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From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
	Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>,
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>, Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, timmurray@google.com,
	minchan@google.com, sspatil@google.com, lokeshgidra@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] Add a new sysctl knob: unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only
Date: Fri, 8 May 2020 12:54:03 -0400
Message-ID: <20200508125314-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200508125054-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>

On Fri, May 08, 2020 at 12:52:34PM -0400, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 05:26:32PM -0700, Daniel Colascione wrote:
> > This sysctl can be set to either zero or one. When zero (the default)
> > the system lets all users call userfaultfd with or without
> > UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY, modulo other access controls. When
> > unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only is set to one, users without
> > CAP_SYS_PTRACE must pass UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY to userfaultfd or the API
> > will fail with EPERM. This facility allows administrators to reduce
> > the likelihood that an attacker with access to userfaultfd can delay
> > faulting kernel code to widen timing windows for other exploits.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
> 
> The approach taken looks like a hard-coded security policy.
> For example, it won't be possible to set the sysctl knob
> in question on any sytem running kvm. So this is
> no good for any general purpose system.
> 
> What's wrong with using a security policy for this instead?

In fact I see the original thread already mentions selinux,
so it's just a question of making this controllable by
selinux.

> 
> 
> > ---
> >  Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 13 +++++++++++++
> >  fs/userfaultfd.c                        | 11 ++++++++++-
> >  include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h           |  1 +
> >  kernel/sysctl.c                         |  9 +++++++++
> >  4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst
> > index 0329a4d3fa9e..4296b508ab74 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst
> > @@ -850,6 +850,19 @@ privileged users (with SYS_CAP_PTRACE capability).
> >  
> >  The default value is 1.
> >  
> > +unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only
> > +========================================
> > +
> > +This flag controls whether unprivileged users can use the userfaultfd
> > +system calls to handle page faults in kernel mode.  If set to zero,
> > +userfaultfd works with or without UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY, modulo
> > +unprivileged_userfaultfd above.  If set to one, users without
> > +SYS_CAP_PTRACE must pass UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY in order for userfaultfd
> > +to succeed.  Prohibiting use of userfaultfd for handling faults from
> > +kernel mode may make certain vulnerabilities more difficult
> > +to exploit.
> > +
> > +The default value is 0.
> >  
> >  user_reserve_kbytes
> >  ===================
> > diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> > index 21378abe8f7b..85cc1ab74361 100644
> > --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
> > +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
> >  #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
> >  
> >  int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd __read_mostly = 1;
> > +int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only __read_mostly = 0;
> >  
> >  static struct kmem_cache *userfaultfd_ctx_cachep __read_mostly;
> >  
> > @@ -2009,8 +2010,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
> >  	static const int uffd_flags = UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY;
> >  	struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
> >  	int fd;
> > +	bool need_cap_check = false;
> >  
> > -	if (!sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> > +	if (!sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd)
> > +		need_cap_check = true;
> > +
> > +	if (sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only &&
> > +	    (flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY) == 0)
> > +		need_cap_check = true;
> > +
> > +	if (need_cap_check && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
> >  		return -EPERM;
> >  
> >  	BUG_ON(!current->mm);
> > diff --git a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
> > index a8e5f3ea9bb2..d81e30074bf5 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h
> > @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
> >  #define UFFD_FLAGS_SET (EFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS)
> >  
> >  extern int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd;
> > +extern int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only;
> >  
> >  extern vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason);
> >  
> > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > index 8a176d8727a3..9cbdf4483961 100644
> > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > @@ -1719,6 +1719,15 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
> >  		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
> >  		.extra2		= SYSCTL_ONE,
> >  	},
> > +	{
> > +		.procname	= "unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only",
> > +		.data		= &sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only,
> > +		.maxlen		= sizeof(sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only),
> > +		.mode		= 0644,
> > +		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
> > +		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
> > +		.extra2		= SYSCTL_ONE,
> > +	},
> >  #endif
> >  	{ }
> >  };
> > -- 
> > 2.26.2.303.gf8c07b1a785-goog
> > 


  reply index

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-23  0:26 [PATCH 0/2] Control over userfaultfd kernel-fault handling Daniel Colascione
2020-04-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 1/2] Add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY Daniel Colascione
2020-07-24 14:28   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-07-24 14:46     ` Lokesh Gidra
2020-07-26 10:09       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-04-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 2/2] Add a new sysctl knob: unprivileged_userfaultfd_user_mode_only Daniel Colascione
2020-05-06 19:38   ` Peter Xu
2020-05-07 19:15     ` Jonathan Corbet
2020-05-20  4:06       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-05-08 16:52   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-05-08 16:54     ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2020-05-20  4:59       ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-05-20 18:03         ` Kees Cook
2020-05-20 19:48           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-05-20 19:51             ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-05-20 20:17               ` Lokesh Gidra
2020-05-20 21:16                 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-07-17 12:57                   ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2020-07-23 17:30                     ` Lokesh Gidra
2020-07-24  0:13                       ` Nick Kralevich
2020-07-24 13:40                         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-08-06  0:43                           ` Nick Kralevich
2020-08-06  5:44                             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-08-17 22:11                               ` Lokesh Gidra
2020-09-04  3:34                                 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-09-05  0:36                                   ` Lokesh Gidra
2020-09-19 18:14                                     ` Nick Kralevich
2020-07-24 14:01 ` [PATCH 0/2] Control over userfaultfd kernel-fault handling Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-07-24 14:41   ` Lokesh Gidra

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