From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.7 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1F225C5518A for ; Wed, 22 Apr 2020 12:20:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08AA720784 for ; Wed, 22 Apr 2020 12:20:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726998AbgDVMTs (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Apr 2020 08:19:48 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:53432 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-FAIL-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728871AbgDVMRy (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Apr 2020 08:17:54 -0400 Received: from Galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [IPv6:2a0a:51c0:0:12e:550::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6705FC03C1A8; Wed, 22 Apr 2020 05:17:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [5.158.153.53] (helo=tip-bot2.lab.linutronix.de) by Galois.linutronix.de with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1jREJw-00081i-M7; Wed, 22 Apr 2020 14:17:40 +0200 Received: from [127.0.1.1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by tip-bot2.lab.linutronix.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id A11E11C0450; Wed, 22 Apr 2020 14:17:33 +0200 (CEST) Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 12:17:33 -0000 From: "tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov" Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: perf/core] drivers/perf: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Cc: Alexey Budankov , James Morris , Will Deacon , Alexei Starovoitov , Andi Kleen , Igor Lubashev , Jiri Olsa , Namhyung Kim , Peter Zijlstra , Serge Hallyn , Song Liu , Stephane Eranian , Thomas Gleixner , intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , x86 , LKML In-Reply-To: <4ec1d6f7-548c-8d1c-f84a-cebeb9674e4e@linux.intel.com> References: <4ec1d6f7-548c-8d1c-f84a-cebeb9674e4e@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <158755785322.28353.1027174524920122867.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> X-Mailer: tip-git-log-daemon Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Linutronix-Spam-Score: -1.0 X-Linutronix-Spam-Level: - X-Linutronix-Spam-Status: No , -1.0 points, 5.0 required, ALL_TRUSTED=-1,SHORTCIRCUIT=-0.0001 Sender: linux-doc-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org The following commit has been merged into the perf/core branch of tip: Commit-ID: cea7d0d4a59b4efd0e1fe067130b4c06ab4d412f Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/cea7d0d4a59b4efd0e1fe067130b4c06ab4d412f Author: Alexey Budankov AuthorDate: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 11:51:21 +03:00 Committer: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo CommitterDate: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 12:19:09 -03:00 drivers/perf: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov Reviewed-by: James Morris Acked-by: Will Deacon Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Igor Lubashev Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: Song Liu Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4ec1d6f7-548c-8d1c-f84a-cebeb9674e4e@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo --- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c index b72c048..0e0961a 100644 --- a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +++ b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event) if (!attr->exclude_kernel) reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT); - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && perfmon_capable()) reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT); return reg; @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event) return -EOPNOTSUPP; reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event); - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && + if (!perfmon_capable() && (reg & (BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT) | BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT) | BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT))))