From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
To: <email@example.com>, <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Cc: <email@example.com>, <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Chris Browy <email@example.com>, <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Lorenzo Pieralisi <email@example.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <email@example.com>,
Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/4] PCI/CMA and SPDM library
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 00:18:35 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210804161839.3492053-1-Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> (raw)
This is an RFC to start discussions about how we support the Component
Measurement and Authentication (CMA) ECN (pcisig.com)
CMA provides an adaptation of the data objects and underlying protocol
defined in the DMTF SPDM specification to be used to authenticate and
conduct run-time measurements of the state of PCI devices (kind of like
IMA for devices / firmware). This is done using a Data Object Exchange (DOE)
protocol described in the ECN.
The CMA ECN is available from the PCI SIG and SPDM can be found at
CMA/SPDM is focused on establishing trust of the device by:
1) Negotiate algorithms supported.
2) Retrieve and check the certificate chain from the device against
a suitable signing certificate on the host.
3) Issue a challenge to the device to verify it can sign with the private
key associated with the leaf certificate.
4) (Request a measurement of device state)
5) (Establish a secure channel for further measurements or other uses)
6) (Mutual authentication)
This RFC only does steps 1-3
Testing of this patch set has been conducted against QEMU emulation of
the device backed by openSPDM emulation of the SPDM protocol.
Open questions are called out in the individual patches but the big ones are
1) Certificate management.
Current code uses a _cma keyring created by the kernel, into which a
suitable root certificate can be inserted from userspace.
A=$(keyctl search %:_cma keyring _cma)
evmctl import ecdsaca.cert.der $A
Is this an acceptable way to load the root certificates for this purpose?
The root of the device provided certificate chain is then checked against
certificates on this keychain, but is itself (with the other certificates
in the chain) loaded into an SPDM instance specific keychain. Currently
there is no safe cleanup of this which will need to be fixed.
Using the keychain mechanism provides a very convenient way to manage these
certificates and to allow userspace to read them for debug purpose etc, but
is this the right use model?
Finally the leaf certificate of this chain is used to check signatures of
the rest of the communications with the device.
2) ASNL1 encoder for ECDSA signature
It seems from the openSPDM implementation that for these signatures,
the format is a simple pair of raw values. The kernel implementation of
ECDSA signature verification assumes ASN1 encoding as seems to be used
in x509 certificates. Currently I work around that by encoding the
signatures so that the ECDSA code can un-encode them again and use them.
This seems slightly silly, but it is minimum impact on current code.
Other suggestions welcome.
3) Interface to present to drivers. Currently I'm providing just one exposed
function that wraps up all the exhanges until a challenge authentication
response from the device. This is done using one possible sequence.
I don't think it makes sense to expose the low level components due to the
underlying spdm_state updates and there only being a fixed set of valid
Future patches will raise questions around management of the measurements, but
I'll leave those until I have some sort of implementation to shoot at.
The 'on probe' use in the CXL driver is only one likely time when authentication
would be needed.
Note I'm new to a bunch of the areas of the kernel this touches, so have
probably done things that are totally wrong.
CC list is best effort to identify those who 'might' care. Please share
with anyone I've missed.
Jonathan Cameron (4):
lib/asn1_encoder: Add a function to encode many byte integer values.
spdm: Introduce a library for DMTF SPDM
PCI/CMA: Initial support for Component Measurement and Authentication
cxl/pci: Add really basic CMA authentication support.
drivers/cxl/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/cxl/mem.h | 2 +
drivers/cxl/pci.c | 13 +-
drivers/pci/Kconfig | 9 +
drivers/pci/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/pci/doe.c | 2 -
include/linux/asn1_encoder.h | 3 +
include/linux/pci-doe.h | 2 +
lib/Kconfig | 3 +
lib/Makefile | 2 +
lib/asn1_encoder.c | 54 ++
lib/spdm.c | 1196 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
12 files changed, 1285 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 lib/spdm.c
next reply other threads:[~2021-08-04 16:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-04 16:18 Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2021-08-04 16:18 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] lib/asn1_encoder: Add a function to encode many byte integer values Jonathan Cameron
2021-08-04 16:18 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] spdm: Introduce a library for DMTF SPDM Jonathan Cameron
2022-02-18 22:05 ` Dan Williams
2022-02-28 18:13 ` Box, David E
2022-03-01 9:59 ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-03-02 21:34 ` David E. Box
2021-08-04 16:18 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] PCI/CMA: Initial support for Component Measurement and Authentication ECN Jonathan Cameron
2021-09-17 16:22 ` Jonathan Cameron
2021-08-04 16:18 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] cxl/pci: Add really basic CMA authentication support Jonathan Cameron
2021-08-05 16:43 ` [RFC PATCH 0/4] PCI/CMA and SPDM library Jonathan Cameron
2021-08-31 12:55 ` Jonathan Cameron
2021-11-17 17:46 ` Chris Browy
2021-11-18 11:54 ` Jonathan Cameron
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