From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Ard Biesheuvel Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 7/9] crypto: qat: Remove VLA usage Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 10:55:10 +0200 Message-ID: References: <20180807211843.47586-1-keescook@chromium.org> <20180807211843.47586-8-keescook@chromium.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Cc: Kees Cook , Herbert Xu , Eric Biggers , Giovanni Cabiddu , "Alasdair G. Kergon" , Mike Snitzer , Tudor-Dan Ambarus , Andrew Morton , Thomas Gleixner , Geert Uytterhoeven , Will Deacon , Rasmus Villemoes , David Woodhouse , Matthew Wilcox , "David S. Miller" , "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" , device-mapper deve To: Arnd Bergmann Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org On Wed, 26 Sep 2018 at 10:54, Arnd Bergmann wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 26, 2018 at 10:44 AM Ard Biesheuvel > wrote: > > > > On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 18:12, Arnd Bergmann wrote: > > > > > > On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 11:18 PM Kees Cook wrote: > > > > > > > > In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this uses > > > > the new upper bound for the stack buffer. Also adds a sanity check. > > > > > > > > [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook > > > > > > After rebasing to linux-next, I now get a warning about this file: > > > > > > drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c: In function 'qat_alg_do_precomputes': > > > drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c:257:1: error: the frame size > > > of 1112 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=] > > > > > > I assume it was already possible to get into that state with the VLA, > > > but it seems bad enough that I think we need to do something > > > about it. > > > > > > The large stack variables add up to 1084 bytes, which fully explains > > > how we got here: > > > > > > SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, ctx->hash_tfm); /* 360 */ > > > struct sha1_state sha1; /* 92 */ > > > struct sha256_state sha256; /* 104 */ > > > struct sha512_state sha512; /* 208 */ > > > char ipad[MAX_ALGAPI_BLOCKSIZE]; /* 160 */ > > > char opad[MAX_ALGAPI_BLOCKSIZE]; /* 160 */ > > > > > > The question is what we can do about it. One simple step I've tried > > > is to move the sha1/sha256/sha512 into a union, which saves around > > > 200 bytes and should bring us (slightly) below the warning > > > limit, but I suspect we can do better than that. Any ideas? > > > > > > > All the processing takes place in the context of a setkey() operation, > > which means only one such operation should be in flight per tfm at any > > given time. So we could move all these pieces into the tfm context > > struct instead. Something like the below [untested] (whitespace > > mangling courtesy of Gmail) > > Ah, right, this is what I was hoping for. I assume we already guarantee > that this context is never put on the stack somewhere else, right? > Yes.