[PATCH] crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization

[PATCH] crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization

[meenakshi.aggarwal]

From: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>

RNG (re-)initialization will be needed on pm resume path,
thus refactor the corresponding code out of the probe callback.

Signed-off-by: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c   | 199 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h |   1 +
 2 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index 5a6cd63742a4..cf93cfb0eb99 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -342,13 +342,12 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
 /*
  * kick_trng - sets the various parameters for enabling the initialization
  *	       of the RNG4 block in CAAM
- * @pdev - pointer to the platform device
+ * @dev - pointer to the controller device
  * @ent_delay - Defines the length (in system clocks) of each entropy sample.
  */
-static void kick_trng(struct platform_device *pdev, int ent_delay)
+static void kick_trng(struct device *dev, int ent_delay)
 {
-	struct device *ctrldev = &pdev->dev;
-	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
+	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl;
 	struct rng4tst __iomem *r4tst;
 	u32 val;
@@ -589,6 +588,100 @@ static void caam_remove_debugfs(void *root)
 	debugfs_remove_recursive(root);
 }
 
+static int caam_ctrl_rng_init(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl = ctrlpriv->ctrl;
+	int ret, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
+	u8 rng_vid;
+
+	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
+		struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
+
+		perfmon = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
+			  (struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->perfmon :
+			  (struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrl->perfmon;
+
+		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
+			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
+	} else {
+		struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
+
+		vreg = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
+			(struct version_regs *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
+			(struct version_regs *)&ctrl->vreg;
+
+		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
+			  CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
+	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
+	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
+	 */
+	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && ctrlpriv->pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
+			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
+		/*
+		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
+		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
+		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
+		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
+		 */
+		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
+		do {
+			int inst_handles =
+				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_MASK;
+			/*
+			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
+			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
+			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
+			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
+			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
+			 * the TRNG parameters.
+			 */
+			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
+				dev_info(dev,
+					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
+					 ent_delay);
+				kick_trng(dev, ent_delay);
+				ent_delay += 400;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
+			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
+			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
+			 * interval, leading to a successful initialization of
+			 * the RNG.
+			 */
+			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
+					      gen_sk);
+			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
+				/*
+				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
+				 * so don't hog the CPU
+				 */
+				cpu_relax();
+		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
+			return ret;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Set handles initialized by this module as the complement of
+		 * the already initialized ones
+		 */
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
+
+		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
+		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_FSL_MC_BUS
 static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version, u32 major,
 			  u32 minor, u32 revision)
@@ -619,7 +712,7 @@ static bool needs_entropy_delay_adjustment(void)
 /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
 static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
-	int ret, ring, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
+	int ret, ring;
 	u64 caam_id;
 	const struct soc_device_attribute *imx_soc_match;
 	struct device *dev;
@@ -629,10 +722,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
 	struct dentry *dfs_root;
 	u32 scfgr, comp_params;
-	u8 rng_vid;
 	int pg_size;
 	int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
-	bool pr_support = false;
 	bool reg_access = true;
 
 	ctrlpriv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrlpriv), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -768,7 +859,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 		mc_version = fsl_mc_get_version();
 		if (mc_version)
-			pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20, 0);
+			ctrlpriv->pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20,
+							     0);
 		else
 			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
 	}
@@ -858,9 +950,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	if (!reg_access)
-		goto report_live;
-
 	comp_params = rd_reg32(&ctrl->perfmon.comp_parms_ls);
 	ctrlpriv->blob_present = !!(comp_params & CTPR_LS_BLOB);
 
@@ -870,101 +959,19 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	 * check both here.
 	 */
 	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
-		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
-			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
 		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
 			(rd_reg32(&ctrl->perfmon.cha_num_ls) & CHA_ID_LS_AES_MASK);
 	} else {
-		struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
-
-		vreg = ring ? (struct version_regs *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
-			      (struct version_regs *)&ctrl->vreg;
-
-		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
-			   CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
 		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
 			(rd_reg32(&ctrl->vreg.aesa) & CHA_VER_MISC_AES_NUM_MASK);
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
-	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
-	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
-	 */
-	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
-			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
-		/*
-		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
-		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
-		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
-		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
-		 */
-		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
-		do {
-			int inst_handles =
-				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
-								RDSTA_MASK;
-			/*
-			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
-			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
-			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
-			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
-			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
-			 * the TRNG parameters.
-			 */
-			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
-				ent_delay = 12000;
-			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
-				dev_info(dev,
-					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
-					 ent_delay);
-				kick_trng(pdev, ent_delay);
-				ent_delay += 400;
-			}
-			/*
-			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
-			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
-			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
-			 * interval, leading to a successful initialization of
-			 * the RNG.
-			 */
-			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
-					      gen_sk);
-			/*
-			 * Entropy delay is determined via TRNG characterization.
-			 * TRNG characterization is run across different voltages
-			 * and temperatures.
-			 * If worst case value for ent_dly is identified,
-			 * the loop can be skipped for that platform.
-			 */
-			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
-				break;
-			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
-				/*
-				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
-				 * so don't hog the CPU
-				 */
-				cpu_relax();
-		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
-		if (ret) {
-			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
+	if (reg_access) {
+		ret = caam_ctrl_rng_init(dev);
+		if (ret)
 			return ret;
-		}
-		/*
-		 * Set handles initialized by this module as the complement of
-		 * the already initialized ones
-		 */
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
-
-		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
-		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
 	}
 
-	/* NOTE: RTIC detection ought to go here, around Si time */
-
-report_live:
 	caam_id = (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ms) << 32 |
 		  (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ls);
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
index efe2bc2f1103..a5048605cd67 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct caam_drv_private {
 	u8 blob_present;	/* Nonzero if BLOB support present in device */
 	u8 mc_en;		/* Nonzero if MC f/w is active */
 	u8 optee_en;		/* Nonzero if OP-TEE f/w is active */
+	bool pr_support;        /* RNG prediction resistance available */
 	int secvio_irq;		/* Security violation interrupt number */
 	int virt_en;		/* Virtualization enabled in CAAM */
 	int era;		/* CAAM Era (internal HW revision) */
-- 
2.25.1

Re: [PATCH] crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization

[Herbert Xu]

On Mon, Mar 20, 2023 at 08:38:48AM +0100, meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com wrote:
>
> @@ -619,7 +712,7 @@ static bool needs_entropy_delay_adjustment(void)
>  /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
>  static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  {
> -	int ret, ring, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
> +	int ret, ring;
>  	u64 caam_id;
>  	const struct soc_device_attribute *imx_soc_match;
>  	struct device *dev;
> @@ -629,10 +722,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  	struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
>  	struct dentry *dfs_root;
>  	u32 scfgr, comp_params;
> -	u8 rng_vid;
>  	int pg_size;
>  	int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
> -	bool pr_support = false;
>  	bool reg_access = true;

This patch does not apply against cryptodev.  There is no reg_access
in my tree.

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

[PATCH v2] crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization

[meenakshi.aggarwal]

From: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>

RNG (re-)initialization will be needed on pm resume path,
thus refactor the corresponding code out of the probe callback.

Signed-off-by: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
---
changes in v2:
	Rebased on "page 0" patches
	
NOTE: This patch depends on "page 0" patches, which are under
 review on mailing list.

 drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c   | 201 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h |   1 +
 2 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index 9c5a035e1b96..852d538cfc25 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -342,13 +342,12 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
 /*
  * kick_trng - sets the various parameters for enabling the initialization
  *	       of the RNG4 block in CAAM
- * @pdev - pointer to the platform device
+ * @dev - pointer to the controller device
  * @ent_delay - Defines the length (in system clocks) of each entropy sample.
  */
-static void kick_trng(struct platform_device *pdev, int ent_delay)
+static void kick_trng(struct device *dev, int ent_delay)
 {
-	struct device *ctrldev = &pdev->dev;
-	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
+	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl;
 	struct rng4tst __iomem *r4tst;
 	u32 val;
@@ -589,6 +588,100 @@ static void caam_remove_debugfs(void *root)
 	debugfs_remove_recursive(root);
 }
 
+static int caam_ctrl_rng_init(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl = ctrlpriv->ctrl;
+	int ret, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
+	u8 rng_vid;
+
+	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
+		struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
+
+		perfmon = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
+			  (struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->perfmon :
+			  (struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrl->perfmon;
+
+		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
+			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
+	} else {
+		struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
+
+		vreg = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
+			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
+			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrl->vreg;
+
+		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
+			  CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
+	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
+	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
+	 */
+	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && ctrlpriv->pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
+			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
+		/*
+		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
+		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
+		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
+		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
+		 */
+		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
+		do {
+			int inst_handles =
+				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_MASK;
+			/*
+			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
+			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
+			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
+			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
+			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
+			 * the TRNG parameters.
+			 */
+			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
+				dev_info(dev,
+					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
+					 ent_delay);
+				kick_trng(dev, ent_delay);
+				ent_delay += 400;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
+			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
+			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
+			 * interval, leading to a successful initialization of
+			 * the RNG.
+			 */
+			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
+					      gen_sk);
+			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
+				/*
+				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
+				 * so don't hog the CPU
+				 */
+				cpu_relax();
+		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
+			return ret;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Set handles initialized by this module as the complement of
+		 * the already initialized ones
+		 */
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
+
+		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
+		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_FSL_MC_BUS
 static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version, u32 major,
 			  u32 minor, u32 revision)
@@ -609,17 +702,10 @@ static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version, u32 major,
 }
 #endif
 
-static bool needs_entropy_delay_adjustment(void)
-{
-	if (of_machine_is_compatible("fsl,imx6sx"))
-		return true;
-	return false;
-}
-
 /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
 static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
-	int ret, ring, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
+	int ret, ring;
 	u64 caam_id;
 	const struct soc_device_attribute *imx_soc_match;
 	struct device *dev;
@@ -629,10 +715,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
 	struct dentry *dfs_root;
 	u32 scfgr, comp_params;
-	u8 rng_vid;
 	int pg_size;
 	int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
-	bool pr_support = false;
 	bool reg_access = true;
 
 	ctrlpriv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrlpriv), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -768,7 +852,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 		mc_version = fsl_mc_get_version();
 		if (mc_version)
-			pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20, 0);
+			ctrlpriv->pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20,
+							     0);
 		else
 			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
 	}
@@ -859,9 +944,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	if (!reg_access)
-		goto report_live;
-
 	comp_params = rd_reg32(&perfmon->comp_parms_ls);
 	ctrlpriv->blob_present = !!(comp_params & CTPR_LS_BLOB);
 
@@ -871,8 +953,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	 * check both here.
 	 */
 	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
-		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
-			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
 		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
 			(rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_num_ls) & CHA_ID_LS_AES_MASK);
 	} else {
@@ -882,91 +962,16 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
 			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrl->vreg;
 
-		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
-			   CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
 		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
 			(rd_reg32(&vreg->aesa) & CHA_VER_MISC_AES_NUM_MASK);
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
-	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
-	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
-	 */
-	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
-			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
-		/*
-		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
-		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
-		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
-		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
-		 */
-		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
-		do {
-			int inst_handles =
-				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
-								RDSTA_MASK;
-			/*
-			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
-			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
-			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
-			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
-			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
-			 * the TRNG parameters.
-			 */
-			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
-				ent_delay = 12000;
-			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
-				dev_info(dev,
-					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
-					 ent_delay);
-				kick_trng(pdev, ent_delay);
-				ent_delay += 400;
-			}
-			/*
-			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
-			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
-			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
-			 * interval, leading to a successful initialization of
-			 * the RNG.
-			 */
-			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
-					      gen_sk);
-			/*
-			 * Entropy delay is determined via TRNG characterization.
-			 * TRNG characterization is run across different voltages
-			 * and temperatures.
-			 * If worst case value for ent_dly is identified,
-			 * the loop can be skipped for that platform.
-			 */
-			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
-				break;
-			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
-				/*
-				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
-				 * so don't hog the CPU
-				 */
-				cpu_relax();
-		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
-		if (ret) {
-			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
+	if (reg_access) {
+		ret = caam_ctrl_rng_init(dev);
+		if (ret)
 			return ret;
-		}
-		/*
-		 * Set handles initialized by this module as the complement of
-		 * the already initialized ones
-		 */
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
-
-		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
-		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
 	}
 
-report_live:
-	/* NOTE: RTIC detection ought to go here, around Si time */
-
 	caam_id = (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ms) << 32 |
 		  (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ls);
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
index 86ed1b91c22d..b4f7bf77f487 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct caam_drv_private {
 	u8 blob_present;	/* Nonzero if BLOB support present in device */
 	u8 mc_en;		/* Nonzero if MC f/w is active */
 	u8 optee_en;		/* Nonzero if OP-TEE f/w is active */
+	bool pr_support;        /* RNG prediction resistance available */
 	int secvio_irq;		/* Security violation interrupt number */
 	int virt_en;		/* Virtualization enabled in CAAM */
 	int era;		/* CAAM Era (internal HW revision) */
-- 
2.25.1

RE: [PATCH v2] crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization

[Gaurav Jain]

HI

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
> Sent: Wednesday, April 5, 2023 4:03 PM
> To: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>; Varun Sethi <V.Sethi@nxp.com>;
> Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>; Gaurav Jain <gaurav.jain@nxp.com>;
> herbert@gondor.apana.org.au; davem@davemloft.net; linux-
> crypto@vger.kernel.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;
> leonard.crestez@nxp.com; Aisheng Dong <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
> Cc: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
> Subject: [PATCH v2] crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization
> 
> From: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
> 
> RNG (re-)initialization will be needed on pm resume path, thus refactor the
> corresponding code out of the probe callback.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
> Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
> Signed-off-by: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
> ---
> changes in v2:
> 	Rebased on "page 0" patches
> 
> NOTE: This patch depends on "page 0" patches, which are under  review on
> mailing list.
> 
>  drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c   | 201 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
>  drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h |   1 +
>  2 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c index
> 9c5a035e1b96..852d538cfc25 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
> @@ -342,13 +342,12 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int
> state_handle_mask,
>  /*
>   * kick_trng - sets the various parameters for enabling the initialization
>   *	       of the RNG4 block in CAAM
> - * @pdev - pointer to the platform device
> + * @dev - pointer to the controller device
>   * @ent_delay - Defines the length (in system clocks) of each entropy sample.
>   */
> -static void kick_trng(struct platform_device *pdev, int ent_delay)
> +static void kick_trng(struct device *dev, int ent_delay)
>  {
> -	struct device *ctrldev = &pdev->dev;
> -	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
> +	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
>  	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl;
>  	struct rng4tst __iomem *r4tst;
>  	u32 val;
> @@ -589,6 +588,100 @@ static void caam_remove_debugfs(void *root)
>  	debugfs_remove_recursive(root);
>  }
> 
> +static int caam_ctrl_rng_init(struct device *dev) {
> +	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> +	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl = ctrlpriv->ctrl;
> +	int ret, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
> +	u8 rng_vid;
> +
> +	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
> +		struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
> +
> +		perfmon = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
> +			  (struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->perfmon :
> +			  (struct caam_perfmon *)&ctrl->perfmon;
> +
> +		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
> +			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
> +	} else {
> +		struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
> +
> +		vreg = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
> +			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
> +			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrl->vreg;
> +
> +		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
> +			  CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
> +	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
> +	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC
> f/w.
> +	 */
> +	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && ctrlpriv->pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
> +		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
> +			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
> +		/*
> +		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
> +		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
> +		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
> +		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
> +		 */
> +		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
> +		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
> +		do {
> +			int inst_handles =
> +				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_MASK;
> +			/*
> +			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
> +			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
> +			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
> +			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
> +			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
> +			 * the TRNG parameters.
> +			 */
> +			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
> +				dev_info(dev,
> +					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
> +					 ent_delay);
> +				kick_trng(dev, ent_delay);
> +				ent_delay += 400;
> +			}
> +			/*
> +			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
> +			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
> +			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
> +			 * interval, leading to a successful initialization of
> +			 * the RNG.
> +			 */
> +			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
> +					      gen_sk);
> +			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
> +				/*
> +				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
> +				 * so don't hog the CPU
> +				 */
> +				cpu_relax();
> +		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay <
> RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
> +		if (ret) {
> +			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
> +			return ret;
> +		}
> +		/*
> +		 * Set handles initialized by this module as the complement of
> +		 * the already initialized ones
> +		 */
> +		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
> +
> +		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
> +		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_FSL_MC_BUS
>  static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version, u32 major,
>  			  u32 minor, u32 revision)
> @@ -609,17 +702,10 @@ static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_version
> *mc_version, u32 major,  }  #endif
> 
> -static bool needs_entropy_delay_adjustment(void)
> -{
> -	if (of_machine_is_compatible("fsl,imx6sx"))
> -		return true;
> -	return false;
> -}
This will break the RNG on i.MX6SX platform.
Please rework this.

Regards
Gaurav Jain

> -
>  /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */  static int caam_probe(struct
> platform_device *pdev)  {
> -	int ret, ring, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
> +	int ret, ring;
>  	u64 caam_id;
>  	const struct soc_device_attribute *imx_soc_match;
>  	struct device *dev;
> @@ -629,10 +715,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  	struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
>  	struct dentry *dfs_root;
>  	u32 scfgr, comp_params;
> -	u8 rng_vid;
>  	int pg_size;
>  	int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
> -	bool pr_support = false;
>  	bool reg_access = true;
> 
>  	ctrlpriv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrlpriv), GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -768,7 +852,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> 
>  		mc_version = fsl_mc_get_version();
>  		if (mc_version)
> -			pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20, 0);
> +			ctrlpriv->pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10,
> 20,
> +							     0);
>  		else
>  			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
>  	}
> @@ -859,9 +944,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  	}
> 
> -	if (!reg_access)
> -		goto report_live;
> -
>  	comp_params = rd_reg32(&perfmon->comp_parms_ls);
>  	ctrlpriv->blob_present = !!(comp_params & CTPR_LS_BLOB);
> 
> @@ -871,8 +953,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  	 * check both here.
>  	 */
>  	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
> -		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
> -			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
>  		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
>  			(rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_num_ls) &
> CHA_ID_LS_AES_MASK);
>  	} else {
> @@ -882,91 +962,16 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
>  			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrl->vreg;
> 
> -		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
> -			   CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
>  		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
>  			(rd_reg32(&vreg->aesa) &
> CHA_VER_MISC_AES_NUM_MASK);
>  	}
> 
> -	/*
> -	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
> -	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
> -	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC
> f/w.
> -	 */
> -	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
> -		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
> -			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
> -		/*
> -		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
> -		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
> -		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
> -		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
> -		 */
> -		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
> -		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
> -		do {
> -			int inst_handles =
> -				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
> -								RDSTA_MASK;
> -			/*
> -			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
> -			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
> -			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
> -			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
> -			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
> -			 * the TRNG parameters.
> -			 */
> -			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
> -				ent_delay = 12000;
> -			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
> -				dev_info(dev,
> -					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
> -					 ent_delay);
> -				kick_trng(pdev, ent_delay);
> -				ent_delay += 400;
> -			}
> -			/*
> -			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
> -			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
> -			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
> -			 * interval, leading to a successful initialization of
> -			 * the RNG.
> -			 */
> -			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
> -					      gen_sk);
> -			/*
> -			 * Entropy delay is determined via TRNG
> characterization.
> -			 * TRNG characterization is run across different
> voltages
> -			 * and temperatures.
> -			 * If worst case value for ent_dly is identified,
> -			 * the loop can be skipped for that platform.
> -			 */
> -			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
> -				break;
> -			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
> -				/*
> -				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
> -				 * so don't hog the CPU
> -				 */
> -				cpu_relax();
> -		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay <
> RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
> -		if (ret) {
> -			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
> +	if (reg_access) {
> +		ret = caam_ctrl_rng_init(dev);
> +		if (ret)
>  			return ret;
> -		}
> -		/*
> -		 * Set handles initialized by this module as the complement of
> -		 * the already initialized ones
> -		 */
> -		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
> -
> -		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
> -		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
>  	}
> 
> -report_live:
> -	/* NOTE: RTIC detection ought to go here, around Si time */
> -
>  	caam_id = (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ms) << 32 |
>  		  (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ls);
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h index
> 86ed1b91c22d..b4f7bf77f487 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
> @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct caam_drv_private {
>  	u8 blob_present;	/* Nonzero if BLOB support present in device */
>  	u8 mc_en;		/* Nonzero if MC f/w is active */
>  	u8 optee_en;		/* Nonzero if OP-TEE f/w is active */
> +	bool pr_support;        /* RNG prediction resistance available */
>  	int secvio_irq;		/* Security violation interrupt number */
>  	int virt_en;		/* Virtualization enabled in CAAM */
>  	int era;		/* CAAM Era (internal HW revision) */
> --
> 2.25.1

[PATCH v3] crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization

[meenakshi.aggarwal]

From: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>

RNG (re-)initialization will be needed on pm resume path,
thus refactor the corresponding code out of the probe callback.

Signed-off-by: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
---
changes in v2:
	Rebased on "page 0" patches

changes in v3:
	Incorporated review comments

 drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c   | 205 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
 drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h |   1 +
 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index 9c5a035e1b96..7070349943c8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -342,13 +342,12 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
 /*
  * kick_trng - sets the various parameters for enabling the initialization
  *	       of the RNG4 block in CAAM
- * @pdev - pointer to the platform device
+ * @dev - pointer to the controller device
  * @ent_delay - Defines the length (in system clocks) of each entropy sample.
  */
-static void kick_trng(struct platform_device *pdev, int ent_delay)
+static void kick_trng(struct device *dev, int ent_delay)
 {
-	struct device *ctrldev = &pdev->dev;
-	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
+	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl;
 	struct rng4tst __iomem *r4tst;
 	u32 val;
@@ -616,10 +615,115 @@ static bool needs_entropy_delay_adjustment(void)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static int caam_ctrl_rng_init(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl = ctrlpriv->ctrl;
+	int ret, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
+	u8 rng_vid;
+
+	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
+		struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
+
+		perfmon = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
+			  (struct caam_perfmon __iomem *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->perfmon :
+			  (struct caam_perfmon __iomem *)&ctrl->perfmon;
+
+		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
+			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
+	} else {
+		struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
+
+		vreg = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
+			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
+			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrl->vreg;
+
+		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
+			  CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
+	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
+	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
+	 */
+	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && ctrlpriv->pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
+			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
+		/*
+		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
+		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
+		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
+		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
+		 */
+		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
+		do {
+			int inst_handles =
+				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_MASK;
+			/*
+			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
+			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
+			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
+			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
+			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
+			 * the TRNG parameters.
+			 */
+			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
+				ent_delay = 12000;
+			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
+				dev_info(dev,
+					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
+					 ent_delay);
+				kick_trng(dev, ent_delay);
+				ent_delay += 400;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
+			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
+			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
+			 * interval, leading to a successful initialization of
+			 * the RNG.
+			 */
+			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
+					      gen_sk);
+			/*
+			 * Entropy delay is determined via TRNG characterization.
+			 * TRNG characterization is run across different voltages
+			 * and temperatures.
+			 * If worst case value for ent_dly is identified,
+			 * the loop can be skipped for that platform.
+			 */
+			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
+				break;
+			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
+				/*
+				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
+				 * so don't hog the CPU
+				 */
+				cpu_relax();
+		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
+			return ret;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Set handles initialized by this module as the complement of
+		 * the already initialized ones
+		 */
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
+
+		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
+		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
 static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
-	int ret, ring, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
+	int ret, ring;
 	u64 caam_id;
 	const struct soc_device_attribute *imx_soc_match;
 	struct device *dev;
@@ -629,10 +733,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
 	struct dentry *dfs_root;
 	u32 scfgr, comp_params;
-	u8 rng_vid;
 	int pg_size;
 	int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
-	bool pr_support = false;
 	bool reg_access = true;
 
 	ctrlpriv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrlpriv), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -768,7 +870,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 		mc_version = fsl_mc_get_version();
 		if (mc_version)
-			pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20, 0);
+			ctrlpriv->pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20,
+							     0);
 		else
 			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
 	}
@@ -859,9 +962,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	if (!reg_access)
-		goto report_live;
-
 	comp_params = rd_reg32(&perfmon->comp_parms_ls);
 	ctrlpriv->blob_present = !!(comp_params & CTPR_LS_BLOB);
 
@@ -871,8 +971,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	 * check both here.
 	 */
 	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
-		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
-			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
 		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
 			(rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_num_ls) & CHA_ID_LS_AES_MASK);
 	} else {
@@ -882,91 +980,16 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
 			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrl->vreg;
 
-		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
-			   CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
 		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
 			(rd_reg32(&vreg->aesa) & CHA_VER_MISC_AES_NUM_MASK);
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
-	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
-	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
-	 */
-	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
-			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
-		/*
-		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
-		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
-		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
-		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
-		 */
-		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
-		do {
-			int inst_handles =
-				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
-								RDSTA_MASK;
-			/*
-			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
-			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
-			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
-			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
-			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
-			 * the TRNG parameters.
-			 */
-			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
-				ent_delay = 12000;
-			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
-				dev_info(dev,
-					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
-					 ent_delay);
-				kick_trng(pdev, ent_delay);
-				ent_delay += 400;
-			}
-			/*
-			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
-			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
-			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
-			 * interval, leading to a successful initialization of
-			 * the RNG.
-			 */
-			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
-					      gen_sk);
-			/*
-			 * Entropy delay is determined via TRNG characterization.
-			 * TRNG characterization is run across different voltages
-			 * and temperatures.
-			 * If worst case value for ent_dly is identified,
-			 * the loop can be skipped for that platform.
-			 */
-			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
-				break;
-			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
-				/*
-				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
-				 * so don't hog the CPU
-				 */
-				cpu_relax();
-		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay < RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
-		if (ret) {
-			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
+	if (reg_access) {
+		ret = caam_ctrl_rng_init(dev);
+		if (ret)
 			return ret;
-		}
-		/*
-		 * Set handles initialized by this module as the complement of
-		 * the already initialized ones
-		 */
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
-
-		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
-		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
 	}
 
-report_live:
-	/* NOTE: RTIC detection ought to go here, around Si time */
-
 	caam_id = (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ms) << 32 |
 		  (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ls);
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
index 86ed1b91c22d..b4f7bf77f487 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct caam_drv_private {
 	u8 blob_present;	/* Nonzero if BLOB support present in device */
 	u8 mc_en;		/* Nonzero if MC f/w is active */
 	u8 optee_en;		/* Nonzero if OP-TEE f/w is active */
+	bool pr_support;        /* RNG prediction resistance available */
 	int secvio_irq;		/* Security violation interrupt number */
 	int virt_en;		/* Virtualization enabled in CAAM */
 	int era;		/* CAAM Era (internal HW revision) */
-- 
2.25.1

RE: [PATCH v3] crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization

[Gaurav Jain]

Reviewed-by: Gaurav Jain <gaurav.jain@nxp.com>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
> Sent: Monday, April 17, 2023 11:59 PM
> To: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@nxp.com>; Varun Sethi <V.Sethi@nxp.com>;
> Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>; Gaurav Jain <gaurav.jain@nxp.com>;
> herbert@gondor.apana.org.au; davem@davemloft.net; linux-
> crypto@vger.kernel.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;
> leonard.crestez@nxp.com; Aisheng Dong <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
> Cc: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
> Subject: [PATCH v3] crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization
> 
> From: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
> 
> RNG (re-)initialization will be needed on pm resume path, thus refactor the
> corresponding code out of the probe callback.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
> Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
> Signed-off-by: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
> ---
> changes in v2:
> 	Rebased on "page 0" patches
> 
> changes in v3:
> 	Incorporated review comments
> 
>  drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c   | 205 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
>  drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h |   1 +
>  2 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c index
> 9c5a035e1b96..7070349943c8 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
> @@ -342,13 +342,12 @@ static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int
> state_handle_mask,
>  /*
>   * kick_trng - sets the various parameters for enabling the initialization
>   *	       of the RNG4 block in CAAM
> - * @pdev - pointer to the platform device
> + * @dev - pointer to the controller device
>   * @ent_delay - Defines the length (in system clocks) of each entropy sample.
>   */
> -static void kick_trng(struct platform_device *pdev, int ent_delay)
> +static void kick_trng(struct device *dev, int ent_delay)
>  {
> -	struct device *ctrldev = &pdev->dev;
> -	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
> +	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
>  	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl;
>  	struct rng4tst __iomem *r4tst;
>  	u32 val;
> @@ -616,10 +615,115 @@ static bool needs_entropy_delay_adjustment(void)
>  	return false;
>  }
> 
> +static int caam_ctrl_rng_init(struct device *dev) {
> +	struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
> +	struct caam_ctrl __iomem *ctrl = ctrlpriv->ctrl;
> +	int ret, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
> +	u8 rng_vid;
> +
> +	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
> +		struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
> +
> +		perfmon = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
> +			  (struct caam_perfmon __iomem *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]-
> >perfmon :
> +			  (struct caam_perfmon __iomem *)&ctrl->perfmon;
> +
> +		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
> +			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
> +	} else {
> +		struct version_regs __iomem *vreg;
> +
> +		vreg = ctrlpriv->total_jobrs ?
> +			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
> +			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrl->vreg;
> +
> +		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
> +			  CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
> +	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
> +	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC
> f/w.
> +	 */
> +	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && ctrlpriv->pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
> +		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
> +			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
> +		/*
> +		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
> +		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
> +		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
> +		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
> +		 */
> +		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
> +		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
> +		do {
> +			int inst_handles =
> +				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_MASK;
> +			/*
> +			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
> +			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
> +			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
> +			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
> +			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
> +			 * the TRNG parameters.
> +			 */
> +			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
> +				ent_delay = 12000;
> +			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
> +				dev_info(dev,
> +					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
> +					 ent_delay);
> +				kick_trng(dev, ent_delay);
> +				ent_delay += 400;
> +			}
> +			/*
> +			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
> +			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
> +			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
> +			 * interval, leading to a successful initialization of
> +			 * the RNG.
> +			 */
> +			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
> +					      gen_sk);
> +			/*
> +			 * Entropy delay is determined via TRNG
> characterization.
> +			 * TRNG characterization is run across different
> voltages
> +			 * and temperatures.
> +			 * If worst case value for ent_dly is identified,
> +			 * the loop can be skipped for that platform.
> +			 */
> +			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
> +				break;
> +			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
> +				/*
> +				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
> +				 * so don't hog the CPU
> +				 */
> +				cpu_relax();
> +		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay <
> RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
> +		if (ret) {
> +			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
> +			return ret;
> +		}
> +		/*
> +		 * Set handles initialized by this module as the complement of
> +		 * the already initialized ones
> +		 */
> +		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
> +
> +		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
> +		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */  static int caam_probe(struct
> platform_device *pdev)  {
> -	int ret, ring, gen_sk, ent_delay = RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MIN;
> +	int ret, ring;
>  	u64 caam_id;
>  	const struct soc_device_attribute *imx_soc_match;
>  	struct device *dev;
> @@ -629,10 +733,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  	struct caam_perfmon __iomem *perfmon;
>  	struct dentry *dfs_root;
>  	u32 scfgr, comp_params;
> -	u8 rng_vid;
>  	int pg_size;
>  	int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
> -	bool pr_support = false;
>  	bool reg_access = true;
> 
>  	ctrlpriv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrlpriv), GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -768,7 +870,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> 
>  		mc_version = fsl_mc_get_version();
>  		if (mc_version)
> -			pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20, 0);
> +			ctrlpriv->pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10,
> 20,
> +							     0);
>  		else
>  			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
>  	}
> @@ -859,9 +962,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  	}
> 
> -	if (!reg_access)
> -		goto report_live;
> -
>  	comp_params = rd_reg32(&perfmon->comp_parms_ls);
>  	ctrlpriv->blob_present = !!(comp_params & CTPR_LS_BLOB);
> 
> @@ -871,8 +971,6 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  	 * check both here.
>  	 */
>  	if (ctrlpriv->era < 10) {
> -		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_id_ls) &
> -			   CHA_ID_LS_RNG_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_RNG_SHIFT;
>  		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
>  			(rd_reg32(&perfmon->cha_num_ls) &
> CHA_ID_LS_AES_MASK);
>  	} else {
> @@ -882,91 +980,16 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>  			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrlpriv->jr[0]->vreg :
>  			(struct version_regs __iomem *)&ctrl->vreg;
> 
> -		rng_vid = (rd_reg32(&vreg->rng) & CHA_VER_VID_MASK) >>
> -			   CHA_VER_VID_SHIFT;
>  		ctrlpriv->blob_present = ctrlpriv->blob_present &&
>  			(rd_reg32(&vreg->aesa) &
> CHA_VER_MISC_AES_NUM_MASK);
>  	}
> 
> -	/*
> -	 * If SEC has RNG version >= 4 and RNG state handle has not been
> -	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
> -	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC
> f/w.
> -	 */
> -	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
> -		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
> -			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
> -		/*
> -		 * If the secure keys (TDKEK, JDKEK, TDSK), were already
> -		 * generated, signal this to the function that is instantiating
> -		 * the state handles. An error would occur if RNG4 attempts
> -		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
> -		 */
> -		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
> -		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
> -		do {
> -			int inst_handles =
> -				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
> -								RDSTA_MASK;
> -			/*
> -			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
> -			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
> -			 * parameters are properly set and thus the function
> -			 * setting these (kick_trng(...)) is skipped.
> -			 * Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
> -			 * the TRNG parameters.
> -			 */
> -			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
> -				ent_delay = 12000;
> -			if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
> -				dev_info(dev,
> -					 "Entropy delay = %u\n",
> -					 ent_delay);
> -				kick_trng(pdev, ent_delay);
> -				ent_delay += 400;
> -			}
> -			/*
> -			 * if instantiate_rng(...) fails, the loop will rerun
> -			 * and the kick_trng(...) function will modify the
> -			 * upper and lower limits of the entropy sampling
> -			 * interval, leading to a successful initialization of
> -			 * the RNG.
> -			 */
> -			ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
> -					      gen_sk);
> -			/*
> -			 * Entropy delay is determined via TRNG
> characterization.
> -			 * TRNG characterization is run across different
> voltages
> -			 * and temperatures.
> -			 * If worst case value for ent_dly is identified,
> -			 * the loop can be skipped for that platform.
> -			 */
> -			if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
> -				break;
> -			if (ret == -EAGAIN)
> -				/*
> -				 * if here, the loop will rerun,
> -				 * so don't hog the CPU
> -				 */
> -				cpu_relax();
> -		} while ((ret == -EAGAIN) && (ent_delay <
> RTSDCTL_ENT_DLY_MAX));
> -		if (ret) {
> -			dev_err(dev, "failed to instantiate RNG");
> +	if (reg_access) {
> +		ret = caam_ctrl_rng_init(dev);
> +		if (ret)
>  			return ret;
> -		}
> -		/*
> -		 * Set handles initialized by this module as the complement of
> -		 * the already initialized ones
> -		 */
> -		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
> -
> -		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
> -		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
>  	}
> 
> -report_live:
> -	/* NOTE: RTIC detection ought to go here, around Si time */
> -
>  	caam_id = (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ms) << 32 |
>  		  (u64)rd_reg32(&perfmon->caam_id_ls);
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h index
> 86ed1b91c22d..b4f7bf77f487 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
> @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct caam_drv_private {
>  	u8 blob_present;	/* Nonzero if BLOB support present in device */
>  	u8 mc_en;		/* Nonzero if MC f/w is active */
>  	u8 optee_en;		/* Nonzero if OP-TEE f/w is active */
> +	bool pr_support;        /* RNG prediction resistance available */
>  	int secvio_irq;		/* Security violation interrupt number */
>  	int virt_en;		/* Virtualization enabled in CAAM */
>  	int era;		/* CAAM Era (internal HW revision) */
> --
> 2.25.1

Re: [PATCH v3] crypto: caam - refactor RNG initialization

[Herbert Xu]

On Mon, Apr 17, 2023 at 08:28:39PM +0200, meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com wrote:
> From: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
> 
> RNG (re-)initialization will be needed on pm resume path,
> thus refactor the corresponding code out of the probe callback.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Horia GeantA <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
> Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com>
> Signed-off-by: Meenakshi Aggarwal <meenakshi.aggarwal@nxp.com>
> ---
> changes in v2:
> 	Rebased on "page 0" patches
> 
> changes in v3:
> 	Incorporated review comments
> 
>  drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c   | 205 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
>  drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h |   1 +
>  2 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)

Patch applied.  Thanks.
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt