From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6DC57CA9EA3 for ; Fri, 18 Oct 2019 07:32:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4440B21D80 for ; Fri, 18 Oct 2019 07:32:39 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="QDjSdwVh" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2504660AbfJRHci (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Oct 2019 03:32:38 -0400 Received: from mail-lj1-f194.google.com ([209.85.208.194]:38598 "EHLO mail-lj1-f194.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2504654AbfJRHci (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Oct 2019 03:32:38 -0400 Received: by mail-lj1-f194.google.com with SMTP id b20so5155000ljj.5; Fri, 18 Oct 2019 00:32:35 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=M59q7a9C0OgA4oCmsCvNmrsotdikD3/oQO5y00c53pE=; b=QDjSdwVhwSC0JWfWLJhp/h9DdZY9n0KxIP8OCUJAgh30ovPE8RBv1vHr+hVbVE0tME iJD/yM8B0njK1VSHughXZlw5SQkhpbffxcCOWITVKsRI0dqS8/ILGqUXSDE6L6GQObAB 8Spdl/ikovaOjEkQ7UyA0Glo6fnrOJKKEAP/gqHenduF5Lu0WFI9N0bTzyfpDg3zfBV2 IRnoDoHGZNoLlHtk2Azb1de+77SEAhw9DcNfUSfk+GVqyQLuuShl+xT1Ca29rp3J6LGC y80VJ4sumAssPPDxX3/qBR8wbdfQ+PliuJhcYWI5xzyfTw1IL0YY22z+NQybKAWp1Wdy emHA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=M59q7a9C0OgA4oCmsCvNmrsotdikD3/oQO5y00c53pE=; b=OqejqXKR2Btm1eTSswEz+ntVUVN002t/R6PIbFviDA8rDmBsMfnOqN1irwdOo3hjLk YCQJmYJPPmSSliIOEzh3BExrQKzDWEeiUZ8AayTQPl8freFcAAWECvbqNSjxLkdTQxQH 4kBGov1jEAb74kfS/wwJFKQ6ZC0kK+QCpj9Tek0yKgWE5jmyg2HTCo2Z5ljF7rAOuRYV CGtjMwbu5cewKg1OpkImqfETsVT4bRSnps0DURCtaijdt2vXKKxSPkUdDmLC/DiX+kCY LzDHJlA+CWX3ZvLndruQAhUAB/FTET9F+bvfxQ79i8N6bJpAMb6VP2lEpy23OeWbbf4U 8qSQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUKB0TO2VE+TYCtmu/wgTBKNDFG/DLwK/HVpgBXIRZMFh15wFHX 891On3Yw/5kr2uKORTWgdzQPvF5k2OXAXMhuJaY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxGOxFAMF/DGekSaTRLTT9JUI7FrVcOqmXscMrke5xrFR1FwSh6E7g1AZnXqZ7em90pHobqgkjM7M2X9uVhFI0= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:b4a8:: with SMTP id q8mr5095902ljm.106.1571383954846; Fri, 18 Oct 2019 00:32:34 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20191004182711.GC6945@linux.intel.com> <20191007000520.GA17116@linux.intel.com> <59b88042-9c56-c891-f75e-7c0719eb5ff9@linux.ibm.com> <20191008234935.GA13926@linux.intel.com> <20191008235339.GB13926@linux.intel.com> <20191014190033.GA15552@linux.intel.com> <1571081397.3728.9.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20191016110031.GE10184@linux.intel.com> <1571229252.3477.7.camel@HansenPartnership.com> In-Reply-To: <1571229252.3477.7.camel@HansenPartnership.com> From: Janne Karhunen Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2019 10:32:23 +0300 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: asym_tpm: Switch to get_random_bytes() To: James Bottomley Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , "Safford, David (GE Global Research, US)" , Ken Goldman , Mimi Zohar , "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" , "stable@vger.kernel.org" , "open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" , "open list:CRYPTO API" , open list Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-crypto-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 6:35 PM James Bottomley wrote: > > The documentation says that krng is suitable for key generation. > > Should the documentation changed to state that it is unsuitable? > > How do you get that from the argument above? The krng is about the > best we have in terms of unpredictable key generation, so of course it > is suitable ... provided you give the entropy enough time to have > sufficient entropy. Yes, so it can be both the safest and the least safe option available. By default it's the worst one, but use it wisely and it can be the best source. Hence I was proposing that kconfig option + boot time printout to make this clear for everyone.. -- Janne