From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
x86-patch-review@intel.com
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2020 10:19:08 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200205181935.3712-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks
return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details can be found in "Intel
64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
This series depends on the XSAVES supervisor state series that was split
out and submitted earlier [2].
Changes from v8:
- Simplify signal handling code.
- Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack.
- Replace ELF parser with Dave Martin's patch [3].
The goal of this posting is to seek additional comments.
[1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32-
architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4
[2] XSAVES supervisor states patches:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200121201843.12047-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/
[3] Dave Martin's ELF program property parsing patch:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200122212144.6409-3-broonie@kernel.org/
[4] CET patches v8:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190813205225.12032-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190813205359.12196-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/
Dave Martin (1):
ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support
Yu-cheng Yu (26):
Documentation/x86: Add CET description
x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow
Enforcement Technology (CET)
x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states
x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack
protection
mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for Shadow Stack memory
Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack.
x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW
x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW
x86/mm: Update pte_modify, pmd_modify, and _PAGE_CHG_MASK for
_PAGE_DIRTY_SW
drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for
_PAGE_DIRTY_SW
x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
mm: Handle Shadow Stack page fault
mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB Shadow Stack page fault
mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for Shadow Stack
x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support
x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction
x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for Shadow Stack
ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties
binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND
ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack
x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread Shadow Stack
mm/mmap: Add Shadow Stack pages to memory accounting
x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +
Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 294 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 24 ++
arch/x86/Makefile | 7 +
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 17 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 44 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 +
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 22 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 5 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 18 +
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 197 +++++++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 50 ++-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 +
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 344 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 84 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 25 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 89 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 25 +-
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 +
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 12 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 31 ++
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 10 +
arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 59 +++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 18 +
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 2 +
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 41 +++
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +-
fs/Kconfig.binfmt | 3 +
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 131 +++++++
fs/compat_binfmt_elf.c | 4 +
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h | 40 ++
include/linux/elf.h | 33 ++
include/linux/mm.h | 28 +-
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +-
include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 12 +
mm/gup.c | 8 +-
mm/huge_memory.c | 12 +-
mm/memory.c | 7 +-
mm/mmap.c | 5 +
.../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
57 files changed, 1779 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
--
2.21.0
next reply other threads:[~2020-02-05 18:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-05 18:19 Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-06 0:16 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-02-06 20:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-28 15:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 17:57 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 17:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 17:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:27 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-09 19:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 19:50 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 20:54 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 20:59 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 21:12 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 22:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-09 22:19 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-09 23:51 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-09 23:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10 0:08 ` H.J. Lu
2020-03-10 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-10 2:13 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:02 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/27] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:10 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-05 20:44 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 17:03 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-26 19:57 ` Pavel Machek
2020-03-05 20:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 18:05 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 1:02 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 1:16 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-27 2:11 ` H.J. Lu
2020-02-27 3:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-27 18:03 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 18:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-03-06 19:02 ` Dave Hansen
2020-03-06 21:16 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for Shadow Stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:07 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/27] Add guard pages around a Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:11 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:17 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 18:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 21:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-01 19:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-01 19:22 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/27] x86/mm: Update pte_modify, pmd_modify, and _PAGE_CHG_MASK for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-26 22:02 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/27] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:13 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-03 15:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:14 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:20 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-26 22:47 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/27] mm: Handle Shadow Stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27 0:08 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-07 18:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-04-07 22:21 ` Dave Hansen
2020-04-08 18:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 20:59 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-13 22:00 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-27 0:34 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 17/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode Shadow Stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-27 0:55 ` Dave Hansen
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:10 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-05 18:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 20/27] ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 21/27] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:18 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 22/27] ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:20 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 23/27] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:22 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 25/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:29 ` Kees Cook
2020-03-25 21:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 26/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow Stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-05 18:19 ` [RFC PATCH v9 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-02-25 21:31 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: " Kees Cook
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