From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Linux Security Module list
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linuxppc-dev <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Linux ACPI <linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux PCI <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-pm mailing list <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-serial@vger.kernel.org, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
Netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
Kexec Mailing List <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2021 11:09:29 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFqZXNtuH0329Xvcb415Kar-=o6wwrkFuiP8BZ_2OQhHLqkkAg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPcyv4jvR8CT4rYODR5KUHNdiqMwQSwJZ+OkVf61kLT3JfjC_Q@mail.gmail.com>
On Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 12:18 AM Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 1:51 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > Commit 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux
> > lockdown") added an implementation of the locked_down LSM hook to
> > SELinux, with the aim to restrict which domains are allowed to perform
> > operations that would breach lockdown.
> >
> > However, in several places the security_locked_down() hook is called in
> > situations where the current task isn't doing any action that would
> > directly breach lockdown, leading to SELinux checks that are basically
> > bogus.
> >
> > To fix this, add an explicit struct cred pointer argument to
> > security_lockdown() and define NULL as a special value to pass instead
> > of current_cred() in such situations. LSMs that take the subject
> > credentials into account can then fall back to some default or ignore
> > such calls altogether. In the SELinux lockdown hook implementation, use
> > SECINITSID_KERNEL in case the cred argument is NULL.
> >
> > Most of the callers are updated to pass current_cred() as the cred
> > pointer, thus maintaining the same behavior. The following callers are
> > modified to pass NULL as the cred pointer instead:
> > 1. arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
> > Seems to be some interactive debugging facility. It appears that
> > the lockdown hook is called from interrupt context here, so it
> > should be more appropriate to request a global lockdown decision.
> > 2. fs/tracefs/inode.c:tracefs_create_file()
> > Here the call is used to prevent creating new tracefs entries when
> > the kernel is locked down. Assumes that locking down is one-way -
> > i.e. if the hook returns non-zero once, it will never return zero
> > again, thus no point in creating these files. Also, the hook is
> > often called by a module's init function when it is loaded by
> > userspace, where it doesn't make much sense to do a check against
> > the current task's creds, since the task itself doesn't actually
> > use the tracing functionality (i.e. doesn't breach lockdown), just
> > indirectly makes some new tracepoints available to whoever is
> > authorized to use them.
> > 3. net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:copy_to_user_*()
> > Here a cryptographic secret is redacted based on the value returned
> > from the hook. There are two possible actions that may lead here:
> > a) A netlink message XFRM_MSG_GETSA with NLM_F_DUMP set - here the
> > task context is relevant, since the dumped data is sent back to
> > the current task.
> > b) When adding/deleting/updating an SA via XFRM_MSG_xxxSA, the
> > dumped SA is broadcasted to tasks subscribed to XFRM events -
> > here the current task context is not relevant as it doesn't
> > represent the tasks that could potentially see the secret.
> > It doesn't seem worth it to try to keep using the current task's
> > context in the a) case, since the eventual data leak can be
> > circumvented anyway via b), plus there is no way for the task to
> > indicate that it doesn't care about the actual key value, so the
> > check could generate a lot of "false alert" denials with SELinux.
> > Thus, let's pass NULL instead of current_cred() here faute de
> > mieux.
> >
> > Improvements-suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> > Improvements-suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > Fixes: 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown")
> > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> [..]
> > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/mem.c b/drivers/cxl/mem.c
> > index 2acc6173da36..c1747b6555c7 100644
> > --- a/drivers/cxl/mem.c
> > +++ b/drivers/cxl/mem.c
> > @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static bool cxl_mem_raw_command_allowed(u16 opcode)
> > if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS))
> > return false;
> >
> > - if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_NONE))
> > + if (security_locked_down(current_cred(), LOCKDOWN_NONE))
>
> Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
>
> ...however that usage looks wrong. The expectation is that if kernel
> integrity protections are enabled then raw command access should be
> disabled. So I think that should be equivalent to LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS
> in terms of the command capabilities to filter.
Yes, the LOCKDOWN_NONE seems wrong here... but it's a pre-existing bug
and I didn't want to go down yet another rabbit hole trying to fix it.
I'll look at this again once this patch is settled - it may indeed be
as simple as replacing LOCKDOWN_NONE with LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS.
--
Ondrej Mosnacek
Software Engineer, Linux Security - SELinux kernel
Red Hat, Inc.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-31 9:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-16 8:51 [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-06-18 3:40 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-31 9:08 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-08-31 13:49 ` Paul Moore
2021-06-18 22:18 ` Dan Williams
2021-08-31 9:09 ` Ondrej Mosnacek [this message]
2021-08-31 13:53 ` Paul Moore
2021-08-31 18:58 ` Dan Williams
2021-08-31 18:59 ` Paul Moore
2021-06-19 17:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-07-13 2:34 ` Paul Moore
2021-06-21 8:35 ` Steffen Klassert
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to='CAFqZXNtuH0329Xvcb415Kar-=o6wwrkFuiP8BZ_2OQhHLqkkAg@mail.gmail.com' \
--to=omosnace@redhat.com \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-pm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-serial@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=steffen.klassert@secunet.com \
--cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).