From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF4A5C433F5 for ; Thu, 30 Dec 2021 17:20:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239703AbhL3RUG (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Dec 2021 12:20:06 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48870 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236737AbhL3RUF (ORCPT ); Thu, 30 Dec 2021 12:20:05 -0500 Received: from mail-wr1-x436.google.com (mail-wr1-x436.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::436]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 39581C061574; Thu, 30 Dec 2021 09:20:05 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-wr1-x436.google.com with SMTP id v7so51567643wrv.12; Thu, 30 Dec 2021 09:20:05 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=n/qQDXJk2QbH2NGsjvFVJ3ub2PnKBdYzofoYgc2mPZM=; b=XrPlU1tx5TWNnHIjx83NHVcOfK6mlpBbpa6/8BUJlN94o4v8Y0mSY0zGWEf/hGvZ9L DtR0hvQ63iuj7i0ayJrqmb+dj1HaPslKmm795bNWjD7ajEfs4yLRZSdKoGr/Lklc+wA/ hKQOvcEIw8ryMt+CytyyTcPTsXoMeJW8QbdN6zhq7XW7v2/eLicw3a+RobJCX4ayad90 dctaa8htJdCK+U74RtDAlXV29k531+mjLHI88wdd09vc4jWFU3rUZC+EyJKOqBiyDl4g /ksAJG5UnfZGR2ybxW+YzobTlY1thsuJX02rNtDadTQcQZDm2asOTq+Ao1fXlvgFCc3L F6TA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=n/qQDXJk2QbH2NGsjvFVJ3ub2PnKBdYzofoYgc2mPZM=; b=dCgEpLazT4ol3l6cQZCtnFYSTsBOO+QY7cyF/GzK2si21CuJQRxQmxU90Yn7kVXazT saOHmF2rNeXCEbGBGvDd1tB+Yz55cVB5AlEr6HQkU1lBBFnEGVarESra91jz/Wz0+13s 5b+bxa9D5WEsIR7G7bJiuPr/l7PaXtuzccYR0+DzHcJvpX5tzasBRH46HF66JnKOGPvP Af8Rol6ulUDAH8HkwQsoSW2ljEmHGZKU5RURnmO7Fdw5tZwYJfpvTqjpRyJek+97eHb7 MJCZXkI2i5gVk/l3th8EMPl75/yr4DSA288haITeZi0Z6jM6oOUESoBb6v0cV8fgacz9 5vnA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM53377+JEqXV48R/DdLGPy6HW39JHpBKCgdh4QZhvqWQ9CQvhfeVp t2+0flV4BbGplwpYW5SzRDAVwlnMtWQ= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz7pk+TZP3KIA3Wu6oebLD35Y7oBH4hmjvWmB6lCBLzTaBGLJqkAUgaOh9+sgYOQjuXLiFIXg== X-Received: by 2002:a5d:448f:: with SMTP id j15mr26833990wrq.603.1640884803135; Thu, 30 Dec 2021 09:20:03 -0800 (PST) Received: from felia.fritz.box ([2001:16b8:2657:9600:789b:54e9:fc28:95aa]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id z5sm23709975wru.87.2021.12.30.09.20.01 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 30 Dec 2021 09:20:02 -0800 (PST) From: Lukas Bulwahn To: Andi Kleen , Randy Dunlap , Thomas Gleixner , Tim Chen , Jonathan Corbet , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Lukas Bulwahn Subject: [PATCH] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 18:19:40 +0100 Message-Id: <20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within the same sentence. Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to the config that provides that. Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre") Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index ab7d402c1677..a2b22d5640ec 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2 before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits using the firmware. - Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes attacks on the kernel generally more difficult. -- 2.17.1