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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Cc: Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>,
	Pascal van Leeuwen <pascalvanl@gmail.com>,
	"open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" 
	<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2] crypto: xts - Add support for Cipher Text Stealing
Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2019 09:05:30 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu_EEZqYkXE9tj6n-KE3y4T_rAAS9-BGsdfWEg_sGCKHOQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1353558c-ea2f-b94b-a570-4ca8f3a653ee@gmail.com>

On Thu, 8 Aug 2019 at 16:11, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 08/08/2019 12:37, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >>> True. Which is another historical mistake imo, since XTS is only
> >>> specified for AES, but I digress ... :-)
> >>>
> >> Yes, I was also surprised by the use of XTS with other blockciphers.
> >> It sort of violates the don't roll your own crypto paradigm ...
> >> (although some might argue that XTS is supposed to be secure if the
> >> underlying blockcipher is, regardless of what that cipher actually is)
> >>
> >
> > That doesn't really matter. What matters is that nobody took a careful
> > look whether XTS combined with other ciphers is a good idea before
> > throwing it out into the world.
>
> Couldn't resist, but tell that to TrueCrypt authors (if you know them :)
>
> They used XTS for other AES candidates (Serpent, Twofish, also in
> chained modes together).
>
> Older versions used LRW mode, doing the same.
> Even implementing LRW over Blowfish that has 8-byte block size, so you
> need GF(2^64) operations - that is luckily not implemented in Linux kernel
> crypto API :-)
>
> VeraCrypt continued the tradition, adding the Camellia and
> Kuznyetchik (actually discussed GOST standard) to the XTS mix.
>
> But without sarcasm, I do want to support this for users,
> we can map (but not create) such images in cryptsetup, and it is partially
> reason I want dm-crypt to be fully configurable...
>

The cat is already out of the bag, so we're stuck with it in any case.
But going forward, I'd like to apply a bit more sanity to which
combinations of modes we support, which is why I was skeptical about
eboiv potentially being used by authenc(hmac(crc32),lrw(blowfish))
while it is only intended for use with cbc(aes).

      reply	other threads:[~2019-08-10  6:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-08  6:18 [PATCHv2] crypto: xts - Add support for Cipher Text Stealing Pascal van Leeuwen
2019-08-08  7:44 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-08  8:18   ` Pascal Van Leeuwen
2019-08-08  8:32     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-08 10:16       ` Pascal Van Leeuwen
2019-08-08 10:37         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-08 11:15           ` Pascal Van Leeuwen
2019-08-08 13:11           ` Milan Broz
2019-08-10  6:05             ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]

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