTSUPP  if the sev does not support SEV
>>> + * -%ETIMEDOUT if the sev command timed out
>>> + * -%EIO       if the sev returned a non-zero return code
>>> + */
> 
> I think that if the word 'sev' would be 'SEV' in this comment, the diff
> will be a bit less misleading (basically this patch should not introduce
> changes to sev_do_cmd).
> 
> -Dov
> 
>>> +int sev_do_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret);
>>> +
>>> +/**
>>> + * snp_guest_dbg_decrypt_page - perform SEV SNP_DBG_DECRYPT command
>>> + *
>>> + * @sev_ret: sev command return code
>>> + *
>>> + * Returns:
>>>    * 0 if the SEV successfully processed the command
>>>    * -%ENODEV    if the SEV device is not available
>>>    * -%ENOTSUPP  if the SEV does not support SEV
>>>    * -%ETIMEDOUT if the SEV command timed out
>>>    * -%EIO       if the SEV returned a non-zero return code
>>>    */
>>> -int sev_do_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret);
>>> +int snp_guest_dbg_decrypt_page(u64 gctx_pfn, u64 src_pfn, u64 dst_pfn, int *error);
>>>   
>>>   void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 uaddr, u32 len);
>>>   void *snp_alloc_firmware_page(gfp_t mask);
>>> @@ -987,6 +1000,11 @@ static inline void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 __user uaddr, u32 len) { return ERR_P
>>>   
>>>   void snp_mark_pages_offline(unsigned long pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
>>>   
>>> +static inline int snp_guest_dbg_decrypt_page(u64 gctx_pfn, u64 src_pfn, u64 dst_pfn, int *error)
>>> +{
>>> +	return -ENODEV;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>>   static inline void *snp_alloc_firmware_page(gfp_t mask)
>>>   {
>>>   	return NULL;
>>

  reply	other threads:[~2023-03-02 14:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 147+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-20 18:37 [PATCH RFC v8 00/56] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 01/56] KVM: x86: Add 'fault_is_private' x86 op Michael Roth
2023-03-01 10:25   ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-18  4:51   ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-20 17:46     ` Michael Roth
2023-03-18  4:53   ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 02/56] KVM: x86: Add 'update_mem_attr' " Michael Roth
2023-03-18  4:56   ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-20 18:05     ` Michael Roth
2023-03-21 11:21       ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-22  1:58         ` Michael Roth
2023-03-23 18:17           ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-28  4:36             ` Michael Roth
2023-03-28 23:00               ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-29 23:50                 ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 03/56] KVM: x86: Add platform hooks for private memory invalidations Michael Roth
2023-03-18  5:13   ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-03-20 18:09     ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 04/56] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-02-20 21:37   ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-27  0:34     ` Michael Roth
2023-04-04 14:40       ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 05/56] KVM: SEV: Require KVM_PROTECTED_VM when AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 06/56] KVM: Split out memory attribute xarray updates to helper function Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 07/56] KVM: SEV: Populate private memory fd during LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:37 ` [PATCH RFC v8 08/56] KVM: SEV: Rename sev_{pin,unpin}_memory Michael Roth
2023-03-03 14:00   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-03-06 11:01     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 09/56] KVM: SEV: Handle memory backed by restricted memfd Michael Roth
2023-03-03 14:05   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-03-06 11:03     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 10/56] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-02-21 21:21   ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-02-22 23:27     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 11/56] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-02-20 20:12   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 12/56] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-03-03 15:28   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-03-29 22:59     ` Michael Roth
2023-04-20 16:31       ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 13/56] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 14/56] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 15/56] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-03-01 12:07   ` Tom Dohrmann
2023-03-01 16:15   ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-28 22:12     ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 16/56] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 17/56] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address Michael Roth
2023-03-01 16:21   ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-28 23:31     ` Michael Roth
2023-04-11 18:27       ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-03 15:31   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 18/56] x86/fault: fix handle_split_page_fault() to work with memfd backed pages Michael Roth
2023-02-20 19:57   ` Hugh Dickins
2023-02-20 20:31     ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 19/56] x86/fault: Return pfn from dump_pagetable() for SEV-specific fault handling Michael Roth
2023-02-20 21:13   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-28 10:53   ` Wu Zongyong
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 20/56] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-04-17 14:54   ` Sabin Rapan
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 21/56] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 22/56] crypto:ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 23/56] crypto: ccp: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-03-03 15:54   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 24/56] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-02-21  9:28   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-21 15:31     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-21 21:15       ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-21 22:06         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 25/56] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 26/56] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 27/56] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-02-22 12:32   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-22 16:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-22 22:43     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-23  6:38       ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-23 14:19         ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 28/56] crypto: ccp: Provide APIs to query extended attestation report Michael Roth
2023-02-22 20:24   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-22 22:35     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-23  8:14       ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 29/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 30/56] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 31/56] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-02-22 20:42   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 32/56] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-02-23 17:46   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 33/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 34/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-02-23 21:41   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-24 16:22     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-04-26 17:06   ` Sabin Rapan
2023-04-26 18:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 35/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-02-24 11:55   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 36/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-03-24 14:40   ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 37/56] KVM: X86: Keep the NPT and RMP page level in sync Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 38/56] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 39/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 40/56] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 41/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-02-24 15:06   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 42/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 43/56] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 44/56] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault Michael Roth
2023-02-28 19:11   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 45/56] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-02-24 11:01   ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-28 19:34   ` Zhi Wang
2023-04-17 13:05   ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 46/56] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 47/56] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-02-24 12:37   ` Alexander Graf
2023-02-28 20:47     ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-01 21:14       ` Alexander Graf
2023-04-05  0:54         ` Michael Roth
2023-04-04 22:48     ` Michael Roth
2023-04-05 15:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 48/56] KVM: SVM: Add SNP-specific handling for memory attribute updates Michael Roth
2023-03-01 23:37   ` Dave Hansen
2023-04-05 23:48     ` Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 49/56] KVM: SVM: Implement .fault_is_private callback for SNP Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 50/56] KVM: SEV: Handle restricted memory invalidations " Michael Roth
2023-03-01 10:41   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 51/56] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-03-01 10:45   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 52/56] ccp: Add support to decrypt the page Michael Roth
2023-03-01 21:20   ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-02  5:59     ` Dov Murik
2023-03-02 14:33       ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2023-03-02 21:11         ` Dov Murik
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 53/56] KVM: SVM: Make VMSAVE target area memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-03-01 21:23   ` Zhi Wang
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 54/56] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for instance certs Michael Roth
2023-02-21 12:40   ` Dov Murik
2023-03-02  0:02   ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-02  1:41     ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-03-02 11:27       ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-02 11:34   ` Dov Murik
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 55/56] x86/sev: Document KVM_SEV_SNP_{G,S}ET_CERTS Michael Roth
2023-02-20 18:38 ` [PATCH RFC v8 56/56] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-03-01 16:56 ` [PATCH RFC v8 00/56] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Dave Hansen
2023-03-01 22:59   ` Zhi Wang
2023-03-01 23:39     ` Dave Hansen
2023-08-03 18:27 ` Schander, Johanna 'Mimoja' Amelie
2023-08-04  1:01   ` Kalra, Ashish

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