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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	tony.luck@intel.com, npmccallum@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 07:45:11 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d0759889-94df-73b0-4285-fa064eb187cd@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YMI02+k2zk9eazjQ@zn.tnic>


On 6/10/21 10:50 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 02, 2021 at 09:04:05AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>> @@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
>>  /* RMP page size */
>>  #define RMP_PG_SIZE_4K			0
>>  
>> +/* Memory opertion for snp_prep_memory() */
>> +enum snp_mem_op {
>> +	MEMORY_PRIVATE,
>> +	MEMORY_SHARED
> See below.
>
>> +};
>> +
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>>  extern struct static_key_false sev_es_enable_key;
>>  extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
>> @@ -103,6 +109,11 @@ static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate)
>>  
>>  	return rc;
>>  }
>> +void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
>> +		unsigned int npages);
>> +void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
>> +		unsigned int npages);
> Align arguments on the opening brace.

Noted.


>
>> +void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op);
>>  #else
>>  static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
>>  static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
>> @@ -110,6 +121,15 @@ static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { ret
>>  static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
>>  static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; }
>>  static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate) { return 0; }
>> +static inline void __init
>> +early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages)
> Put those { } at the end of the line:
>
> early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages) { }
>
> no need for separate lines. Ditto below.

Noted.


>
>> +{
>> +}
>> +static inline void __init
>> +early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +static inline void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op) { }
>>  #endif
>>  
>>  #endif
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
>> index 455c09a9b2c2..6e9b45bb38ab 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
>> @@ -532,6 +532,111 @@ static u64 get_jump_table_addr(void)
>>  	return ret;
>>  }
>>  
>> +static void pvalidate_pages(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages, bool validate)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned long vaddr_end;
>> +	int rc;
>> +
>> +	vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
>> +	vaddr_end = vaddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
>> +
>> +	while (vaddr < vaddr_end) {
>> +		rc = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, validate);
>> +		if (WARN(rc, "Failed to validate address 0x%lx ret %d", vaddr, rc))
>> +			sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
> 					^^
>
> I guess that 1 should be a define too, if we have to be correct:
>
> 			sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
>
> or so. Ditto for all other calls of this.

Sure, I will define a macro for it.


>
>> +
>> +		vaddr = vaddr + PAGE_SIZE;
>> +	}
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void __init early_set_page_state(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npages, int op)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned long paddr_end;
>> +	u64 val;
>> +
>> +	paddr = paddr & PAGE_MASK;
>> +	paddr_end = paddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
>> +
>> +	while (paddr < paddr_end) {
>> +		/*
>> +		 * Use the MSR protocol because this function can be called before the GHCB
>> +		 * is established.
>> +		 */
>> +		sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_GFN(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, op));
>> +		VMGEXIT();
>> +
>> +		val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
>> +
>> +		if (GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP)
> From a previous review:
>
> Does that one need a warning too or am I being too paranoid?

IMO, there is no need to add a warning. This case should happen if its
either a hypervisor bug or hypervisor does not follow the GHCB
specification. I followed the SEV-ES vmgexit handling  and it does not
warn if the hypervisor returns a wrong response code. We simply
terminate the guest.


>
>> +			goto e_term;
>> +
>> +		if (WARN(GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val),
>> +			 "Failed to change page state to '%s' paddr 0x%lx error 0x%llx\n",
>> +			 op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE ? "private" : "shared",
>> +			 paddr, GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val)))
>> +			goto e_term;
>> +
>> +		paddr = paddr + PAGE_SIZE;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return;
>> +
>> +e_term:
>> +	sev_es_terminate(1, GHCB_TERM_PSC);
>> +}
>> +
>> +void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
>> +					 unsigned int npages)
>> +{
>> +	if (!sev_feature_enabled(SEV_SNP))
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	 /* Ask hypervisor to add the memory pages in RMP table as a 'private'. */
> 	    Ask the hypervisor to mark the memory pages as private in the RMP table.

Noted.


>
>> +	early_set_page_state(paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
>> +
>> +	/* Validate the memory pages after they've been added in the RMP table. */
>> +	pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, 1);
>> +}
>> +
>> +void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
>> +					unsigned int npages)
>> +{
>> +	if (!sev_feature_enabled(SEV_SNP))
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Invalidate the memory pages before they are marked shared in the
>> +	 * RMP table.
>> +	 */
>> +	pvalidate_pages(vaddr, npages, 0);
>> +
>> +	 /* Ask hypervisor to make the memory pages shared in the RMP table. */
> 			      mark

Noted.


>> +	early_set_page_state(paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED);
>> +}
>> +
>> +void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned long vaddr, npages;
>> +
>> +	vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
>> +	npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> +
>> +	switch (op) {
>> +	case MEMORY_PRIVATE: {
>> +		early_snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, paddr, npages);
>> +		return;
>> +	}
>> +	case MEMORY_SHARED: {
>> +		early_snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, paddr, npages);
>> +		return;
>> +	}
>> +	default:
>> +		break;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op);
> A lot easier, diff ontop of your patch:

thanks. I will apply it.

I did thought about reusing the VMGEXIT defined macro
SNP_PAGE_STATE_{PRIVATE, SHARED} but I was not sure if you will be okay
with that. Additionally now both the function name and macro name will
include the "SNP". The call will look like this:

snp_prep_memory(paddr, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)

>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> index 7c2cb5300e43..2ad4b5ab3f6c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> @@ -65,12 +65,6 @@ extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
>  /* RMP page size */
>  #define RMP_PG_SIZE_4K			0
>  
> -/* Memory opertion for snp_prep_memory() */
> -enum snp_mem_op {
> -	MEMORY_PRIVATE,
> -	MEMORY_SHARED
> -};
> -
>  #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>  extern struct static_key_false sev_es_enable_key;
>  extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 2a5dce42af35..991d7964cee9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -662,20 +662,13 @@ void __init snp_prep_memory(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int sz, int op)
>  	vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
>  	npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>  
> -	switch (op) {
> -	case MEMORY_PRIVATE: {
> +	if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
>  		early_snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, paddr, npages);
> -		return;
> -	}
> -	case MEMORY_SHARED: {
> +	else if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED)
>  		early_snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, paddr, npages);
> -		return;
> +	else {
> +		WARN(1, "invalid memory page op %d\n", op);
>  	}
> -	default:
> -		break;
> -	}
> -
> -	WARN(1, "invalid memory op %d\n", op);
>  }
>  
>  int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
> ---
>
>>  static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>>  
>> +/*
>> + * When SNP is active, changes the page state from private to shared before
> s/changes/change/

Noted.


>
>> + * copying the data from the source to destination and restore after the copy.
>> + * This is required because the source address is mapped as decrypted by the
>> + * caller of the routine.
>> + */
>> +static inline void __init snp_memcpy(void *dst, void *src, size_t sz,
>> +				     unsigned long paddr, bool decrypt)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned long npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> +
>> +	if (!sev_feature_enabled(SEV_SNP) || !decrypt) {
>> +		memcpy(dst, src, sz);
>> +		return;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * If the paddr needs to be accessed decrypted, mark the page
> What do you mean "If" - this is the SNP version of memcpy. Just say:
>
> 	/*
> 	 * With SNP, the page address needs to be ...
> 	 */
>
>> +	 * shared in the RMP table before copying it.
>> +	 */
>> +	early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(paddr), paddr, npages);
>> +
>> +	memcpy(dst, src, sz);
>> +
>> +	/* Restore the page state after the memcpy. */
>> +	early_snp_set_memory_private((unsigned long)__va(paddr), paddr, npages);
>> +}
>> +
>>  /*
>>   * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
>>   * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
>> @@ -96,8 +125,8 @@ static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
>>  		 * Use a temporary buffer, of cache-line multiple size, to
>>  		 * avoid data corruption as documented in the APM.
>>  		 */
>> -		memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len);
>> -		memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len);
>> +		snp_memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len, paddr, enc);
>> +		snp_memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len, paddr, !enc);
>>  
>>  		early_memunmap(dst, len);
>>  		early_memunmap(src, len);
>> @@ -277,9 +306,23 @@ static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
>>  	else
>>  		sme_early_decrypt(pa, size);
>>  
>> +	/*
>> +	 * If page is getting mapped decrypted in the page table, then the page state
>> +	 * change in the RMP table must happen before the page table updates.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (!enc)
>> +		early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(pa), pa, 1);
> Merge the two branches:

Noted.


>
> 	/* Encrypt/decrypt the contents in-place */
>         if (enc) {
>                 sme_early_encrypt(pa, size);
>         } else {
>                 sme_early_decrypt(pa, size);
>
>                 /*
>                  * On SNP, the page state change in the RMP table must happen
>                  * before the page table updates.
>                  */
>                 early_snp_set_memory_shared((unsigned long)__va(pa), pa, 1);
>         }

- Brijesh


  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-14 12:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-02 14:03 [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 01/22] x86/sev: shorten GHCB terminate macro names Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 15:54   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 02/22] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 15:59   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-06-08 16:51     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 03/22] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2021-06-03 19:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-08 17:35   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 04/22] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper Brijesh Singh
2021-06-05 10:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:03 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 05/22] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 14:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-07 14:58     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 06/22] x86/sev: check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 14:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-07 16:01     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-17 18:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18  5:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 07/22] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 15:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 08/22] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2021-06-08 11:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-08 15:58     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 10:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 09/22] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-06-09 17:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 12:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 10/22] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-10  5:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 12:29     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2021-06-10 15:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 12:45     ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-06-14 19:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 21:01         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 10:07           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 11:00             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 12:03               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 12:49                 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 13:02                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 13:10                     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 14:36                       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 14:37                         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 13:06                   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 12/22] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-06-10 16:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 13/22] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 14/22] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-06-11  9:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 13:05     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 19:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 15/22] KVM: SVM: define new SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB Save State Area Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 16/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-14 19:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-14 19:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 17/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 18/22] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 19/22] x86/sev-snp: SEV-SNP AP creation support Brijesh Singh
2021-06-16 13:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-16 16:13     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18  6:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-18 13:57     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18 15:05       ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]         ` <162442264313.98837.16983159316116149849@amd.com>
2021-06-23 10:22           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24  3:19             ` Michael Roth
2021-06-24  7:27               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 12:26                 ` Michael Roth
2021-06-24 12:34                 ` Michael Roth
2021-06-24 12:54                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 14:11                     ` Michael Roth
2021-06-25 14:48                       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-25 15:24                         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-25 17:01                           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-25 18:14                             ` Michael Roth
2021-06-28 13:43                               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-24 13:09               ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2021-06-04 11:28   ` Sergio Lopez
2021-06-09 19:24   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-11 13:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-14 17:15       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-14 18:24         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 13:20     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-14 17:23       ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-06-14 20:50         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-18  9:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-18 13:59     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-02 14:04 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2021-06-30 13:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-30 16:26     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-01 18:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-01 21:32         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-03 16:19           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-05 10:39             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Venu Busireddy
2021-06-07 19:17   ` Borislav Petkov

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