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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: CVE-2024-26992: KVM: x86/pmu: Disable support for adaptive PEBS
Date: Wed,  1 May 2024 07:30:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024050144-CVE-2024-26992-4f0e@gregkh> (raw)

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: x86/pmu: Disable support for adaptive PEBS

Drop support for virtualizing adaptive PEBS, as KVM's implementation is
architecturally broken without an obvious/easy path forward, and because
exposing adaptive PEBS can leak host LBRs to the guest, i.e. can leak
host kernel addresses to the guest.

Bug #1 is that KVM doesn't account for the upper 32 bits of
IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL when (re)programming fixed counters, e.g
fixed_ctrl_field() drops the upper bits, reprogram_fixed_counters()
stores local variables as u8s and truncates the upper bits too, etc.

Bug #2 is that, because KVM _always_ sets precise_ip to a non-zero value
for PEBS events, perf will _always_ generate an adaptive record, even if
the guest requested a basic record.  Note, KVM will also enable adaptive
PEBS in individual *counter*, even if adaptive PEBS isn't exposed to the
guest, but this is benign as MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG is guaranteed to be zero,
i.e. the guest will only ever see Basic records.

Bug #3 is in perf.  intel_pmu_disable_fixed() doesn't clear the upper
bits either, i.e. leaves ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE set, and
intel_pmu_enable_fixed() effectively doesn't clear ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE
either.  I.e. perf _always_ enables ADAPTIVE counters, regardless of what
KVM requests.

Bug #4 is that adaptive PEBS *might* effectively bypass event filters set
by the host, as "Updated Memory Access Info Group" records information
that might be disallowed by userspace via KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER.

Bug #5 is that KVM doesn't ensure LBR MSRs hold guest values (or at least
zeros) when entering a vCPU with adaptive PEBS, which allows the guest
to read host LBRs, i.e. host RIPs/addresses, by enabling "LBR Entries"
records.

Disable adaptive PEBS support as an immediate fix due to the severity of
the LBR leak in particular, and because fixing all of the bugs will be
non-trivial, e.g. not suitable for backporting to stable kernels.

Note!  This will break live migration, but trying to make KVM play nice
with live migration would be quite complicated, wouldn't be guaranteed to
work (i.e. KVM might still kill/confuse the guest), and it's not clear
that there are any publicly available VMMs that support adaptive PEBS,
let alone live migrate VMs that support adaptive PEBS, e.g. QEMU doesn't
support PEBS in any capacity.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-26992 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 6.0 with commit c59a1f106f5c and fixed in 6.1.88 with commit 0fb74c00d140
	Issue introduced in 6.0 with commit c59a1f106f5c and fixed in 6.6.29 with commit 037e48ceccf1
	Issue introduced in 6.0 with commit c59a1f106f5c and fixed in 6.8.8 with commit 7a7650b3ac23
	Issue introduced in 6.0 with commit c59a1f106f5c and fixed in 6.9-rc5 with commit 9e985cbf2942

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2024-26992
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fb74c00d140a66128afc0003785dcc57e69d312
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/037e48ceccf163899374b601afb6ae8d0bf1d2ac
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a7650b3ac23e5fc8c990f00e94f787dc84e3175
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e985cbf2942a1bb8fcef9adc2a17d90fd7ca8ee

                 reply	other threads:[~2024-05-01  5:31 UTC|newest]

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