From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>, Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>,
Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>,
Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
qat-linux@intel.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, simo@redhat.com,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>, Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 21:34:19 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yd1dK//76455cHdz@gondor.apana.org.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <871r1eyamd.fsf@suse.de>
On Tue, Jan 11, 2022 at 08:50:18AM +0100, Nicolai Stange wrote:
>
> I haven't tried, but wouldn't this allow the instantiation of e.g.
> hmac(blake2s-256) in FIPS mode?
You're right. The real issue is that any algorithm with no tests
at all is allowed in FIPS mode. That's clearly suboptimal. But we
can't just ban every unknown algorithm because we rely on that
to let things like echainiv through.
Let me figure out a way to differentiate these two cases.
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-11 10:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-09 9:03 [PATCH v2 00/18] crypto: dh - infrastructure for NVM in-band auth and FIPS conformance Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] crypto: dh - remove struct dh's ->q member Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] crypto: dh - constify struct dh's pointer members Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:33 ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-13 10:06 ` Nicolai Stange
2021-12-13 10:10 ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-17 5:52 ` Herbert Xu
2021-12-20 15:27 ` Nicolai Stange
2021-12-29 2:14 ` Herbert Xu
2022-01-06 14:30 ` Stephan Mueller
2022-01-07 2:44 ` Herbert Xu
2022-01-07 6:37 ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-11 6:13 ` [PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1) Herbert Xu
2022-01-11 7:50 ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-11 10:34 ` Herbert Xu [this message]
2022-01-14 6:16 ` [v2 PATCH] " Herbert Xu
2022-01-14 9:09 ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-14 10:55 ` Herbert Xu
2022-01-14 12:34 ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-14 12:35 ` Stephan Mueller
2022-01-14 12:54 ` James Bottomley
2022-01-26 9:01 ` Stephan Mueller
2022-01-28 14:14 ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-28 15:49 ` Stephan Mueller
2022-02-02 10:09 ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-07 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] crypto: dh - introduce RFC 7919 safe-prime groups Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:34 ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 05/18] crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 7919 ffdhe3072 test vector Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:34 ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] crypto: dh - introduce RFC 3526 safe-prime groups Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:35 ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 3526 modp2048 test vector Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] crypto: testmgr - run only subset of DH vectors based on config Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:36 ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] crypto: dh - implement private key generation primitive Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to dh-generic Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to hpre driver Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to qat driver Nicolai Stange
2021-12-15 21:54 ` Giovanni Cabiddu
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] crypto: testmgr - add DH test vectors for key generation Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:37 ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] lib/mpi: export mpi_rshift Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] crypto: dh - store group id in dh-generic's dh_ctx Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] crypto: dh - calculate Q from P for the full public key verification Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] crypto: dh - try to match domain parameters to a known safe-prime group Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09 9:03 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] crypto: dh - accept only approved safe-prime groups in FIPS mode Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:37 ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-10 7:56 ` [PATCH v2 00/18] crypto: dh - infrastructure for NVM in-band auth and FIPS conformance Stephan Mueller
2021-12-10 10:00 ` Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:38 ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-13 10:12 ` Nicolai Stange
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