From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: [RFC PATCH 11/12] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 15:43:16 -0400 Message-ID: <20200325194317.526492-12-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200325194317.526492-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> Prior to running the next kernel via kexec, the Secure Launch code closes down private SMX resources and does an SEXIT. This allows the next kernel to start normally without any issues starting the APs etc. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/kexec_core.c | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c index fea15b0e36b7..516964408fe5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c @@ -633,3 +633,68 @@ static void __exit slaunch_exit(void) late_initcall(slaunch_late_init); __exitcall(slaunch_exit); + +static inline void txt_getsec_sexit(void) +{ + asm volatile (".byte 0x0f,0x37\n" + : : "a" (SMX_X86_GETSEC_SEXIT)); +} + +void slaunch_sexit(void) +{ + void __iomem *config; + u64 one = 1, val; + + if (!(slaunch_get_flags() & (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE|SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT))) + return; + + if (smp_processor_id() != 0) { + pr_err("Error TXT SEXIT must be called on CPU 0\n"); + return; + } + + config = ioremap(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) { + pr_err("Error SEXIT failed to ioremap TXT private reqs\n"); + return; + } + + /* Clear secrets bit for SEXIT */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_NO_SECRETS, &one, sizeof(u64)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(u64)); + + /* Unlock memory configurations */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG, &one, sizeof(u64)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(u64)); + + /* Close the TXT private register space */ + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(u64)); + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_CLOSE_PRIVATE, &one, sizeof(u64)); + + /* + * Calls to iounmap are not being done because of the state of the + * system this late in the kexec process. Local IRQs are disabled and + * iounmap causes a TLB flush which in turn causes a warning. Leaving + * thse mappings is not an issue since the next kernel is going to + * completely re-setup memory management. + */ + + /* Map public registers and do a final read fence */ + config = ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) { + pr_err("Error SEXIT failed to ioremap TXT public reqs\n"); + return; + } + + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(u64)); + + /* Disable SMX mode */ + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMXE); + + /* Do the SEXIT SMX operation */ + txt_getsec_sexit(); + + pr_emerg("TXT SEXIT complete."); +} diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c index 15d70a90b50d..08105eeebf90 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/frame.h> +#include <linux/slaunch.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/sections.h> @@ -1173,6 +1174,8 @@ int kernel_kexec(void) cpu_hotplug_enable(); pr_emerg("Starting new kernel\n"); machine_shutdown(); + + slaunch_sexit(); } machine_kexec(kexec_image); -- 2.25.1
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-03-25 19:43 [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson 2020-03-26 18:06 ` Daniel Kiper 2020-03-26 19:42 ` Ross Philipson 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson 2020-03-26 19:00 ` Daniel Kiper 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson 2020-03-26 3:44 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-03-26 22:49 ` Daniel P. Smith 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] x86: Add early TPM TIS/CRB interface support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] x86: Add early TPM1.2/TPM2.0 " Ross Philipson 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] x86: Add early general TPM " Ross Philipson 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] x86: Secure Launch adding event log securityfs Ross Philipson 2020-03-25 20:21 ` Matthew Garrett 2020-03-25 21:43 ` Daniel P. Smith 2020-03-25 19:43 ` Ross Philipson [this message] 2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson 2020-03-25 20:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support Matthew Garrett 2020-03-25 22:51 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-03-26 20:50 ` Daniel P. Smith 2020-03-26 23:13 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-05-11 19:00 ` Daniel P. Smith 2020-03-26 13:40 ` Daniel Kiper 2020-03-26 20:19 ` Matthew Garrett 2020-03-26 20:33 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-03-26 20:40 ` Matthew Garrett 2020-03-26 20:59 ` Daniel P. Smith 2020-03-26 21:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-03-26 21:28 ` Matthew Garrett 2020-03-26 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-03-26 22:59 ` Matthew Garrett 2020-03-26 23:04 ` Andy Lutomirski 2020-03-27 0:01 ` Daniel P. Smith 2020-03-26 23:50 ` Daniel P. Smith 2020-05-11 19:00 ` Daniel P. Smith 2020-03-26 20:50 ` Daniel P. Smith 2020-03-26 20:54 ` Matthew Garrett 2020-03-26 22:37 ` Daniel P. Smith 2020-03-26 22:41 ` Matthew Garrett 2020-03-26 23:55 ` Daniel P. Smith
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